Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Aaron Cardinale was stopped by Omaha police officers after they observed him allegedly failing to signal a left turn at least 100 feet in advance, as required by Nebraska law. During the stop, a K-9 unit detected drugs in his vehicle, leading to his arrest and subsequent indictment for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Cardinale moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska denied Cardinale's motion to suppress. The court found that the officers had a reasonable belief that Cardinale violated the traffic signal law based on Officer Cleveland's testimony. The court reviewed video evidence and other exhibits but concluded that the evidence did not clearly show the officer's belief was unreasonable. Cardinale's motion to reconsider was also denied, with the court reiterating that the entire record supported the officer's reasonable suspicion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Cardinale argued that the government did not present sufficient historical facts to justify the stop and that Officer Cleveland's testimony was too conclusory. The appellate court upheld the district court's decision, noting that the officer's testimony was credible and supported by the record. The court emphasized that reasonable suspicion does not require precise measurements or perfect knowledge, only that the officer's belief was reasonable under the circumstances. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Cardinale's motion to suppress evidence. View "United States v. Cardinale" on Justia Law

In this case, law enforcement in Little Rock, Arkansas, conducted a sting operation targeting illegal prostitution, which led to the arrest of A.B., a woman working for Deonte Womack. Initially, A.B. did not identify Womack, but after suffering physical abuse from him, she later cooperated with authorities. The FBI’s investigation revealed that Womack managed a prostitution ring involving at least twelve women, exerting control through violence, threats, and financial manipulation. Womack was arrested and charged with three counts of sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion, and one count of witness intimidation.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas presided over Womack’s trial. The court allowed testimony from a woman, C.C., about uncharged conduct under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), with a limiting instruction to the jury. At the close of the government’s case, the district court granted Womack’s motion for judgment of acquittal on one sex trafficking count and the witness intimidation count, but denied it as to the remaining two sex trafficking counts. The court also denied Womack’s request for a lesser included offense jury instruction and sentenced him to 235 months’ imprisonment, applying a base offense level of 34 under the sentencing guidelines.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed four issues. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting C.C.’s testimony under Rule 404(b), nor in denying the lesser included offense instruction, and found sufficient evidence supported the convictions. However, the appellate court concluded that the district court erred in calculating the base offense level at sentencing, as Womack was not convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1). The court affirmed the convictions but remanded the case for resentencing with the correct base offense level. View "United States v. Womack" on Justia Law

Lonnie Parker, a licensed medical practitioner, was found guilty by a jury of distributing oxycodone and promethazine HCl with codeine solution in a manner unauthorized by the Controlled Substances Act. The case began when an individual named N.C. was pulled over for reckless driving, found impaired, and later died in custody. The DEA suspected Parker of operating a "pill mill" and seized patient records from his clinic. An expert reviewed these records and found that Parker had prescribed controlled substances inappropriately.The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas sentenced Parker to 87 months’ imprisonment. Parker appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, the jury instructions were improper, and the district court committed procedural error in sentencing. The district court had calculated Parker’s base offense level by including uncharged prescriptions as relevant conduct, resulting in a total offense level of 30 and an advisory sentencing guidelines range of 108 to 135 months. The court varied downwards to 87 months.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support Parker’s convictions, as the expert testimony provided enough basis for the jury to conclude that Parker prescribed controlled substances without a legitimate medical purpose. The court also found no plain error in the jury instructions, noting that the instructions as a whole clarified the requirements for criminal conduct. Finally, the court determined that any potential error in calculating the quantity of controlled substances for sentencing was harmless, as the district court stated it would have imposed the same sentence regardless. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Parker" on Justia Law

