Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's 63-month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in imposing a four-level sentencing enhancement under USSG 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possession of the handgun in connection with another felony offense. In this case, the district court found that the government established by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant possessed a firearm in connection with the North Dakota felony offense of preventing arrest. View "United States v. Nilsen" on Justia Law

Defendant remains at large after escaping from a residential reentry center just over four months ago. Having given him a chance to surrender and respond to an order to show cause, the Eighth Circuit now exercises its discretion and dismissed the appeal under the fugitive-disentitlement doctrine. The court explained that it may sua sponte dismiss in circumstances like this one. View "United States v. Emery" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's 60-month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The court concluded that defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable where the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors, weighing the mitigation factors against his extensive criminal history and propensity for violence. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying an upward variance. View "United States v. Hubbs" on Justia Law

Jacqueline Mills was convicted of multiple counts of wire fraud, money laundering, and bribery. These charges were related to a years-long scheme to defraud the United States of monies intended to feed low-income children. The jury found that fourteen properties and monies were traceable to the proceeds of Mills's fraud. Rosie and John Farr, Mills's mother and stepfather, filed third party petitions asserting interests in various properties to be forfeited, including monies from a Southern Bancorp account number. The forfeiture order became final as to Mills when she was sentenced, but it remained preliminary as to the Farrs until the ancillary proceeding concluded. In the two years between the Farrs filing their third party petitions and the government moving for summary judgment, the Farrs failed to present evidence supporting their claims of a superior ownership interest in the Southern Bancorp account.The Eighth Circuit concluded that, on this record, the Farrs failed to prove a prior interest in the property under 21 U.S.C. 853(n)(6)(A) because the proceeds of an offense do not exist before the offense is committed, and when they come into existence, the government's interest under the relation-back doctrine immediately vests. Furthermore, the Farrs failed to present evidence that they qualify as bona fide purchasers for value under section 853(n)(6)(B). The court also concluded that excusable neglect under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) does not include ignorance or carelessness on the part of an attorney, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying that general rule in this case. Finally, as in United States v. Waits, it is clear that the Farrs as third parties had adequate notice the government intended to seek forfeiture, as their timely third party petitions confirmed. View "United States v. Farr" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act, concluding that recent precedents foreclosed defendant's arguments. The court concluded that the fact that the district court did not make an affirmative statement acknowledging its broad First Step Act discretion does not raise an inference that the court misapprehended the scope of its authority. Furthermore, in exercising its First Step Act discretion, a district court may consider the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors, but section 404 of the Act does not mandate analysis of these factors. In this case, the district court did not abuse its substantial discretion in denying relief under the Act. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Porter received a 104-month prison sentence for illegally possessing a firearm. Shortly before he was scheduled for supervised release, the probation office realized that he did not have a release plan and asked the district court to order Porter to spend 120 days at a residential reentry center, to find work and a place to live. The district court approved the request, but Porter checked out to go to work one day and never returned, violating both his conditions of supervised release and the reentry center’s rules. Porter remained at large until he was captured several weeks later. The district court imposed a 14-month prison sentence for violating the conditions of supervised release. The government filed a separate charge for escaping from custody, 18 U.S.C. 751(a). Porter argued that he was not in the reentry center “by virtue of” a “conviction,” as the statute requires, but rather because he did not have a place to live.The Eighth Circuit affirmed his conviction and concurrent 12-month sentence. Porter was in “custody” at the reentry center and his “unauthorized departure” was an “escape.” A conviction must only be a cause of the custody or confinement, whether “immediate” or not. Porter never would have been at a reentry center had he not first been convicted of a crime. View "United States v. Porter" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. The court rejected defendant's contention that the district court imposed an illegal sentence because he overserved the maximum time permitted by statute for his felon-in-possession charge (10 years). Rather, the court concluded that defendant's sentence does not violate the maximum term set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(3). The court explained that the maximum term of imprisonment is governed by the law of the offense. The court also concluded that the revocation of defendant's supervised release did not violate his Constitutional right to a jury trial. Finally, defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable where the district court carefully considered and weighed the relevant 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors and the district court did not abuse its discretion. View "United States v. Childs" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant Campbell-Martin and Leiva's motion to suppress. Defendants conditionally pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. Considering all the relevant circumstances, the court concluded that the officer's initial encounter with Campbell-Martin and Leiva was not a Fourth Amendment seizure because it was a consensual encounter. Furthermore, even if it became nonconsensual, the officer had reasonable suspicion to question them and ask for identification. In this case, the officer's conduct would not have communicated to a reasonable person that he could not leave. Nor does requesting identification or asking questions effect a seizure as long as the police do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is required.The court also concluded that the search of the car and the backpack without a warrant was a valid inventory search. The court rejected Campbell-Martin's claims that the district court erred in denying her request for a two-level reduction for a minor role in the offense under USSG 3B1.2(b), concluding that the evidence was more than sufficient to support the district court's decision. Because Leiva stipulated in his plea agreement that he knowingly and intentionally possessed the methamphetamine and was within 1,000 feet of a school, the district court properly applied the two-level enhancement under USSG 2D1.2(a)(1). Finally, the district court did not err in determining that Leiva's 2018 drug-possession offense was not relevant conduct to the instant offense and could be assessed three-criminal history points. Therefore, the court affirmed defendants' sentences. View "United States v. Campbell-Martin" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's 300-month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute more than 100 grams of a mixture or substance containing heroin. The court concluded that the district court did not rely on clearly erroneous facts in making its sentencing decision and, even assuming the district court did procedurally err, any such error was harmless. In this case, the government explained that the district court found a 300-month sentence appropriate not because it believed fentanyl was present but because heroin distributed by defendant led to someone's death and defendant has an extensive criminal history, with approximately 1 conviction per year since he turned 21 years old. Furthermore, the district court court engaged in a thoughtful and thorough analysis of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, and defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Wise" on Justia Law

After panel rehearing, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motions to suppress and his objection to application of the career criminal enhancement in USSG 4B1.1(a). Defendant robbed a Sprint Wireless Express store at gunpoint, and then left with a GPS tracker.The court concluded that the police had at least reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle where, considering the tight window of opportunity officers have to locate a fleeing suspect, it was reasonable for police to rely on third-party GPS data. Furthermore, other factors also supported the officers' suspicion, such as the store employee's description of the vehicle and the unusual behavior of the vehicle's occupants. Therefore, the totality of the circumstances gave police at least reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, and thus stopping the vehicle to investigate that suspicion comported with the Fourth Amendment. The court also concluded that any error in denying as moot defendant's objection to evidence of a show-up was harmless after the government stated it did not intend to use the evidence at trial. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not err in imposing the career offender enhancement where Illinois armed robbery qualifies as generic robbery under the enumerated offense clause of section 4B1.2(a)(2). View "United States v. Martin" on Justia Law