Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

K.S. is biracial and has been diagnosed with Asperger Syndrome, obsessive compulsive disorder, mood disorder, adjustment disorder, and Tourette's syndrome. K.S. was a freshman and sophomore at Cedar Rapids Kennedy High School 2010-12. K.S. is gifted academically, with a full scale IQ of 123. She excels in math and science; successfully took several advanced placement classes, and was involved in show choir, the school musical, and volleyball. K.S. received special education and services under an individualized education program (IEP) as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400. The district provided K.S. with one-on-one paraprofessional support throughout the school day. K.S. could return to a special classroom at any time and could use that classroom to take tests in a quiet environment. During winter break, K.S. was raped K.S. returned to class and to participation in the school's show choir in January 2012, but experienced unsettling social interactions with peers and other emotional disappointments during the semester; her IEP was amended to add paraprofessional support for K.S.'s extracurricular activities. K.S. did not make the cut for show choir. Her parents eventually removed K.S. to a private school and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Eighth Circuit rejected their claims, finding that the district had provided a Free Appropriate Public Education. View "Sneitzer v. Iowa Dept. of Educ." on Justia Law

K.S. is biracial and has been diagnosed with Asperger Syndrome, obsessive compulsive disorder, mood disorder, adjustment disorder, and Tourette's syndrome. K.S. was a freshman and sophomore at Cedar Rapids Kennedy High School 2010-12. K.S. is gifted academically, with a full scale IQ of 123. She excels in math and science; successfully took several advanced placement classes, and was involved in show choir, the school musical, and volleyball. K.S. received special education and services under an individualized education program (IEP) as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400. The district provided K.S. with one-on-one paraprofessional support throughout the school day. K.S. could return to a special classroom at any time and could use that classroom to take tests in a quiet environment. During winter break, K.S. was raped K.S. returned to class and to participation in the school's show choir in January 2012, but experienced unsettling social interactions with peers and other emotional disappointments during the semester; her IEP was amended to add paraprofessional support for K.S.'s extracurricular activities. K.S. did not make the cut for show choir. Her parents eventually removed K.S. to a private school and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Eighth Circuit rejected their claims, finding that the district had provided a Free Appropriate Public Education. View "Sneitzer v. Iowa Dept. of Educ." on Justia Law

The Belcourt School District operates within the Turtle Mountain Indian Reservation. The North Dakota Constitution requires that the District provide education to children who are Indians or reside on Indian reservations. The Tribe and School District have agreed to share responsibility for educating students, both Indian and non-Indian, residing on the Reservation, and entered into agreements in 2006 and 2009 that provided the District with exclusive authority to administer "day-to-day operations" at Turtle Mountain Community High School, including supervision and employment of staff. Tribe members sued, alleging defamation, excessive use of force, and multiple employment-related claims. The Tribal Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the District and its employees for claims related to the employees' performance of their official duties. The Tribal Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that the District signed the agreements, subjecting itself to Tribal jurisdiction. The federal trial court concluded that the Tribal Court had jurisdiction, based on the agreements. The Eighth Circuit reversed and held that the Tribal Court did not have jurisdiction, reasoning that the District was clearly acting in its official capacity, in furtherance of its obligations under the state constitution, when it entered into the agreements, View "Belcourt Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Davis" on Justia Law

Fort Yates School District operates within the Standing Rock Indian Reservation. The North Dakota Constitution requires that the District provide education to children who are Indians or reside on reservations. In 2003, the District and the Tribe entered into an Agreement, providing that both the Standing Rock and the Fort Yates School Boards would govern the school system; that all property or equipment purchased under the Agreement would generally be joint property; and that it "neither diminishes nor expands rights or protections afforded … under tribal, state or federal law." After a fight between two students, A. was suspended and C. obtained a restraining order against A. A. allegedly violated the restraining order by verbally harassing C. at school. The school suspended A. for 10 additional days. Murphy sued on behalf of her daughter, C., a Tribe member, in the Tribal Court, which held that it had jurisdiction. The District did not appeal to the Standing Rock Supreme Court, but filed suit in federal court against Murphy and the Tribal Court. The district court dismissed and remanded to the Tribal Court. The Eighth Circuit reversed with respect to Tribal Court jurisdiction, but affirmed dismissal of the Tribal Court on sovereign immunity grounds. View "Fort Yates Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Murphy" on Justia Law

