Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of attempting to persuade, induce, and entice an individual who had not yet attained the age of 18 years old to engage in sexual activity. The district court sentenced Defendant to a mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. Sec 2422(b). Defendant challenged the district court's imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence as a violation of the Eighth Amendment.The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence, finding that it did not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The court explained that the facts of the case show defendant intentionally engaged in dangerous conduct that was exploitive of children, which is exactly the type of conduct contemplated and targeted by the statute. Under these facts, the court determined that there was no inference of gross disproportionality. View "United States v. Raul Rivas" on Justia Law

Appellant petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus in part on the basis that an off-the-record jury selection procedure violated his constitutional rights. Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court dismissed Appellant’s petition with prejudice. The Eighth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability as to whether the district court prematurely dismissed Appellant’s claims that the pretrial jury selection procedure violated his right to be present, right to a public trial and right to an appeal and that his trial counsel was ineffective for participating in the procedure.The Eighth Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court explained that Appellant has not shown that “fundamental unfairness” resulted from his trial counsel’s participation in the pretrial jury selection procedure. Appellant alleged that his was fundamentally unfair because he was unaware of the pretrial jury selection procedure and any discriminatory strikes made during this procedure.  However, the court wrote, that Appellant’s trial counsel agreed to and participated in the procedure, which effectively gave both parties an additional 15 peremptory strikes; a record was, in fact, made of these strikes, and maintained by and available for review at the Washington County Circuit Court Clerk’s Office; the written submission of strikes that occurred as part of the pretrial jury selection procedure was only a portion of voir dire; and the remainder of voir dire, along with the evidentiary and sentencing phases of the trial, remained open to the public. Thus, Appellant’s trial counsel’s participation in the pretrial jury selection procedure did not render his trial fundamentally unfair. View "Zachariah Marcyniuk v. Dexter Payne" on Justia Law

Cruz repeatedly brought methamphetamine from Texas to North Dakota for sale. South Dakota officers stopped and searched Cruz’s vehicle, finding drugs and cash. Cruz posted bond, returned to North Dakota, and continued using methamphetamine and selling drugs. Grafton Officers Jones and Campoverde surveilled his residence. When Cruz exited, they approached. Cruz shot Campoverde, who was wearing a marked police ballistic vest. The bullet entered Campoverde’s arm, caused nerve damage, and collapsed his lung. Jones shot Cruz before apprehending him. Where Cruz fell, officers found his gun, methamphetamine, and marijuana. A search of the residence produced additional drugs and ammunition.Cruz pleaded guilty to five counts; two carried potential life sentences, and one carried a minimum sentence of a mandatory consecutive 120 months, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The government agreed to limit its sentencing recommendation to 360 months. The PSR recommended an advisory range of 235–293 months with a mandatory consecutive sentence of 120 months, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The government did not pursue the application of a six-level upward adjustment under U.S.S.G. 3A1.2(c)(1) for assaulting an officer during flight, so the resulting advisory Guidelines range was 130–162 months plus the consecutive 120 months. Cruz described his criminal history as old and as largely the product of his addiction to methamphetamine. The Eighth Circuit affirmed a 420-month sentence as not substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Cruz" on Justia Law

