Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, an Arkansas prisoner under a sentence of death for capital murder, petitioned for habeas corpus in the federal district court. In a previous appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of several claims, but remanded for further proceedings on four claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. The court also remanded for further proceedings on petitioner's claim that he is ineligible for the death penalty, due to intellectual disability, under the Eighth Amendment and the rule of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). On remand, the district court rejected the Atkins claim, but granted relief on two of the ineffective-assistance claims and set aside petitioner's sentence. Both parties appealed.The Eighth Circuit reversed the grant of relief based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. In this case, petitioner's federal claim that trial counsel failed to obtain a timely psychological evaluation of him was presented in the state postconviction court and defaulted when he declined to appeal on that ground. As such, the procedural default cannot be excused based on alleged ineffectiveness of state postconviction counsel. Likewise, the third claim cannot be excused based on alleged ineffectiveness of state postconviction counsel. The court affirmed the denial of relief under the Eighth Amendment, concluding that the district court considered the Atkins claim under both the DSM-IV-TR and DSM-V criteria, reached the same conclusion based on each, and thus there was no legal error. The court rejected petitioner's remaining challenges to the district court's analysis of his intellectual functioning, including additional indicia of intellectual disability, expert and witness testimony, adaptive strengths and weaknesses, and adaptive functioning deficits. View "Sasser v. Payne" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from her lockbox in an action where she pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. In this case, the search warrant was for evidence of drug use and distribution. Furthermore, officers saw defendant on the couch, asleep, with a meth pipe next to her. The court concluded that this was enough to give officers particularized suspicion that defendant was connected to the illicit activity that provided the basis for the warrant. The court explained that, while defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the lockbox, officers had probable cause that she was involved in the criminal activity that formed the basis for the warrant. Therefore, defendant's lockbox fell within the scope of the warrant and searching it was lawful. View "United States v. Simmermaker" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for unlawfully distributing methamphetamine and of conspiring to distribute it. The court concluded that, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, a single conspiracy existed. Furthermore, even if a variance occurred, reversal is warranted only if it infringes on defendant's substantial rights. In this case, defendant raised neither notice nor double-jeopardy concerns, only asserting a spillover of evidence from one conspiracy to another. The court concluded that the evidence of defendant's participation in one conspiracy would have been probative of his intent to participate in the other and was therefore admissible. Furthermore, the jury instructions also reduced any risk of prejudice. The court also concluded that there was no error in admitting statements under the coconspirator exception because they were not in furtherance of the conspiracy, in not separately polling a juror, and in calculating drug quantity. View "United States v. Sims" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's motion to recuse the district court judge in petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2254 motion for habeas relief and denial of his application for a certificate of appealability (COA) on three of his habeas corpus claims. Petitioner was found guilty of first-degree murder for killing an officer and sentenced to death. In this case, petitioner concedes that the judge left the Missouri Supreme Court before his case was briefed, argued, or decided. Furthermore, in reviewing petitioner's habeas petition, the judge never had to review any of his past state court rulings.The court concluded that a knowledgeable, reasonable person would not question the judge's impartiality as he took no part in the consideration of petitioner's state appeal. Furthermore, the judge's prior dissent in an unrelated case while a member of the Missouri Supreme Court did not require his recusal from petitioner's federal habeas case where there was no evidence of pervasive personal bias and prejudice against petitioner. Finally, the court declined to disturb the prior administrative panel's denial of petitioner's application for a COA. View "Johnson v. Steele" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendants' pro se motions to reduce their sentences under the First Step Act of 2018. The court explained that Section 404(a) of the First Step Act says that covered offenses are those whose penalties "were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act." Before the Fair Sentencing Act, defendants' crack-cocaine quantity—over 50 grams—triggered a 10-year minimum sentence. It now triggers a 5-year minimum sentence. Therefore, the court concluded that the "statutory penalties for" one object of defendants' multidrug conspiracy offense "were modified" by section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act. The court further explained that the statutory penalties for a drug-trafficking offense include all the penalties triggered by every drug-quantity element of the offense, not just the highest tier of penalties triggered by any one drug-quantity element. Therefore, defendants are eligible for resentencing under the First Step Act. View "United States v. Spencer" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit dismissed the petition for review of the BIA's order finding petitioner inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(C) based on lack of jurisdiction. Under section 1182(a)(2)(C)(i), a non citizen is inadmissible to the United States if "the Attorney General knows or has reason to believe" that the noncitizen is or has been either "an illicit trafficker in any controlled substance," or "a knowing aider, abettor, assister, conspirator, or colluder with others" in such trafficking.The court agreed with the BIA that section 1182(a)(2)(C)'s "reason to believe" language requires a finding of probable cause. In this case, the court concluded that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the BIA's conclusion that there was probable cause to believe petitioner was involved in illicit drug trafficking. Therefore, petitioner is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(2)(C) and thus the court lacked jurisdiction over the petition for review. View "Rojas v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying defendant a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under USSG 3E1.1 based on his pre-plea conduct while incarcerated at the detention center. In this case, defendant and other inmates were involved in an assault of another inmate. The court explained that, under its precedent, it was entitled to rely on such criminal conduct in denying acceptance of responsibility based on a defendant's pre-plea conduct. View "United States v. Cooper" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant Spencer and Farah's convictions and sentences for Hobbs Act robbery and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. The court agreed with the Government that defendants forfeited their objection to the Hobbs Act instruction. In this case, the only ground for objecting to the original instruction that defendants asserted with specificity before the district court was that the instruction failed to make clear that Hobbs Act robbery requires a mens rea of knowledge with respect to the taking of the victim’s property. Therefore, the court concluded that defendants forfeited the right to object to the instruction on other grounds, including the ground that the instruction failed to make clear that Hobbs Act robbery requires an effect on interstate commerce. Even if defendants' proposed instruction had been clearer than the district court's, the mere tender of an alternative instruction that avoids an alleged error in the district court's instruction does not preserve the error for appeal unless the party specifies the alleged error as a basis for objecting to the district court's instruction. However, it was not until this appeal that defendants argued that the district court's instruction failed to make clear that Hobbs Act robbery requires an effect on interstate commerce. Accordingly, defendants forfeited their objection even assuming their proposed instruction made clear that Hobbs Act robbery requires an effect on interstate commerce, and defendants' challenge to the jury instructions regarding Hobbs Act robbery fails under plain error review.The court also rejected defendants' claim of prosecutorial misconduct under plain error review. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not procedurally err in calculating the advisory sentencing guidelines, upholding the obstruction of justice enhancement under USSG 3C1.1 and the reckless endangerment enhancement during flight under USSG 3C1.2. View "United States v. Spencer" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's 24-month sentence imposed upon the revocation of his second supervised release. The court concluded that defendant's sentence was procedurally reasonable where the district court adequately explained its reasoning for defendant's sentence, and the district court did not commit a Tapia error, much less plain error, by considering defendant's need for rehabilitation when crafting his sentence. The court also concluded that defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable based on the upward variance and the district court did not clearly err in weighing the relevant 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute at least 50 grams of actual methamphetamine and at least 500 grams of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, and six counts of distribution of a controlled substance. Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 853, the indictment also sought forfeiture of $13,400 in United States currency, which was seized from a residence in Davenport, Iowa.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and concluded that the district court's factual findings are supported by the record and it did not err in concluding that the money was subject to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. 853(a)(2). In this case, the district court did not err in determining that the cash discovered inside the lockbox found in the same bedroom as the methamphetamine was subject to forfeiture. View "United States v. Sheley" on Justia Law