Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Continental Resources, Inc. operates an input well on Timothy and Tracy Browns’ land in Harding County, South Dakota. The Browns sued Continental, seeking compensation for damage to the surface of their land and Continental’s use of their pore space. Continental removed the case to federal court and twice moved for partial summary judgment. The district court granted both motions, finding that Plaintiffs: (1) released Continental from liability for surface damage; and (2) could not recover damages under South Dakota law for Continental’s pore space use.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that section 45-5A-4 clearly articulates three categories of compensable harm. Plaintiffs sought damages for lost use, which is not one of the categories. They try to infuse ambiguity into the statutory scheme by pointing to Chapter 45-5A’s purpose and legislative findings sections. While these sections may help a court interpret ambiguous statutory language, the court found none in Section 45-5A-4. Accordingly, the court held that Plaintiffs have not suffered compensable harm under South Dakota law, so the district court did not err in granting summary judgment. View "Timothy Brown v. Continental Resources, Inc." on Justia Law

Highline Exploration, Inc. (“Highline”) Nisku Royalty and others (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) sued QEP Energy Company (“QEP”), alleging QEP breached overriding royalty interest assignments held by Plaintiffs because QEP deducted post-production costs from royalties (“ORRIs”) in the oil, gas, and other minerals it paid to Plaintiffs. The district court granted summary judgment to QEP and denied the same to Plaintiffs. Highline appealed the district court’s summary judgment order.The Eighth Circuit affirmed and agreed with the district court’s conclusion: the free and clear clause was intended to specify which costs were not deductible from the ORRIs. This interpretation does not render the free and clear clause meaningless. The assignments provide for nonstandard ORRIs, and the free and clear clause clarifies that the standard costs (production costs) are excluded from royalty payment calculations. Therefore, Highline’s argument that the district court failed to provide meaning to the free and clear clause fails.Further, the court held that the “free and clear” language does modify the ORRIs: it limits the expenses that can be deducted from the parties’ nonstandard ORRI grants. Given this interpretation, the free and clear clause’s modification of the ORRIs supports summary judgment. View "Highline Exploration, Inc. v. QEP Energy Company" on Justia Law

Northern filed a quiet-title action in federal court against EOG over a dispute regarding the parties' competing interests in mineral rights in North Dakota. Northern and EOG both lease oil and gas rights, and their lessors litigated a similar matter in state court. The district court found that Northern was in privity with its lessor, holding that the lessors' case barred Northern's claims.The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of EOG's motion to dismiss under principles of res judicata, holding that no privity exists between Northern and its lessor because Northern acquired its lease before the lessors' case. The court applied Gerrity Bakken, LLC v. Oasis Petroleum N. Am., LLC, 915 N.W.2d 677 (N.D. 2018), and held that the privity doctrine cannot be applied if the rights to property were acquired by the person sought to be bound before the adjudication. View "Northern Oil and Gas, Inc. v. EOG Resources, Inc." on Justia Law

SPP, a Regional Transmission Organization (RTO), is authorized by the Commission to provide electric transmission services across a multi-state region. Pursuant to SPP's license-plate rate design, SPP is divided into different zones, and customers in each zone pay rates based on the cost of transmission facilities in that zone.The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review brought by NPPD of FERC's approval of SPP's placement of Tri-State into Zone 17. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Commission's finding that Tri-State's placement into Zone 17 was just and reasonable. In this case, because the Commission stated plausible and articulable reasons for why the costs and benefits were comparable in this case, the court could not say that its cost-causation analysis was arbitrary and capricious. Furthermore, the Commission did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in deciding that Tri-State's placement into Zone 17 was just and reasonable. View "Nebraska Public Power District v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

Pitchblack and Whitetail filed suit against Hess, alleging that their overriding royalty interests in a number of oil and gas leases should continue to burden various top leases that Hess acquired over the subject leases.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Hess, holding that Hess did not owe Pitchblack or Whitetail any fiduciary duty that would have required Hess to treat the top leases as extensions or renewals. Based on North Dakota law and the lack of any fiduciary duties expressed in the parties' agreement, the court held that Hess did not owe Pitchblack and Whitetail any fiduciary duty to extend or renew the subject leases. Consequently, Pitchblack and Whitetail's argument that the top leases were extensions or renewals of the subject leases based on a fiduciary duty fails. The court also held that the district court correctly concluded that the top leases were not extensions or renewals of the subject leases. Therefore, because the top leases were new leases, the extension or renewal clause did not attach the overriding royalty interests to the top leases. The court held that the top leases were thus not burdened by the overriding royalty interests. View "Hess Bakken Investments II, LLC v. Whitetail Wave" on Justia Law