Shue Moua was convicted by a jury of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The conviction stemmed from a traffic stop conducted by Deputy Nils Hansen, who observed Moua's erratic behavior at a gas station and suspected she was impaired. During the stop, Hansen noted several signs of impairment and discovered methamphetamine in Moua's vehicle during an inventory search after her arrest.Moua moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search, arguing that the traffic stop was invalid and unreasonably prolonged. A magistrate judge recommended granting the motion, finding that Hansen lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop. However, the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota overruled this recommendation, concluding that Hansen had reasonable suspicion based on Moua's impaired behavior and vehicle registration issues. The district court also found that the stop was not unreasonably extended. Moua was subsequently convicted and sentenced to 72 months' imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the district court's decision. The appellate court found that Deputy Hansen had reasonable suspicion to stop Moua's vehicle based on her erratic driving and the absence of visible registration tags. The court also determined that the stop was not unreasonably prolonged, as Hansen's suspicions evolved during the encounter, justifying further investigation. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Moua's motion to suppress and upheld her conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Moua" on Justia Law

Verlynin Buckley pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court determined that he was an armed career criminal and sentenced him to 180 months in prison. Buckley appealed, arguing that the court erred in deeming him an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which mandates a minimum of fifteen years in prison for defendants with three or more prior convictions for a violent felony or a serious drug offense.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas held that Buckley’s prior Arkansas convictions for possessing cocaine with the intent to deliver and for delivering cocaine were serious drug offenses under the ACCA. Buckley conceded that his prior convictions involved prohibited activity subjecting him to ten or more years in prison but contended that his prior convictions did not involve a controlled substance as defined by federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and rejected Buckley’s argument. The court held that the Arkansas statutes under which Buckley was convicted did not incorporate the state’s drug schedules but instead referred to cocaine in its ordinary sense. The court found no reason to believe that Arkansas intended to define cocaine more broadly than federal law. Consequently, Buckley’s prior cocaine convictions were deemed serious drug offenses under the ACCA. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, upholding Buckley’s sentence as an armed career criminal. View "United States v. Buckley" on Justia Law

Justin Johnson, a pretrial detainee at Jefferson County Jail, was attacked by two other inmates while in protective custody. Johnson sued correctional officers Jacob Schurman and Christopher Taylor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to protect him and for negligence under Missouri law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers, finding that qualified immunity barred the § 1983 claims and that official immunity and the public duty doctrine barred the negligence claims.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri determined that Johnson could not show a constitutional violation necessary to overcome qualified immunity. The court found no evidence that the officers were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm, as the attackers were not known to be violent, and Johnson had no prior relationship with them. The court also dismissed the negligence claims, ruling that the officers were protected by official immunity because their actions were discretionary, not ministerial. Additionally, the court found that the public duty doctrine applied, as the officers owed no particular duty to Johnson beyond that owed to the general prison population.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, as Johnson failed to show that they were deliberately indifferent to a known risk. The court also upheld the dismissal of the negligence claims, concluding that the officers' actions involved discretionary decisions protected by official immunity. The court did not address the public duty doctrine, as the official immunity finding was sufficient to resolve the negligence claims. View "Johnson v. Schurman" on Justia Law

The case concerns Erik J. Vivier, who was accused of engaging in sexual acts with J.M., a 15-year-old girl, while she was allegedly incapacitated due to alcohol consumption. J.M. testified that she felt dizzy, nauseous, and not in control of her body after drinking, and described being invited into Vivier’s home, given more alcohol, and then sexually assaulted while in a spare bedroom. Vivier initially denied knowing J.M., then changed his account multiple times, eventually admitting to a sexual act but claiming he was not in the right state of mind. Other witnesses present at the home offered limited observations, and the government’s case relied heavily on J.M.’s testimony and Vivier’s inconsistent statements.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota presided over the trial, where a jury convicted Vivier of sexual abuse of an incapacitated victim and sexual abuse of a minor. Vivier moved for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of sexual abuse of an incapacitated victim, arguing insufficient evidence of J.M.’s incapacity and his knowledge thereof. The district court denied this motion. During trial, Vivier also objected to the testimony of an FBI agent who opined on Vivier’s truthfulness, arguing it was undisclosed expert testimony. The district court denied the motion to strike but issued a curative instruction, partially adopting Vivier’s proposed language.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. The court held that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that J.M. was incapacitated and that Vivier knew of her incapacity. The court also found that, although the district court erred in its curative instruction regarding the agent’s opinion testimony, this did not affect Vivier’s substantial rights. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Vivier" on Justia Law

