Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ellison, remodeling Stephen’s house, noticed a USB drive on the toilet tank. Ellison had researched hidden recording devices following a break-in and recognized it as a hidden camera. Ellison took the USB home but did not view its contents. The next morning, Ellison returned to Stephen’s home and discovered a young boy asleep. Stephen, a youth basketball coach, arrived with another boy. Returning home, Ellison viewed the USB’s contents, finding multiple videos depicting children secretly recorded in various stages of undress. Ellison delivered the USB to the Monticello Police. The Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation took possession of the USB, obtained a warrant, and viewed its contents. A warranted search of Stephen’s homes uncovered more secret recording devices and a hard drive containing approximately 400 visual depictions of nude minor boys, including images of Stephen molesting unconscious victims. Indicted for sexually exploiting a child, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), possessing child pornography, section 2252(a)(4)(B), and transporting child pornography, section 2252(a)(1), Stephen unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion and Stephen’s 2,160-month sentence. The Fourth Amendment does not apply to private-citizen searches unless that private citizen acted as a government agent. Ellison was acting out of civic duty; even if Ellison intended to assist law enforcement, it would not be enough to establish he was a government agent. The police chief had probable cause to take the USB from Ellison. View "United States v. Stephen" on Justia Law

Dat was born in a Kenyan refugee camp in 1993. Admitted to the U.S. around 1994, he became a lawful permanent resident. Dat pled guilty to robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951, and was sentenced to 78 months' imprisonment. Dat’s robbery conviction is a deportable offense, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Dat moved to vacate his guilty plea, claiming that his attorney, Allen, assured him that his immigration status would not be affected by his plea. Allen testified that she repeatedly told Dat the charges were “deportable offenses,” that she never told him, his mother, or his fiancée that he would not be deported. that she encouraged Dat to hire an immigration attorney, and that they reviewed the Plea Petition, which says that non-citizens would be permanently removed from the U.S. if found guilty of most felony offenses. The Plea Agreement refers to immigration consequences. Dat and Allen also reviewed the PSR, which stated that immigration proceedings would commence after his release from custody.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, finding that Dat was not denied effective assistance of counsel. It was objectively reasonable for Allen to tell Dat that he “could” face immigration ramifications that “could” result in deportation. An alien with a deportable conviction may still seek “relief from removal. These “immigration law complexities” should caution any defense attorney not to advise a defendant considering a guilty plea that the result of a post-conviction, contested removal proceeding is certain. View "Dat v. United States" on Justia Law

Police stopped Anguiano for expired license plates. The car contained a fake DEA badge and cash. At the hotel where Anguiano was staying, Baez’s wife, Gavino, admitted the officers. Baez was sitting next to Chevrolet keys and a methamphetamine pipe. Gavino consented to a search. In a backpack, officers found a Chevrolet Equinox owner’s manual. A locked armoire appeared to be under video surveillance. A canine unit alerted at the armoire and at an Equinox that responded to the Chevrolet keys. With a warrant, officers searched the hotel suite and the Equinox. The armoire held methamphetamine and a gun. The Equinox contained methamphetamine, another firearm, and a safe with ammunition and receipts in Baez’s name. The other conspirators pled guilty.The court denied Baez’s motions to suppress the evidence and his incriminating statements. Baez, claiming that he was infiltrating the conspiracy to assist law enforcement, sought to introduce evidence regarding his mental health and a potential informant with whom he was acquainted. Baez moved to compel the government to disclose information about the informant. The court excluded the evidence, partially granted his Brady motion, and declined to instruct the jury that it would “negate[] the specific intent required” if Baez intended to “assist ongoing federal investigations.” The court departed from the guidelines range of 360 months’ to life imprisonment, sentencing Baez to 168 months’ imprisonment.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, upholding the denial of his suppression motions, the failure to instruct the jury on an “innocent-intent” defense, the exclusion of the evidence related to that defense, the partial denial of his Brady motion, and the reasonableness of his sentence. View "United States v. Baez" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to 180 months imprisonment for possession of controlled substances with the intent to distribute, and a consecutive term of 30 months imprisonment for violating the terms of a previously imposed term of supervised release.The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence, holding that the district court did not procedurally err by finding that a consecutive term was mandatory under the Sentencing Guidelines. Rather, the record reflects that the district court treated the Guidelines as merely advisory and exercised its discretion in ordering consecutive sentences. In this case, the district court calculated the Guidelines range for defendant's new offense as 168 to 210 months imprisonment and noted the parties' plea agreement (and the agreed-to range of 144 to 216-months imprisonment). View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 where petitioner was convicted in 2012, after trial by general court-martial, of rape committed in 1998. At the time of petitioner's conviction and direct appeals, there was no statute of limitations for prosecution of rape under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). In 2018, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held for the first time that a five-year statute of limitations applied to rape in United States v. Mangahas, 77 M.J. 220, 222-24 (C.A.A.F. 2018). However, in United States v. Briggs, 2020 WL 7250099, at 2 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2020), the Supreme Court held that there is not a statute of limitations under the UCMJ for rapes committed between 1986 and 2006. Therefore, the court held that petitioner's conviction was not untimely. View "Hill v. Rivera" on Justia Law