Suits over oil and gas leases on allotted trust lands are governed by federal law, not tribal law, and the tribal court lacks jurisdiction over the nonmember oil and gas companies. This appeal involved a dispute over the practice of flaring natural gas from oil wells, and at issue was the scope of Native American tribal court authority over nonmembers. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction enjoining the tribal court plaintiffs and tribal court judicial officials and held that the district court correctly rejected the tribal court officials' argument that this suit was barred by tribal sovereign immunity.The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction because the oil and gas companies are likely to prevail on the merits. In this case, the district court correctly concluded that the oil and gas companies exhausted their tribal court remedies by moving to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and appealing the issue to the MHA Nation Supreme Court; the district court correctly concluded that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over the oil and gas companies; and the balance of the remaining preliminary injunction factors, along with the oil and gas companies' strong likelihood of success on the merits, showed that the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting the preliminary injunction. View "Kodiak Oil & Gas (USA) Inc. v. Burr" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of OGT in an action brought by the oil field construction company to quiet a pipeline title based on defendant's ineligibility to claim a lien under North Dakota Century Code 35-24-04. The court agreed with the district court that defendant was an employee, rather than an independent contractor, and that section 35-24-04 does not confer lien rights upon employees.In this case, the factors that indicated that defendant was an employee include, among other things, that defendant earned a weekly salary that OGT paid him regardless of the number of hours, amount of work, or number of projects he completed; defendant completed a W-4 to indicate his tax withholdings; OGT withheld and paid employment taxes on defendant's wages and reported his income to him and the IRS on a Form W-2; OGT offered defendant regular employment benefits; and he worked full-time for OGT and no one else. View "Oil & Gas Transfer LLC v. Karr" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant in an action alleging claims of negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and denial of equitable relief. The court held that the district court did not err in granting defendant's summary judgment motion on the negligent misrepresentation claim because Lonesome Dove had not alleged any specific damage from the misrepresentation; the district court did not err by granting summary judgment as to the unjust enrichment claim because Lonesome Dove failed to present specific facts to illustrate any benefit to defendant other than the list of things in the contract; the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lonesome Dove equitable relief where Lonesome Dove had an adequate remedy at law in this case; and the district court did not err by denying Lonesome Dove's motion for a new trial where the verdict was not against the clear weight of the evidence. View "Lonesome Dove Petroleum, Inc. v. Holt" on Justia Law

Smoky II filed a breach of contract suit against the city when it did not receive payment from the city on invoices related to curtailed energy (wind energy that was not actually produced because the producer was directed to reduce production). The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and held that the parties' contract provided that the city could be billed for economic curtailments; the district court did not err in holding the city liable for certain charges that it found to be "timely-billed;" the plain language of the Renewable Energy Purchase Agreement (REPA) supported the district court's interpretation of the meaning of "Emergency Curtailment;" the trial evidence clearly supported the district court's rejection of the city's theory regarding over-allocation of energy; and Smoky II waived the issue of substantial performance. View "Smoky Hills Wind Project II v. Independence, Missouri" on Justia Law

Great Lakes filed suit against ESML for breach of contract. ESML later filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but the district court denied the motion. The case proceeded to trial and judgment was entered for Great Lakes. The court agreed with the district court that the Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. 717u, does not create an express cause of action under which Great Lakes may sue for breach of contract; the NGA also does not create an implied cause of action where there is no indication of legislative intent to create a federal cause of action displacing traditional state law breach of contract causes of action; and assuming that the district court correctly held that federal issues were “necessarily raised” and “actually disputed,” the court concluded that the federal issues in this case are not “substantial,” and the federal courts cannot exercise federal question jurisdiction “without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.” Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "Great Lakes Gas Transmission v. Essar Steel Minnesota LLC" on Justia Law