Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Fisher was charged with conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine and two counts of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); 846. The government filed notice that Fisher was subject to an enhanced sentence based on his prior conviction for first-degree burglary under Minnesota law, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). Fisher pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine but objected to the enhanced sentence and requested sentencing credit for the time he served in tribal jail for a tribal court conviction based on the same conduct.The district court overruled Fisher’s objection to the sentence enhancement and denied Fisher’s request to credit his time served in tribal jail, reasoning that it did not have the authority to impose a sentence below the mandatory minimum. The district court sentenced Fisher to 180 months’ imprisonment, the statutory minimum for a defendant with a “serious violent felony” conviction. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. While Minnesota’s statute is broader than the generic definition of burglary, it is divisible; applying the modified categorical approach, Fisher’s conviction for burglary with assault is a “serious violent felony.” Treating discharged and undischarged sentences differently does not violate the Due Process Clause. View "United States v. Fisher" on Justia Law

Jones transported large amounts of methamphetamine from California to Arkansas and large amounts of money back to California. In January-February of 2019, Jones made at least seven round trips transporting drugs and money. He purchased most of the airline tickets himself. During one trip, Jones was questioned at the airport because he was carrying $21,000. In May 2019, Jones was arrested at a bus stop with 4.395 kilograms of methamphetamine duct-taped to his body.He pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846, and requested a minor-role adjustment under U.S.S.G. 3B1.2(b). The district court denied his request; it considered the unchallenged facts in the PSR, explicitly compared Jones’s role to that of another courier, noted the section 3B1.2 factors, and concluded that Jones did not meet his burden to show “that he was less culpable than the average participant.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Although the district court explicitly compared Jones’s culpability only to another courier and not to the supplier and dealers and did not discuss every section 3B1.2 factor at length, it did not need to make extensive findings. Considering “the totality of the circumstances,” it was not clearly erroneous to conclude that Jones was not substantially “less culpable than the average participant.” View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit dismissed defendant's appeal of the district court's denial of his motion for extension of time to file a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. 2255 as moot, and vacated the district court's order denying the extension motion. The court concluded that the district court cannot revisit the subsequent order because it has now been made final by the administrative panel's denial of a certificate of appealability. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence for a firearm offense, concluding that his convictions for attempted second-degree murder in violation of Minn. Stat. Sections 609.17, subdiv. 1; and 609.19(1), were violent felonies for purposes of sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The court explained that the underlying crime that defendant attempted was second-degree murder, which takes place when a person "causes the death of a human being with intent to effect the death of that person or another, but without premeditation." In this case, defendant must have had intent or purpose, or at least knowledge, which are both greater than recklessness. View "United States v. Matthews" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for a reduction of sentence, holding that a non-retroactive change in the law under which defendant was sentenced cannot constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for reducing a sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). The court stated that the fact that defendant combined his reliance on a non-retroactive change in law with assertions about age, health, and rehabilitation does not help his case for compassionate release. The court explained that adding a legally impermissible ground to other insufficient factual considerations cannot justify a sentence reduction. View "United States v. Crandall" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm charge, as well as forcibly assaulting, resisting, or impeding law enforcement with a dangerous weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1) and (b), and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of this section 111 offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict, and Instruction 7 submitting the section 111 charge was not an abuse of the district court's discretion to fashion appropriate instructions, much less plain error. View "United States v. Wilkins" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for being a felon in possession of ammunition, namely, five .45-caliber shell casings found at the scene of the shooting. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that defendant was the shooter and that the shell casings were knowingly discharged from the shooter's firearm. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its broad discretion to control closing arguments when it did not sua sponte challenge the prosecutor's rebuttal closing arguments. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a substantial upward variance and defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Obi" on Justia Law

Defendant appeals a portion of the judgment in his criminal case imposing an assessment of $5,000 under the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act. The court concluded that a remand for further proceedings is warranted where defendant has established that the district court relied on a plainly erroneous understanding of his net worth in determining whether he was indigent. Furthermore, defendant was prejudiced by this factual error and the court exercised its discretion to correct the factual error. View "United States v. Ohlmeier" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress in a case where he conditionally pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute a mixture or substance containing heroin. The court concluded that the information contained in the affidavit supporting the search warrant application was sufficient to establish probable cause. In this case, even though the indictment cited 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), the indictment adequately informed defendant that he was being charged with conduct prohibited in 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(B)(i)—that is, knowingly possessing, in furtherance of drug trafficking. View "United States v. Reed" on Justia Law

Lopez-Castillo pled guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm as both a felon and a domestic violence misdemeanant, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), (g)(9); 924(a)(2). The district court concluded Lopez-Castillo’ had two prior convictions for crimes of violence (U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(2)): an Iowa arson offense and his Arizona aggravated assault offense, resulting in a recommended sentencing range of 110-120 months of imprisonment. The court sentenced Lopez-Castillo to 102 months of imprisonment. Lopez-Castillo appealed, challenging only the conclusion that aggravated assault under Ariz. Stat. 13-1204(B) qualifies as a crime of violence.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. One element of aggravated assault under Arizona law requires a defendant to have “intentionally or knowingly impede[d] the normal breathing or circulation of blood of another person by applying pressure to the throat or neck or by obstructing the nose and mouth either manually or through the use of an instrument.” Lopez-Castillo necessarily used force to satisfy this element because to be convicted he must have either “appl[ied] pressure to the throat or neck” of another person or “obstruct[ed] the nose and mouth” of another person. That element categorically entails force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person. Lopez-Castillo necessarily used physical force, knowingly or intentionally. View "United States v. Lopez-Castillo" on Justia Law