Jimmy Hudson pled guilty to a drug distribution charge after selling fentanyl to a confidential informant. He was indicted and, as part of a plea agreement, pled guilty to one count of distributing fentanyl. The plea agreement noted that Hudson might be labeled a career offender, which would increase his sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG). The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) confirmed Hudson's status as a career offender due to his prior felony convictions for controlled substance offenses, resulting in a sentencing range of 151 to 188 months. The Government recommended a 151-month sentence, which the district court adopted.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri sentenced Hudson to 151 months’ imprisonment, considering the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and Hudson's status as a career offender. The court noted Hudson's criminal history and the need for a sentence that was sufficient but not greater than necessary. Hudson also received a 24-month sentence for violating supervised release terms, but he did not appeal that sentence.Hudson appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, arguing that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. He contended that his career offender status unfairly increased his sentencing range because his prior convictions were non-violent drug offenses. The Eighth Circuit reviewed the substantive reasonableness of the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard and found that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The court noted that the district court had considered Hudson's individual characteristics and the dangerousness of fentanyl. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the 151-month sentence was not substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Hudson" on Justia Law

River Smith pled guilty to unlawful possession of a machine gun and was sentenced to 80 months of imprisonment. The FBI began investigating Smith after receiving a tip about his suspicious activities at a shooting range. Smith expressed violent and prejudicial views, showed interest in firearms, and discussed plans to obtain illegal weapons. He was arrested after purchasing auto sears and inert grenades from an undercover source. Smith's residence contained a large cache of firearms and ammunition, and his devices revealed searches and communications related to mass shootings and violence.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota sentenced Smith to 80 months of imprisonment, denying a reduction for acceptance of responsibility and applying enhancements for the number of firearms and destructive devices involved. The court also imposed special conditions on Smith's supervised release, including restrictions on internet and social media use, and possession of extremist materials. Smith appealed, challenging the denial of the reduction, the enhancements, the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, and the special conditions of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the reduction for acceptance of responsibility, finding no clear error. It upheld the enhancements related to the grenades, concluding that Smith intended to purchase live grenades. The court also found the 80-month sentence substantively reasonable, given Smith's conduct and potential threat to society. However, the court vacated three special conditions of supervised release, finding them overly restrictive and not reasonably necessary to achieve sentencing goals. The case was remanded for resentencing consistent with the opinion. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Markhel D’John Harris-Franklin was charged with being an armed career criminal in possession of ammunition, violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). He moved to dismiss the indictment, alleging a violation of the Speedy Trial Act and that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. The district court denied his motions, and he was found guilty by a jury.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota initially handled the case. Harris-Franklin made multiple motions to extend the time for filing pretrial motions, which the court granted, finding that the ends of justice served by the continuances outweighed the best interests of the public and Harris-Franklin in a speedy trial. After a competency evaluation and the appointment of new counsel, Harris-Franklin moved to dismiss the indictment for violation of the Speedy Trial Act and challenged the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The magistrate judge recommended denying the motions, and the district court adopted this recommendation. Harris-Franklin did not renew his motion to dismiss before trial, and he was convicted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Harris-Franklin’s rights under the Speedy Trial Act were not violated, as the district court properly excluded certain periods of delay from the 70-day calculation. The court also found that circuit precedent foreclosed Harris-Franklin’s Second Amendment argument, affirming the district court’s denial of his motions to dismiss. The court concluded that the ends-of-justice continuances granted by the district court were reasonable and necessary to allow new counsel time to prepare for trial. View "United States v. Harris-Franklin" on Justia Law