Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioners seek review of the EPA's approval of the Minnesota Regional Haze State Implementation Plan. Specifically, petitioners challenged the EPA's approval of Minnesota's decision to use the Transport Rule in place of source-specific Best Available Retrofit Technology (BART), and Minnesota’s reasonable-progress goals. The court concluded that the EPA’s approval of Minnesota’s reliance on the Transport Rule was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. In this case, the EPA did not rely on factors that Congress did not intend it to consider, did not entirely fail to consider an important aspect of the problem, and did not offer an explanation that runs counter to the evidence before the agency. The court also concluded that the EPA acted rationally within its sphere of expertise when it approved the reasonable-progress goals in the Plan, explaining that Minnesota adequately demonstrated that its progress goals are reasonable. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "National Parks Conservation v. EPA" on Justia Law

The government filed suit against Dico to recover damages for cleanup costs after Dico sold buildings to SIM, which were then torn down and stored in an open field where PCBs were later found. The government alleged that Dico violated the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(3), and the EPA order governing use of the buildings at issue. The district court found Dico liable for both violations. The court reversed and vacated the district court's summary judgment order holding Dico "arranged" for disposal of hazardous materials as a matter of law where the evidence does not demonstrate that Dico was merely trying to get rid of a hazardous substance. The fact that some parts from the buildings were worthless after disassembly does not necessarily transform a potentially legitimate sale of the buildings in which Dico would receive some commercial value into a ploy to simply get rid of the buildings just to dispose of the hazardous substance. The court vacated the district court's order with respect to any response costs associated with the issue of "arranger" liability. The court also reversed the award of punitive damages because the Fund did not incur any costs as a result of Dico's violation of the EPA Order. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "United States v. Dico, Inc." on Justia Law

Phillips owns an underground petroleum pipeline, built in 1930. A 1963 report stated that 100 barrels of leaded gasoline had leaked beneath West Alton, Missouri, and not been recovered. The leak was repaired. In 2002 a West Alton resident noticed a petroleum odor in his home. He contacted Phillips, which investigated. West Alton has no municipal water. Testing on the owner’s well disclosed benzene, a gasoline additive and carcinogen, at three times allowable limits. Phillips purchased the property, and two nearby homes and, with the Missouri Department of Natural Resources (MDNR), established a remediation plan. In 2006 Phillips demolished the homes, removed 4000 cubic yards of soil, and set up wells to monitor for chemicals of concern (COCs). Phillips volunteered to provide precautionary bottled water to 50 residents near the site. Sampling of other wells had not shown COCs above allowable limits. MDNR requested that Phillips test the wells of each family receiving bottled water before ending its water supply program. Phillips chose instead to continue distributing bottled water. Most of the recipients are within 0.25 miles of the contamination site. In 2011 nearby landowners sued, alleging nuisance, on the theory that possible pockets of contamination still exist. The Eighth Circuit reversed class certification, noting the absence of evidence showing class members were commonly affected by contamination, View "Smith v. ConocoPhillips Pipe Line Co." on Justia Law

STABL processed dead cattle and offal in Lexington. As part of Nebraska’s EPA-approved National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System program, the state issued STABL a pretreatment permit, effective in 2008, that contained effluent limitations for wastewater that STABL discharged to the city’s wastewater treatment plant. The city controlled the valve that allowed wastewater to flow from STABL’s facility to the treatment plant. STABL paid the city to perform testing and monitoring and used the city’s records as the basis for discharge monitoring reports required by the permit. STABL’s manager signed the DMRs, which reflect numerous instances when STABL exceeded its permit limitations. In 2010, STABL sold its facility. The purchase price was reduced by $1 million to account for the costs of a pretreatment system needed to bring STABL’s facility into compliance. The federal and the Nebraska governments brought an enforcement action against STABL for violations of the Clean Water Act , 33 U.S.C. 1342, and the Nebraska Environmental Protection Act. The court granted the government partial summary judgment and, following a bench trial of the remaining issues, imposed a civil penalty of $2,285,874. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that district court’s evidentiary rulings and grant of partial summary judgment were not in error or were harmless error. View "United States v. STABL" on Justia Law

Billings, Golden Valley, McKenzie, and Slope Counties in North Dakota, and the state, sued the United States under the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. 2409a, seeking to quiet title to alleged rights-of-way along section lines that run through lands owned by the federal government in the Dakota Prairie Grasslands and managed by the U.S. Forest Service. They alleged that in North Dakota, with a few exceptions, a public easement provides a right-of-way for public travel within 33 feet on either side of the section lines. The federal government does not recognize these rights-of-way. Nonprofit environmental organizations sought to intervene as defendants as of right under FRCP 24(a) or permissive intervention under Rule 24(b). They alleged that they possess important aesthetic, recreational, and environmental interests in preserving the Grasslands. The district court denied the motion to intervene as of right, finding that they failed to show injury in-fact or a recognized interest in the suit’s subject matter and that the United States adequately represented any legally protectable interest. The court also denied the alternative request for permissive intervention. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the groups did not overcome the presumption of adequate representation and noting that permissive intervention is “wholly discretionary.” View "North Dakota v. Badlands Conservation Alliance" on Justia Law