Former employees filed a qui tam False Claims suit against Heritage College, a for-profit school, alleging it fraudulently induced the Department of Education (DOE) to provide funds by falsely promising to keep accurate student records as required by 20 U.S.C. 1094(a)(3). They claimed that Heritage altered grade and attendance records from 2006 to 2012 to ensure students made satisfactory progress and to avoid refunds, thereby maximizing Title IV funds. Around 97% of Heritage students receive Title IV aid, accounting for about 90% of gross tuition. From 2009 to 2012, the DOE disbursed $32,817,727 to Heritage. Each relator also alleged retaliation under the FCA and wrongful discharge under state law. For purposes of summary judgment, Heritage did not dispute that it altered records. The district court granted summary judgment to Heritage, finding that any false statements were not material to government funding decisions. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the FCA claim, but affirmed the employment claims. Heritage could not have executed the participation agreement without stating it would maintain adequate records and without the agreement Heritage could not have received any Title IV funds. Heritage's actions with respect to the plaintiffs were not retaliatory. View "Miller v. Weston Educ., Inc." on Justia Law

Lyons, a part-time lecturer at the University of Missouri at Kansas City, gave a student athlete a grade of “F” in the Fall 2010 semester. The student appealed. Lyons’s supervisor determined the student should be allowed to submit a second paper. Lyons complained to Dean Vaught, who referred the appeal to the Academic Standards Committee, which also determined the student should be allowed to write a second paper. Vaught upheld the ruling. The student submitted a second paper. An appointed committee gave it a 75% grade; Vaught instructed the registrar to change the student’s course grade to D. Lyons then met with Chancellor Morton, claiming preferential academic treatment for student athletes. Morton did not take action. Lyons continued to pursue the matter. He received no advance notice that his course would be eliminated for the Spring 2012 semester. Lyons sued for First Amendment retaliation, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The defendant-administrators unsuccessfully moved to dismiss, alleging that Lyons failed to state a claim and they were entitled to qualified immunity. The Eighth Circuit reversed. Lyons failed to allege plausibly that his only constitutionally protected speech could have been a substantial or motivating factor in defendants’ alleged adverse employment action. View "Lyons v. Vaught" on Justia Law

After series of problems arising between Dr. Fatemi and other program residents and coworkers at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences (UAMS), including reported failure to comply with regulatory standards that require a complete history and physical evaluation in the medical record prior to surgery or within 24 hours of admission, the UAMS program terminated Fatemi, a female second-year neurosurgery resident. Fatemi sued UAMS and several of its employees, asserting, among other things, gender discrimination. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Fatemi's arguments concerning pretext. While there was an atmosphere of contentiousness and discord between Fatemi and her coworkers during her residency, there was no evidence that the discord was the product of intentional gender discrimination. A reasonable jury could come to only one conclusion on gender discrimination after considering all the undisputed material facts, and considering the few disputed facts in Fatemi's favor. She lost her place at UAMS because of her many professional shortcomings as a resident, not because she is a woman. View "Fatemi v. White" on Justia Law

In 1989, Wheatley plaintiffs filed suit against the District alleging on-going violations of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1971 et seq., and the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1990, the district court confirmed a settlement between the parties. In 2012, the District filed a motion to modify or terminate the settlement decree, seeking an order permitting the District to relocate the middle school grades from the Wheatley campus to the Palestine campus. The district court granted the motion and the Wheatley plaintiffs appealed. The court concluded that the district court properly applied the standards for modifying a consent decree when changed circumstances have caused it to be unjust under Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail. In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the modification, which was directly related to the evidence of changed circumstances the District presented. Further, it is apparent from the face of the consent decree that many of its eleven contractual commitments were premised on continued use of two school campuses and, therefore, these provisions were effectively terminated. Other provisions in the decree do not require functioning schools in both communities. The district court did not intend that its order terminate the entire consent decree, and the court so construed its order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order.View "Smith, et al. v. Palestine-Wheatley Sch. Dist, et al." on Justia Law

Appellants, two Minnesota-based, grassroots advocacy organizations and their leaders, filed suit claiming that a provision of the Minnesota Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA), Minn. Stat. 211B.01 et seq., inhibits appellants' ability to speak freely against school-funding ballot initiatives and, thereby, violates their First Amendment rights. The court rejected the county attorney's renewed challenge to standing; because the speech at issue occupies the core of the protection afforded by the First Amendment, the court applied strict scrutiny to legislation attempting to regulate it; the county attorneys failed to demonstrate that the interests advanced in support of section 211B.06 - preserving fair and honest elections and preventing fraud on the electorate - is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government interest where the section is both overbroad and underinclusive and is not the least restrictive means of achieving any stated goal; and the attorney general is immune to suit. Accordingly, the court dismissed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.View "281 Care Committee, et al. v. Arneson, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, parents of minor children who reside in the District, filed suit challenging a resolution to exempt the District from the Public School Choice Act of 2013, Ark. Code Ann. 6-18-1901 et seq. Plaintiffs alleged that the District violated their constitutional rights when it resolved, for the 2013-2014 school year, to opt-out of the Act. The district court denied a preliminary injunction and plaintiffs appealed. The court held that the appeal was moot where the time period in which the requested relief would have been effective has expired and the controversy was not capable of repetition, yet evading review. View "Adkisson, et al. v. Blytheville Sch. Dist. #5" on Justia Law