Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Defendant of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine. Defendant argued that the district court erred in overruling his Batson objection, abused its discretion in admitting parts of the government’s expert witness’s testimony, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction. Defendant’s failure to lodge an objection at trial resulted in the waiver of his Batson claim. Regarding the government’s witness, the court held that any error in admitting the testimony was harmless. Finally, the court found that the government’s evidence against Defendant was sufficient to support his convictions. View "United States v. Robert Hill" on Justia Law

Defendant appeals the district court’s imposition of a 66-month sentence for illegal possession of a firearm. On appeal, Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence that he knew he was a prohibited person under any category; the prosecutor violated his right to a fair trial by misstating the presumption of innocence, and his sentence was improperly enhanced because the Iowa assault conviction is not a “crime of violence.”The court found that there is sufficient evidence of an intimate partnership, including evidence of the no-contact order itself, with the state judge’s finding that Defendant and the victim met the federal definition of intimate partners. Next, the court found that the no-contact order here was issued as part of the judgment agreed to by Defendant, who was represented by counsel, in his guilty plea. Third, the court held that Iowa presumes that a no-contact order “has force and effect until it is modified or terminated by subsequent court action.” In Iowa, the absence of a record can prove the nonoccurrence of an act or event, here the nonoccurrence of any modification or termination of the no-contact order. Thus, the court held the evidence was sufficient to find that Defendant possessed a firearm with knowledge that he was subject to a no-contact order involving an intimate partner. Further, Defendant has not shown that the improper remarks prejudiced his right in obtaining a fair trial. Finally, increase to Defendant’s base offense level under Sec. 2K2.1(a), if error at all, was harmless. View "United States v. Junior Roldan Marin" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant guilty of sexual abuse of an incapacitated victim. On appeal, Defendant challenges one pretrial evidentiary ruling by the district court and one of its directives at trial.Defendant argued that the district court erred in allowing the government to elicit testimony from the victim and her mother regarding the victim’s suicide attempt. Defendant’s primary argument was that the testimony lacked sufficient probative value to overcome its potential prejudicial effect on the jury as it determined whether the victim was sexually assaulted. The court found that the district court adequately addressed Defendant’s concern, noting that “the testimony is unlikely to be so provocative as to divert the jury’s attention from the central sexual abuse allegation.” The court found that due to the temporal and causal proximity of the victim’s suicide attempt in relation to Defendant’s conduct, the evidence was probative and not unfairly prejudicial.Next, Defendant claimed that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the district court impermissibly restricted his cross-examination of both the victim and her mother. However, ultimately, the jury acquitted Defendant of aggravated sexual abuse, but it found him guilty of abuse of an incapacitated victim. That the jury convicted him of only one count but not the other indicates that it was able to make an appropriate determination based on the evidence. Thus, the court affirmed the district court ruling. View "United States v. Paul Cavanaugh" on Justia Law

A confidential informant told police that Defendant was importing heroin from Chicago and selling it at an apartment. A detective applied for a search warrant for Defendant’s apartment to seize evidence of drug distribution. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence arguing that the warrant application incorrectly stated he was listed on the utility bills—one of the seven facts the detective used in his affidavit for a search warrant.Defendant argues that the good-faith exception does not apply because the affidavit in support of the warrant was so lacking in “indicia of probable cause to search for evidence of drug trafficking” at Defendant’s apartment that the existence of probable cause was entirely unreasonable. The court disagreed, reasoning that the detective had had an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause, and the affidavit contained sufficient indicia of probable cause, thus the good-faith exception applies. There is no evidence the detective acted in bad faith, and the issuing judge found that the affidavit provided a substantial basis to find probable cause to search for evidence. Further, information known to the detective reinforces the objective reasonableness of his belief in probable cause.Defendant counters that there was not a sufficient nexus between his drug trafficking and this apartment. However, the good-faith exception applies even if there is no direct nexus between a defendant’s continuous course of drug trafficking and his residence. As a result, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling. View "United States v. Roy Norey" on Justia Law

Defendant was found incompetent to stand trial for the criminal charges against him. Defendant filed seventeen pro se motions seeking either release, a competency evaluation, or an order compelling his counsel to file a Sec. 4247(h) motion for a hearing to determine discharge. The court addressed whether the court had jurisdiction over Defendant’s direct appeal from a magistrate judge’s order. The parties argue the magistrate judge’s order was a “final order” authorized by the district court’s order of reference and Western District of Missouri Local Rule 72.1(c).The court reasoned that it has jurisdiction over “final decisions of the district courts of the United States”, thus without a “decision of a district court” it lacks jurisdiction to proceed any further. Defendant argues the parties implicitly consented to have the magistrate judge decide the motions at hand. But the parties’ consent does not save the appeal. Parties may consent to have a magistrate judge conduct any civil proceeding when the magistrate judge is “specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court”. Here, the district court did not specially designate the magistrate judge to exercise such jurisdiction. Thus, the court dismissed the Defendant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "United States v. Timothy O'Laughlin" on Justia Law

Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained after police stopped Defendant upon suspicion of criminal activity. He later pled guilty and appealed the district court’s denial of his first motion to suppress, arguing that officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by conducting a Terry stop without reasonable suspicion and by arresting him without probable cause.The court found that the officer and a particularized and objective basis for suspecting Defendant of wrongdoing, which provided the officer with reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop. The court reasoned that the officer stopped Defendant at the direction of a detective who was investigating Defendant for drug-related crimes and as a person of interest in a homicide investigation. Defendant argues his past convictions and his involvement in a suspected drug deal two months earlier were “stale” and thus could not provide reasonable suspicion of ongoing criminal activity. However, the court found that the argument is unpersuasive because it fails to take into consideration the totality of the circumstances. Thus, the district court correctly held that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant.Defendant further argues that the Terry stop became an arrest when the officers drew their weapons and handcuffed Defendant. Defendant claims this purported arrest was unlawful because the officers lacked probable cause. The court found that the officers’ protective actions here did not turn the stop into an arrest. View "United States v. Andre Johnson" on Justia Law

Prison corrections officers suspected that Defendant’s family had given him contraband. A strip search did not reveal contraband, but surveillance footage showed Defendant taking bundles out of his shoes and giving them to another inmate. Defendant was charged with three counts of possessing a prohibited object in prison.Defendant claims that excluding his sole witness, a Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) employee, violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to put on a complete defense. Defendant argues that the witness would testify as to his decision not to discipline Defendant. The court held that under Rule 403, the testimony is inadmissible. Whatever probative value the testimony might have is substantially outweighed by the danger that the testimony would be unfairly prejudicial.Defendant argues that the government did not lay the necessary foundation because there was no testimony that the shoes presented at trial were in the same condition as the day of the offense. The court found Defendant didn’t present evidence to rebut the presumption that evidence is presumed unchanged unless there is “a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with.”The court found that the jury instruction was proper because an inmate need not know specifically what prohibited item he has, so long as he knows that he possesses a prohibited object. Finally, Defendant’s evidentiary insufficiency argument fails because a reasonable jury could weigh this evidence and infer that he knew the items were prohibited. Thus, the court affirmed Defendant's convictions. View "United States v. Isiah Dozier" on Justia Law

Defendant appeals his conviction on three counts of a four-count indictment for child abuse. Each count concerns a different child. On appeal defendant argues that (1) the district court plainly erred by not giving a specific unanimity instruction for Count I; (2) the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on all counts; and (3) the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a continuance.Conducting a plain error review, the Eighth Circuit found that the district court erred by not giving a specific unanimity instruction to the jury regarding Count I. The government presented evidence of three separate incidents in a single count of aggravated child abuse. The court reasoned that the trial court should view “the defendant’s acts . . . in a commonsense manner, taking into account whether the acts occurred in a separate time frame or separate identifying place.” State v. White Face, 857 N.W.2d 387 (S.D. 2014).Here, no evidence suggested “a pattern of continuous abuse”; instead, it described three “discrete incidents.” The district court erred by not providing the jury with a special unanimity instruction requiring it to agree on the specific act supporting the conviction or find that defendant had committed all three acts. The plain error prejudiced defendant. The court vacated the Count I conviction and affirmed the district court’s judgment in all other respects. View "United States v. Tyson Keepseagle" on Justia Law

Officers conducted a traffic stop of a car in which the defendant was the passenger. The officers stated they were concerned the defendant was carrying something, so they handcuffed him. Defendant denied carrying anything but told officers they could check, at which point they found a stun gun and a lighter.A federal grand jury indicted the defendant on three counts, and he moved to suppress the evidence officers discovered during the search. He then pled guilty to the charges. Defendant presented mitigation evidence and asked the district court to impose the minimum sentence; however, they sentenced him to 211 months of imprisonment.Defendant argued that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion, the officers placed him under de factor arrest without probable cause, and the district court gave too much weight to aggravating factors when sentencing him. First, the circuit court concluded that the totality of the circumstances justified the officer’s search. Next, the circuit court found that the officers’ reasonable belief that the defendant was carrying weapons allowed them to handcuff him without resulting in a de facto arrest. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by the sentencing defendant at the bottom of the guidelines range.. View "United States v. Tanner Halverson-Weese" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to federal drug charges. The district court determined that defendant had a category VI criminal history and applied a two-level enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight and a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. While considering the statutory sentencing factors, the district court mistakenly stated defendant shot a gun in the air during a prior offense. Defendant was sentenced with a special condition requiring him to undergo substance abuse treatment.The Eighth Circuit held that the district court’s finding regarding the reckless endangerment enhancement was not erroneous. Reasoning that the defendant's actions, such as speeding, running red lights, and unsafe lane changing, amounted to reckless endangerment. Next, the circuit court found that the district court committed a procedural error by linking an erroneous fact with another uncontested conviction. However, the defendant failed to show that the error affected his substantial rights because there was not a reasonable probability that, but for the erroneous fact, the district court would have imposed a lesser sentence. Further, the circuit court concluded the district court’s bottom-of-the-guidelines sentence of 92 months was not substantively unreasonable. Finally, while medication compliance requirements may infringe on constitutional liberty interests, whether a medical professional will prescribe medication or treatment is speculative and does not unconstitutionally infringe on the defendant's liberty interests. View "United States v. Leprese Williams" on Justia Law