Hawkes wishes to mine peat from wetland property owned by affiliated companies in northwestern Minnesota. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers issued an Approved Jurisdictional Determination (JD) that the property constitutes “waters of the United States” within the meaning of the Clean Water Act, requiring a permit to discharge dredged or fill materials into the “navigable waters,” 33 U.S.C. 1344(a), 1362(7). The district court dismissed a challenge, holding that an approved JD, though the consummation of the Corps’ jurisdictional decision-making process, was not a “final agency action” within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 704. While the appeal was pending, a panel of the Fifth Circuit reached the same conclusion. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that both courts misapplied the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision, Sackett v. EPA. A “properly pragmatic analysis of ripeness and final agency action principles compels the conclusion that an Approved JD is subject to immediate judicial review. The Corps’s assertion that the Revised JD is merely advisory and has no more effect than an environmental consultant’s opinion ignores reality.” View "Hawkes Co., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs" on Justia Law

Arkansas imposed more stringent limits on the dissolved minerals EDCC could discharge into two unnamed tributaries (UTA and UTB), and granted EDCC three years to comply. EDCC then initiated a Third Party Rulemaking to increase the levels of dissolved minerals permitted in both UTA and UTB. Arkansas adopted these revisions but the EPA rejected the changes. On appeal EDCC, argued that EPA overstepped its authority in considering the effects on aquatic life in the two creeks at issue. The court concluded that the EPA's reading of its own regulations - that it may look at downstream waters when evaluating a state's water quality standards - was not plainly erroneous; the EPA's refusal to approve the proposed water quality criteria on the basis of incomplete information was not arbitrary or capricious and there was a rational basis for the EPA's disapproval; and the EPA's disapproval of the mass balance approach was not arbitrary or capricious.View "El Dorado Chemical Co. v. EPA, et al." on Justia Law

Asarco filed suit against UP alleging breach of contract and seeking contribution regarding a dispute about environmental liability for a lead refinery and smelter which polluted Omaha, Nebraska. The district court granted UP's motion to dismiss, ruling that UP did not breach the agreement and consent decree that protected UP from Asarco's claims. Despite receiving notice of UP's settlement, Asarco did not object before the district court issued the consent decree. Asarco waited until after entry of the consent decree and brought this collateral case. The court concluded that the district court correctly recognized that all of Asarco's claims were prohibited contribution claims even though some were disguised as breach of contract claims. In light of the consent decree, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601-9675, protected UP against any contribution claim related to the site. Further, the district court correctly concluded that UP neither waived CERCLA's contribution protection nor breached the tolling agreement by invoking that protection. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "ASARCO v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the EPA seeking to impose emission-control technology on NSP's Sherco power plant. NSP moved to intervene but the district court denied the motion. The court concluded that NSP has sufficient Article III standing to intervene. Moreover, NSP's interests are not adequately represented by the existing parties and, thus, NSP is entitled to intervene as a right under Rule 24(a). Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to enter an order granting NSP's motion for leave to intervene as of right. View "National Parks Conservation, et al. v. Northern States Power Co." on Justia Law

The State, in consolidated petitions for review, challenged the EPA's final rule approving in part and disapproving in part two state implementation plans (SIPs) submitted by the State to address its obligations under sections 110 and 169A of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401-7671q. The final rule also promulgated a federal implementation plan (FIP) to address those portions of the SIPs that were disapproved. The court concluded that, even assuming that the State's interpretation of section 7607(d)(3) was correct, the State has failed to demonstrate that the EPA's error in this regard was so serious and related to matters of such central relevance to the rule that there was a substantial likelihood that the rule would have been significantly changed if the error had not been made; the EPA's refusal to consider the existing pollution control technology in use at the Coal Creek Station because it had been voluntarily installed was arbitrary and capricious and its FIP promulgating selective non-catalytic reduction (SNCR) as the best available retrofit technology (BART) for the Coal Creek Station was therefore vacated; the State's petition for review of the EPA's disapproval of the State's SIP and promulgating of a FIP was denied because the EPA properly disapproved the State's reasonable progress determination; the Environmental Groups' motion to dismiss their petition for review was moot; and the State's petition for review of the EPA's disapproval of the interstate transport SIP was denied because the EPA properly disapproved portions of the State's regional haze SIP. Accordingly, the court granted the State's and Great River Energy's petitions for review to the extent that they challenged the EPA's BART determination for the Coal Creek Station promulgated in EPA's FIP; vacated and remanded that portion of the final rule to the EPA for further proceedings; and denied the remainder of the State's, Great River Energy's, and the Environmental Groups' petitions for review, as well as the Environmental Groups' motion for voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b). View "State of North Dakota v. EPA" on Justia Law