Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Wilbur Morrison, Jr. was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child in Indian territory and one count of assault resulting in serious bodily injury. The district court sentenced him to 480 months’ imprisonment for the sexual abuse counts and 120 months for the assault count, to run concurrently. The court also imposed concurrent supervised release terms of five years for the sexual abuse counts and three years for the assault count, but the written judgment incorrectly stated five years for all counts.Morrison appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by admitting a forensic interview and accompanying testimony, that the evidence was insufficient to convict him on the sexual abuse counts, that his sentence was substantively unreasonable, and that the written judgment conflicted with the oral pronouncement of his sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the forensic interview under the residual exception to the hearsay rule, as it had sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to support Morrison’s convictions for both counts of aggravated sexual abuse, based on the testimonies of the children and the medical evidence presented. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Morrison to 480 months’ imprisonment, as it properly considered the relevant factors.However, the court agreed with Morrison that the written judgment conflicted with the oral pronouncement regarding the terms of supervised release. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions on the admission of evidence, the convictions, and the sentence of imprisonment, but vacated the terms of supervised release and remanded the case for the district court to amend its written judgment to conform to its oral pronouncement. View "United States v. Morrison" on Justia Law

In late October 2021, Shamsa Issack was sitting in her car in Fargo, North Dakota, when a man, later identified as Sharmake Mohamed Abdullahi, approached her with a gun and forced her to drive to Moorhead, Minnesota. After attempting to withdraw money from an ATM unsuccessfully, Abdullahi took Issack's cell phone and fled. Issack sought help from bank employees, who called the police. Abdullahi was later arrested and charged with state robbery and kidnapping.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota admitted Issack's statements to bank employees as excited utterances and allowed the jury to hear part of a recording of Issack's conversation with police before striking it from the record. Abdullahi's motion for a mistrial was denied, and he was convicted by a jury of kidnapping and attempted witness tampering. The district court sentenced him to 180 months' imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the kidnapping conviction, finding sufficient evidence that Abdullahi's actions constituted kidnapping under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1). However, the court vacated the attempted witness tampering conviction, concluding that the government failed to prove that Abdullahi contemplated a particular, foreseeable federal proceeding when he made phone calls from state custody. The court held that Abdullahi's actions did not meet the statutory definition of attempted witness tampering under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(b)(1) and 2. View "United States v. Abdullahi" on Justia Law

B.J.S., a Native American born in 2004, was charged with multiple acts of aggravated sexual abuse against his younger sister L.S. between August 2019 and June 2022, when he was 15 to 17 years old. The government filed a juvenile information and moved to transfer the proceedings to adult court. The charges included causing L.S. to engage in sexual acts by force, engaging in sexual acts with L.S. under 12, and causing sexual contact with L.S. under 12 with intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse sexual desire.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota granted the government's motion to transfer the case to adult court. B.J.S. moved to dismiss the transfer motion, arguing that the charges did not qualify as "crimes of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 5032. The district court denied his motion and granted the transfer after an evidentiary hearing. B.J.S. appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the charges under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), 2241(c), and 2244(a)(5) did not qualify as "crimes of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). The court applied the categorical approach, considering only the statutory elements of the offenses. It found that § 2241(a) was overbroad and indivisible, covering more conduct than § 16(a). Similarly, § 2241(c) and § 2244(a)(5) did not require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person. Consequently, the court concluded that none of the charges met the definition of a "crime of violence" for purposes of § 5032 permissive transfer.The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case, determining that the transfer to adult court was not justified. View "United States v. B.J.S." on Justia Law

Laguerre Payen, a federal inmate, was convicted in 2010 of multiple terrorism-related charges and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. During his incarceration, Payen exhibited disruptive and dangerous behavior, including numerous assaults, threats, and other violations. He was diagnosed with schizophrenia and mild intellectual disability and was committed twice under 18 U.S.C. § 4245 for mental health treatment. Despite some improvement, Payen's behavior remained inconsistent, and he refused medication after his commitments ended.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri committed Payen under 18 U.S.C. § 4246, finding by clear and convincing evidence that his release would pose a substantial risk of bodily injury or serious property damage due to his mental illness. Payen appealed, arguing that the district court relied on erroneous facts and that the government failed to prove his dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's finding of dangerousness for clear error. The court noted that the district court had relied on the unanimous opinions of experts, including an independent evaluator, who diagnosed Payen with schizophrenia and intellectual disability and concluded that his release would pose a substantial risk. The court also considered Payen's extensive history of violent and disruptive behavior, his refusal to take medication voluntarily, and the lack of a suitable release plan.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding no clear error in the determination that Payen's release would create a substantial risk of harm to others or their property. The court emphasized that the district court had properly focused on the expert reports and Payen's history of dangerous behavior in making its decision. View "United States v. Payen" on Justia Law

In 2020, Mujera Benjamin Lung’aho threw Molotov cocktails that damaged or destroyed three police cars belonging to state and municipal police departments. He was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 844(f)(1) for maliciously destroying law enforcement vehicles possessed by local police departments receiving federal financial assistance. Lung’aho moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas denied Lung’aho’s motion to dismiss. The court held that while the Property Clause did not apply because the police cars were not federal property and were not bought with federal financial assistance, the prosecution was constitutional under the Spending Clause coupled with the Necessary and Proper Clause.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss de novo. The court held that Lung’aho’s conduct fell within the plain meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 844(f)(1) and that the statute was constitutional as applied to him. The court reasoned that under the Spending Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress has the authority to ensure that federal funds are spent for the general welfare, and criminalizing the arson of police cars from departments receiving federal funding is a rational means of safeguarding federal dollars. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that § 844(f)(1) was constitutionally applied to Lung’aho. View "United States v. Lung'aho" on Justia Law

