Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant sold capsules of heroin that contained fentanyl to a confidential source in the St. Louis metro area. A superseding indictment charged Defendant with conspiracy to distribute heroin and fentanyl between June 2017 and May 2019, possession with intent to distribute heroin, and distribution of fentanyl in August 2019 resulting in death. Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute fentanyl.At sentencing, adopting the presentence investigation report (PSR) without objection, the district court1 determined an advisory guidelines sentencing range of 15-21 months’ imprisonment, granted the government’s motion for an upward departure, and sentenced Defendant to 70 months imprisonment. Defendant appeals, arguing the court erred in granting an upward departure based primarily on Defendant’s role in the August 2019 fentanyl overdose death.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the agent’s testimony, to the extent it included hearsay, bore sufficient indicia of reliability to support its use in sentencing Defendant. Accordingly, the court did not clearly err in finding that the government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that a death resulted from Defendant’s conduct and then granting the government’s motion for an upward departure. Departing upward, the court imposed a sentence of 70 months imprisonment. This sentence is consistent with upward departures the court has approved under Section 5K2.1 for drug distribution conduct that resulted in an overdose death. View "United States v. Jeff Harris" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of aggravated bank robbery, and the district court sentenced him to mandatory life imprisonment under the federal “three strikes” law. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence. On appeal, Defendant argued that (A) the district court erroneously admitted evidence of his flight from the second traffic stop; (B) the jury’s verdict lacked sufficient evidence; and (C) the three strikes law is unconstitutional.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed.  The court held that the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion in concluding any danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the evidence’s probative value. Here, evidence of Defendant’s flight from the second traffic stop helped establish the government’s narrative that Defendant continually evaded police for ten days following the robbery. It also helped the jury understand why the police found Defendant, as well as incriminating evidence, in another state. Further, Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that he was mistakenly identified as the robber. But overwhelming evidence indicates his identification was not a mistake. Finally, the court explained that based Defendant’s criminal history outlined earlier, he has proven he remains a danger to the public despite being given a second and third chance to show otherwise. The sentence imposed here was not grossly disproportionate to Defendant’s crime. View "United States v. Anthony Hall" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court determined that Defendant was a career offender under Section 4B1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines because he had at least two prior convictions for crimes of violence or controlled substance offenses.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that Defendant’s conviction for interference with official acts inflicting bodily injury constitutes a crime of violence. Defendant argued that interference with official acts causing bodily injury can be committed recklessly. If it can, under Borden, it no longer qualifies as a crime of violence. The court held that the offense cannot be committed recklessly. The court explained that reckless conduct is not sufficient. Because interference with official acts inflicting bodily injury cannot be committed recklessly, the Supreme Court’s decision in Borden has not abrogated Malloy. Interference with official acts inflicting bodily injury is a crime of violence under the force clause. Defendant, therefore, qualifies as a career offender under U.S.S.G. Section 4B1.1. View "United States v. Donte Kent" on Justia Law

Defendant alleges that during the third revocation hearing, the district court violated his right to due process because it forced him to proceed either with an incompetent attorney or without any attorney at all.The Eighth Circuit reversed finding that Defendant was denied the right to counsel. The court explained that to show his waiver of the right to counsel was involuntary, a defendant must show the district court forced him to choose between inadequate representation and self-representation.Here, Defendant has shown he was justifiably dissatisfied with his attorney. This is not a case where the evidence shows a defendant who disagrees with his attorney’s strategy or wants to delay the hearing. Instead, the evidence shows an attorney who was not prepared to handle a revocation of supervised release hearing. Further, the attorney’s comment regarding “the big house or the nut house” demonstrates he did not know the factual background of the case or the potential consequences that Defendant was facing. Because Defendant was forced to proceed with either this unprepared attorney or no attorney at all, Defendant’s decision to waive his right to counsel was not knowing and voluntary and his right to due process was violated. View "United States v. Robert Ivers" on Justia Law

Defendant, a federal inmate, appeals an order of the district court directing the Bureau of Prisons to turn over all funds in Defendant’s inmate trust account for payment toward an outstanding restitution obligation.The Eighth Circuit concluded that the order is not adequately supported, and therefore vacated the order and remand for further proceedings. The court reasoned that the district court cited Section 3613(a) only for the proposition that Defendant’s funds were not exempt from enforcement. The court did not assert that 3613(a) is a self-executing means to enforce a lien, and did not rely on 3613 as authority to order that the funds be turned over to the clerk of court. Rather, the court cited restitution provisions in 3664 as the basis for turnover and collection. The court, therefore, declined to affirm the order based on 3613 alone and does not address on the record what authority is available to a district court under that section. View "United States v. Anthony Robinson" on Justia Law

