Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), concluding that defendant's three burglary convictions under Texas Penal Code Ann. Sec. 30.03(c)(2) qualified as violent felony predicate offenses. The court stated that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has made plain that the Texas burglary statute requires a specific intent to commit the crime. Furthermore, the court has not been pointed to any case to the contrary. View "United States v. Hutchinson" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for conspiring to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846, and possessing a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea where he failed to show that the government acted in bad faith in regards to a missing surveillance video. The court stated that holding new evidence that at best was only a source of impeachment material did not constitute a sufficient reason to permit defendant to withdraw his guilty plea.As to defendant's sentence, the court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in denying defendant's request for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility where he made frivolous objections related to the quantity of drugs attributed to him at sentencing. The court also concluded that defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable where the district court thoroughly explained its consideration of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. Finally, in light of the district court's thorough analysis and under plain error review, the court rejected defendant's argument that the district court abused its discretion by making a statement regarding his two siblings. View "United States v. Seys" on Justia Law

The Missouri Division of Family Services (DFS) hotline received a call reporting drug activity, verbal abuse of children, and weapons at the house where Alloway lived with her boyfriend and his children. A DFS social worker went to the house for a welfare check, accompanied by sheriff’s deputies. Alloway met them outside. They stated the reason for their visit. Alloway invited them into the house and told them to wait in the kitchen while she went upstairs to get the older child. While the social worker interviewed the child, a deputy saw three loaded rifles. Where those rifles were was disputed. After confirming that Alloway was a felon, he arrested her. Alloway’s boyfriend stated that he was also a felon and that there was another gun in the bedroom safe. He refused to open the safe and was also arrested. While the deputies were on the phone getting a search warrant for the safe, they spotted more guns in plain sight in the bedroom. They obtained and executed two search warrants, finding 13 guns, 125 grams of meth, and other drug evidence.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress. Alloway consented to the search, and the deputies did not exceed the scope of that consent. View "United States v. Alloway" on Justia Law

Collins paid a minor for sex acts. While in detention, he contacted potential witnesses with instructions on what to say to law enforcement and with questions about the victim’s whereabouts and violated a no-contact order. Collins pled guilty to sex trafficking of children, 18 U.S.C. 1591(a)(1) and (b)(2). His plea agreement stipulated that the government would abstain from recommending a guidelines enhancement for obstruction of justice, U.S.S.G. 3C1.1, and would recommend that Collins receive credit for acceptance of responsibility, U.S.S.G. 3E1.1. The government’s offense conduct statement included a summary of Collins’ post-indictment conduct but nonetheless recommended that Collins receive credit for acceptance and no obstruction enhancement.The PSIR proposed an enhancement for obstruction of justice and no credit for acceptance of responsibility. The government’s sentencing memorandum detailed Collins’ allegedly obstructive conduct, stating that “Collins’ attempts to influence witnesses throughout these proceedings are certainly relevant under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) and as to his acceptance of responsibility.” The district court rejected an enhancement for obstruction. With a two-level reduction for acceptance, Collins’ guidelines range became 210-262 months. The court varied downward by an additional level, stating “the government has an obligation here to move for that third level, but I can’t force them” and sentenced Collins to 210 months’ imprisonment.The Eighth Circuit vacated. The government breached the plea agreement by relying on Collins’ pre-plea conduct to dispute acceptance of responsibility. View "United States v. Collins" on Justia Law

Fisher was charged with conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine and two counts of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); 846. The government filed notice that Fisher was subject to an enhanced sentence based on his prior conviction for first-degree burglary under Minnesota law, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). Fisher pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine but objected to the enhanced sentence and requested sentencing credit for the time he served in tribal jail for a tribal court conviction based on the same conduct.The district court overruled Fisher’s objection to the sentence enhancement and denied Fisher’s request to credit his time served in tribal jail, reasoning that it did not have the authority to impose a sentence below the mandatory minimum. The district court sentenced Fisher to 180 months’ imprisonment, the statutory minimum for a defendant with a “serious violent felony” conviction. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. While Minnesota’s statute is broader than the generic definition of burglary, it is divisible; applying the modified categorical approach, Fisher’s conviction for burglary with assault is a “serious violent felony.” Treating discharged and undischarged sentences differently does not violate the Due Process Clause. View "United States v. Fisher" on Justia Law

Jones transported large amounts of methamphetamine from California to Arkansas and large amounts of money back to California. In January-February of 2019, Jones made at least seven round trips transporting drugs and money. He purchased most of the airline tickets himself. During one trip, Jones was questioned at the airport because he was carrying $21,000. In May 2019, Jones was arrested at a bus stop with 4.395 kilograms of methamphetamine duct-taped to his body.He pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846, and requested a minor-role adjustment under U.S.S.G. 3B1.2(b). The district court denied his request; it considered the unchallenged facts in the PSR, explicitly compared Jones’s role to that of another courier, noted the section 3B1.2 factors, and concluded that Jones did not meet his burden to show “that he was less culpable than the average participant.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Although the district court explicitly compared Jones’s culpability only to another courier and not to the supplier and dealers and did not discuss every section 3B1.2 factor at length, it did not need to make extensive findings. Considering “the totality of the circumstances,” it was not clearly erroneous to conclude that Jones was not substantially “less culpable than the average participant.” View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit dismissed defendant's appeal of the district court's denial of his motion for extension of time to file a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. 2255 as moot, and vacated the district court's order denying the extension motion. The court concluded that the district court cannot revisit the subsequent order because it has now been made final by the administrative panel's denial of a certificate of appealability. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence for a firearm offense, concluding that his convictions for attempted second-degree murder in violation of Minn. Stat. Sections 609.17, subdiv. 1; and 609.19(1), were violent felonies for purposes of sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The court explained that the underlying crime that defendant attempted was second-degree murder, which takes place when a person "causes the death of a human being with intent to effect the death of that person or another, but without premeditation." In this case, defendant must have had intent or purpose, or at least knowledge, which are both greater than recklessness. View "United States v. Matthews" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for a reduction of sentence, holding that a non-retroactive change in the law under which defendant was sentenced cannot constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for reducing a sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). The court stated that the fact that defendant combined his reliance on a non-retroactive change in law with assertions about age, health, and rehabilitation does not help his case for compassionate release. The court explained that adding a legally impermissible ground to other insufficient factual considerations cannot justify a sentence reduction. View "United States v. Crandall" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm charge, as well as forcibly assaulting, resisting, or impeding law enforcement with a dangerous weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1) and (b), and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of this section 111 offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict, and Instruction 7 submitting the section 111 charge was not an abuse of the district court's discretion to fashion appropriate instructions, much less plain error. View "United States v. Wilkins" on Justia Law