Zerba agreed to sell a half-pound of marijuana to Beener. The drug deal resulted in the shooting death of Beener’s associate, Plotz. Zerba pled guilty to conspiring to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(D), 846, and to possessing a weapon in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), 2. The plea agreement states: Defendant ... will be required to pay full restitution to all victims of the offense(s) including relevant conduct victims. The court ordered Zerba to pay $5,611.55 in restitution for Plotz’s funeral costs.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that federal courts are permitted to order restitution only when authorized by statute and that Plotz was not a “victim” under the Victim and Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663. The Act allows restitution to be ordered in a plea agreement. The plea agreement phrase “including relevant conduct victims” goes beyond the Act's definition of "victim." “Relevant conduct” is defined in the Sentencing Guidelines and includes the acts of others that occurred during or in preparation for the offense. Clemens, the shooter, was present and armed at the direction of Zerba, was a member of the conspiracy to distribute marijuana, and committed the crime of use, carry, brandish, and discharge of a firearm during and in relation to the conspiracy to distribute marijuana. View "United States v. Zerba" on Justia Law

Ricker traveled from South Dakota to Texas to sexually abuse the seven-year-old twin daughters of an acquaintance. He took photos and videos of the abuse. Months later, South Dakota officers received information that cheer_dad17 sent and received child pornography via online chat. The internet provider disclosed that cheer_dad17 was accessing the internet from Ricker’s address. Officers obtained a search warrant. During the search, Ricker made incriminating statements and confirmed that he was "user cheer_dad17." Officers seized several devices; forensic review revealed approximately 30,000 images and more than 100 videos of child pornography and child erotica, including images of the twins.Ricker was charged with aggravated sexual abuse of a child who had not attained the age of 12 years; travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct; and counts related to the transportation, distribution, receipt, and possession of child pornography. He was deemed competent to stand trial. His evaluation included diagnostic impressions of autism spectrum disorder and major depression. The court found that Ricker had a prior conviction for possession or distribution of child pornography and sentenced him to 600 months’ imprisonment.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Ricker did not assert his Fifth Amendment rights by saying that his attorney was at a funeral and that his father wanted his attorney to be present. Ricker being on the autism spectrum and English being his second language did not make his statements involuntary. The court properly excluded from the courtroom Ricker's father, a potential witness. Any error in admitting evidence cover sheets was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence. The sentence was reasonable, given that this was “one of the worst child pornography cases that the Court has seen.” View "United States v. Ricker" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from his vehicle. Defendant conditionally pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute controlled substances and possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking.The court held that the state trooper's discovery that defendant's driver's license had been suspended justifiably extended the lawful scope of the traffic stop because of defendant's legal inability to remove the vehicle from the scene and the consequential need for a licensed driver or a tow truck to do so; officers had probable cause to believe that defendant's car contained evidence of trafficking while the trooper was addressing the issue of defendant's suspended license and related vehicle removal; and the automobile exception to the warrant requirement permitted the officer to conduct a warrantless search of defendant's car following its removal from the scene. Finally, defendant was not in custody during the traffic stop and the district court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress his unMirandized statements. View "United States v. Soderman" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress firearms and drugs after defendant conditionally pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's vehicle. In this case, the district court credited the officers' account that they observed or inferred that defendant failed to stop at a stop sign over defendant's experts' recreation of the incident ostensibly showing that was not possible. The court concluded that this was not clearly erroneous, and the officers' testimony was no so incredible or inconsistent as to justify disturbing the district court's finding. Having accepted the district court's findings of fact, the court concluded that the officers had probable cause to believe defendant had committed a traffic violation. View "United States v. Holly" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of plaintiff's 28 U.S.C. 2254 motion for habeas relief based on the denial of his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. Defendant was convicted of aggravated residential burglary, aggravated assault on a family or household member, and first-degree terroristic threatening.The court held that plaintiff clearly and unequivocally invoked his right to self-representation; as soon as he manifested this clear and unequivocal invocation, the proceedings should have paused, and the trial court should have conducted a proper Faretta hearing; and thus the Arkansas Supreme Court's finding to the contrary was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law. The court also held that the record does not support a finding that plaintiff engaged in serious and obstructionist misconduct, and the Arkansas Supreme Court's finding to the contrary is objectively unreasonable. In this case, there is no evidence in the record that defendant was attempting to manipulate, subvert, or delay the trial process. Finally, the state waived its argument that there was a determination that plaintiff was incapable, under Faretta, of waiving his right to counsel. View "Finch v. Payne" on Justia Law