The district court sentenced Defendant to concurrent terms of 280 months’ imprisonment on the sex trafficking offenses and a consecutive 120 months for committing a felony involving a minor while a registered sex offender, for a total imprisonment term of 400 months. Defendant raises four claims on appeal: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the sex trafficking convictions; (2) the district court erred when it instructed the jury that a “happy ending massage” was a commercial sex act; (3) the district court abused its discretion when it admitted prior bad act evidence; and (4) a conviction on Count One—sex trafficking of a minor—violated the double jeopardy clause because it is a lesser included offense of Count Two—sex trafficking by force, fraud, and coercion.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the testimony at trial was sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to establish the women were directed and encouraged by Defendant to digitally stimulate clients' genitalia in exchange for money—conduct that satisfies the statutory definition of a “commercial sex act.” Next, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant participated in a venture by knowingly receiving money acquired from his massage business, which included assisting, supporting, and facilitating sex trafficking. Further, the testimony offered by the women working in Defendant’s massage business, if given credence by the jury, is sufficiently strong for the court to conclude that the 2005 conviction, even assuming it was improperly admitted, did not have a substantial influence on the jury’s verdict. View "United States v. Omar Taylor" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). He filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a vehicle search. The district court denied the motion. Defendant proceeded to trial, where a jury found him guilty. He appealed and raised four arguments: (1) the district court should have granted his motion to suppress; (2) the district court should have admitted impeachment evidence; (3) the district court should have given additional jury instructions; and (4) the evidence was not sufficient to convict.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court correctly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress because the search was supported by reasonable suspicion. At trial, any error in excluding defense Exhibits S and T was harmless because the impeachment information was admitted through the officer’s testimony. The district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Defendant’s proposed jury instructions because the instructions it gave fairly and accurately set forth the law. Finally, the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction. View "United States v. David Allen" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of a firearms offense after police seized evidence during a traffic stop. The district court sentenced Defendant to a term of forty-eight months’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed the conviction and sentence on several grounds. The Eighth Circuit affirmed discerning no reversible error.   The court explained that an officer’s observance of a traffic violation, no matter how minor, gives the officer probable cause to initiate a stop. Here, the officer reasonably concluded that the driver’s following distance was not reasonable and prudent. He thus had probable cause for a traffic stop, and the district court properly denied the motion to suppress. Further, the court wrote that the district court abuse its discretion in concluding that a jury reasonably could infer that Defendant sought to flee the patrol car because he recognized that officers were on the brink of discovering his unlawful possession of firearms in the trunk of the rental car. Defendant’s efforts to escape coincided with the officer’s search of the Altima’s trunk and with Defendant’s anxious statements about that search. Thus, the evidence was properly admitted.   Further, Defendant objects that much of the evidence is “merely circumstantial,” but circumstantial evidence can support a conviction, and the combination of direct and circumstantial evidence here was sufficient to support a finding that Defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, the district court’s finding that he constructively possessed the guns is not clearly erroneous in light of the record as a whole. View "United States v. Drake Banks, Sr." on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon. He appealed the district court’s conclusion that his prior Arkansas burglary convictions were separate offenses, rendering him an armed career criminal subject to an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”).The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the ACCA mandates a 15-year minimum sentence for a defendant who has been convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon following “three previous convictions by any court . . . for a violent felony . . . committed on occasions different from one another[.]” 18 U.S.C. Section 924(e)(1) In determining whether prior convictions are separate and distinct, at least three factors are relevant: “(1) the time lapse between offenses, (2) the physical distance between their occurrence, and (3) their lack of overall substantive continuity, a factor that is often demonstrated in the violent-felony context by different victims or different aggressions.” United States v. Pledge, 821 F.3d 1035.   Here, Defendant committed three residential burglaries—each on different days, in different locations, and against different victims—over an approximate three-week span. The court held that these offenses qualify as separate and distinct criminal episodes committed on occasions different from one another. View "United States v. Jeremy Robinson" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged in a one-count indictment with possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine (actual). 21 U.S.C. Sections 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A). He pleaded guilty without a plea agreement. The district court sentenced him to 96 months in prison. Defendant appealed arguing the court procedurally erred by denying a mitigating role adjustment, see USSG Section 3B1.2, and abused its discretion in imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the sentencing record established that Defendant was “deeply involved” in the possess-with-intent-to-distribute offense to which he pleaded guilty. He helped arrange for cross-country travel from his home in California to Nebraska with instructions to pick up and hold a large quantity of methamphetamine. As in United States v. Garcia, he offered no evidence establishing the relative culpability of participants other than his cousin. Thus, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Defendant was not “substantially less culpable than the average participant” and therefore did not warrant a mitigating role adjustment. Further, Defendant’s “dissatisfaction with a district court’s balancing of the Section 3553(a) factors does not indicate that the district court abused its discretion.” View "United States v. John Beridon, Jr." on Justia Law