Minneapolis police investigated Randle for selling crack cocaine while he was on supervised release for a prior federal offense. After conducting a controlled buy, Officer Hamilton applied for a warrant to search a Brooklyn Park, Minnesota home that Randle listed as his supervised release address. The warrant was executed that day. Randle arrived during the search. Police seized 308 grams of crack cocaine and related evidence from the home and from bags carried by Randle.The district court denied a motion to suppress, applying the good-faith exception while concluding the affidavit did not create a “fair probability that evidence of Randle’s alleged drug trafficking activities would be found at the Residence” because it did not include Hamilton’s statement that in his professional judgment drug traffickers typically keep narcotics in their home and did not state that Hamilton followed Randle to the residence directly after the controlled buy and failed to specify when the officers started following Randle. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The evidence is admissible because “it was objectively reasonable for the officer executing [the] search warrant to have relied in good faith on the [issuing] judge’s determination that there was probable cause to issue the warrant.” The court also upheld the denial of a “Franks” hearing; Randle failed to make the necessary “substantial preliminary showing” of “deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth.” View "United States v. Randle" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of unlawful possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon and sentencing him to 105 months in prison, holding that there was no reversible error in the proceedings below.The presentence report in this case recommended a base offense level of 20 and an advisory guideline range of 92 to 115 months' incarceration. The parties subsequently determined that Defendant's base offense level should be 14. The court considered the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) and ultimately imposed a sentence of 105 months' imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the sentence was not excessive or unreasonable and that the court did not abuse its discretion by considering an improper sentencing factor. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed the order of the district court in this criminal case declaring inadmissible any communications that were "made in confidence" between Defendant and his spouse during the evening of the crimes giving rise to Defendant's charges of arson within Indian country and felony murder within Indian country, holding that an exception to the marital communications privilege applied in this case.Defendant allegedly started a cabin fire that killed an occupant of the dwelling. During his criminal trial, Defendant filed a motion in limine to prevent the government from introducing incriminating statements that Defendant made to his wife after the fire. The district court granted the motion, concluding that if there were a spousal-victim exception to the marital communications privilege, it would not apply in this case. The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that Defendant's statements to his spouse fell within the third-person/spousal-victim exception. View "United States v. White Owl" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of aggravated sexual abuse of a child, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.On appeal, Defendant challenged two of the district court's evidentiary rulings. Specifically, Defendant argued that the district court erred in admitting the expert of Dr. Stacy Benson, a licensed clinical psychologist with a specialization in the evaluation and treatment of sex offenders, and a video recording of the victim's forensic interview. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting either Dr. Benson's testimony or the video recording of the victim's forensic interview. View "United States v. Counts" on Justia Law

Someone shot a St. Louis fire captain and his passenger. The fire captain described the shooter as a “black male,” once on a 911 call right after the shooting, again when responding officers arrived on the scene, and again to an officer at the hospital. He did not give that description to Detective Bowles, who investigated the case. Bowles focused his attention on the Hartman brothers, who are white. Nearby cameras had captured them driving in the area and then stopping shortly before the shooting. Based on this evidence, Detective Bowles requested multiple search and arrest warrants. The paperwork Bowles submitted omitted the fact that the fire captain had described the shooter as black.The brothers were eventually released and sued Bowles, citing the Fourth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. A detective does not violate a clearly established constitutional right by omitting information from a warrant application that he does not actually know, even if the reason is his own reckless investigation. To succeed, the Hartmans had to show that Bowles omitted facts “with the intent to make, or in reckless disregard of whether they make, the affidavit misleading.” Bowles is entitled to qualified immunity. View "Hartman v. Bowles" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion for postconviction relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255 arguing that his firearm conviction under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) should be vacated in light of United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), holding that Defendant overcame the procedural default of his challenge to the firearm conviction and that relief was warranted.After the Supreme Court's decision in Davis, Defendant moved to vacate his conviction for brandishing a firearm during a conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery. In light of Davis, Defendant argued that his conviction under section 924(c) should be vacated because he did not brandish a firearm during a crime of violence. The Eighth Circuit agreed and remanded the case, holding (1) Defendant established cause for failing to raise the Davis issue on direct review; and (2) Defendant's conviction under section 924(c) was premised on a mistaken conclusion that conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery was a crime of violence. View "Jones v. United States" on Justia Law

Isaiah Hammett was killed during the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department’s (SLMPD) execution of a search warrant at his grandfather’s home. Hammett’s surviving mother and grandfather, Gina Torres and Dennis Torres (Dennis), brought Fourth Amendment excessive force and unlawful seizure claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, and state law wrongful death and infliction of emotional distress claims against the City of St. Louis and multiple SLMPD officers.The district court denied the City and defendant officers’ motion for summary judgment on these claims, and they appealed. The Eighth Circuit determined it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of qualified immunity "if at the heart of the argument is a dispute of fact." The Court found that in their essence, defendants' arguments were related to the of the sufficiency of the evidence, and whether certain opinion testimony presented at trial created a genuine issue of fact. To the extent that defendants asserted arguments beyond the scope of the Court's jurisdiction, the Eighth Circuit dismissed their appeal. On the few arguments that remained, the Court reversed the district court's denial of the defendant officers' qualified immunity claims: Dennis was not seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment; (2) the City could not have conspired with itself through the defendant officers acting within the scope of their employment; and (3) the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine did not apply to § 1983 conspiracy claims. Judgment was dismissed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Torres v. Coats" on Justia Law