Deoman Reeves was convicted by a jury of eleven counts related to narcotics and firearms offenses. The charges stemmed from a series of events in 2019, including a shooting incident in University City, Missouri, and subsequent involvement in drug and firearms trafficking. Reeves was identified as a primary suspect in the shooting and was linked to a narcotics trafficking organization. He was involved in a retaliatory shooting that resulted in the death of a bystander, David Anderson, whom Reeves mistakenly believed to be a rival drug trafficker. Reeves was later involved in several controlled buys of fentanyl and firearms set up by ATF agents.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri denied several of Reeves's pretrial motions, including a motion to suppress location data obtained from his cellphones and a motion to sever the count charging him with possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime resulting in death. The district court also denied Reeves's motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial. Reeves was sentenced to life imprisonment on one count, 120 months on seven counts to be served concurrently, and 60 months on three counts to be served consecutively.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and found no reversible error. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion or plainly err in denying the motion to sever, as the offenses were connected to the same drug trafficking conspiracy. The court also upheld the denial of the motion to suppress, finding that the warrants were supported by probable cause and sufficiently particular. The court affirmed the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal, concluding that sufficient evidence supported the convictions. Finally, the court determined that Reeves waived his challenges to the jury instructions by not objecting during the trial. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Reeves" on Justia Law

Alexander Laurel-Olea pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as an unlawful user of a controlled substance and was sentenced to twenty-four months’ imprisonment and thirty-six months of supervised release. After serving his sentence, he began his supervised release on August 30, 2022. In June 2024, he was arrested for committing fifty-four violations of his supervised release conditions. The district court sentenced him to fourteen months’ imprisonment and a one-year term of supervised release.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa determined that the advisory guideline range for Laurel-Olea’s violations was three to nine months’ imprisonment. The court considered both mitigating and aggravating factors. Mitigating factors included his age, lack of adult criminal history, mental health and substance abuse issues, and acceptance of responsibility. Aggravating factors included his involvement in a dangerous shooting, fifty-four violations of release conditions, becoming a fugitive, and failing to meet his restitution obligation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Laurel-Olea argued that his sentence was unreasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), claiming it was disproportionate and did not account for his mental health issues, background, and potential for reintegration. The appellate court applied a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, noting that it is rare to reverse a district court sentence as substantively unreasonable.The Eighth Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The court had considered relevant factors and provided a reasoned explanation for the upward variance from nine to fourteen months, including credit for accepting responsibility. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Laurel-Olea" on Justia Law

Moses Crowe was convicted of aiding and abetting a carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury, aiding and abetting the use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon. The incident involved Crowe and his accomplices forcing Phillip Moore at gunpoint to drive a van, assaulting him, and subsequently beating him unconscious. Crowe was sentenced to 235 months’ imprisonment.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota initially sentenced Crowe, applying a four-level increase under the sentencing guidelines for abduction. Crowe appealed, arguing that the court erred in applying this increase and improperly considered conduct not relevant to his sentencing guideline range. The court also remanded for resentencing after vacating one of Crowe’s convictions and reducing it to a lesser charge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court properly considered Crowe’s conduct at Nike Road under the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and correctly applied the four-level increase for abduction. The court determined that Moore was abducted to facilitate the escape from the carjacking scene, thus justifying the increase. Additionally, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Crowe within the advisory range and adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding Crowe’s 235-month sentence. View "United States v. Crowe" on Justia Law

Robert Cottier was driving with a suspended license and a high blood alcohol concentration when he collided head-on with Cheryl Cross' vehicle, causing serious injuries to Cross and her passengers. Cottier's passenger, Harold Long Soldier, died from the crash. Cottier was charged with involuntary manslaughter and four counts of assault resulting in serious bodily injury. He pleaded guilty to the manslaughter charge and one count of assault.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota accepted Cottier's guilty plea. The plea agreement included a government recommendation for sentences within the applicable Guideline range to run consecutively. The Presentence Investigation Report calculated a total offense level of 21, resulting in a guideline range of 37-46 months. The government’s Sentencing Memorandum recommended a 73-month sentence, which Cottier argued breached the plea agreement. The district court varied upwards and sentenced Cottier to 96 months, explaining the decision was based on the severity of the injuries and Cottier's history of DUI offenses.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Cottier argued that the government breached the plea agreement by recommending a 73-month sentence. The court found no breach, noting that the government’s final position at the sentencing hearing aligned with the plea agreement. The court also determined that any potential breach in the Sentencing Memorandum did not affect the district court’s decision to impose a 96-month sentence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that the government honored its plea agreement obligations and that the district court’s sentence was justified. View "United States v. Cottier" on Justia Law

Melissa Wanna discovered her profile on MyLife, an information broker, which contained a poor reputation score and references to court records. MyLife offered to provide details or remove the profile for a fee. Believing she lost employment opportunities due to this profile, Wanna filed a class action lawsuit against several Lexis entities, alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), and the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), along with several Minnesota state law claims.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed Wanna’s claims, concluding that MyLife was not Lexis’s agent. The court found that the data-licensing agreement between Lexis and MyLife explicitly stated that their relationship was that of independent contractors, not principal and agent. As a result, Wanna’s federal claims, which depended on an agency relationship, failed. The district court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Wanna’s state law claims and dismissed them without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo and affirmed the dismissal. The appellate court agreed that Wanna’s federal claims required an agency relationship between Lexis and MyLife, which was not established. The court found that MyLife did not have actual or apparent authority to act on Lexis’s behalf, nor did Lexis ratify MyLife’s actions. Additionally, the appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. View "Wanna v. RELX Group, PLC" on Justia Law