Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Billings, Golden Valley, McKenzie, and Slope Counties in North Dakota, and the state, sued the United States under the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. 2409a, seeking to quiet title to alleged rights-of-way along section lines that run through lands owned by the federal government in the Dakota Prairie Grasslands and managed by the U.S. Forest Service. They alleged that in North Dakota, with a few exceptions, a public easement provides a right-of-way for public travel within 33 feet on either side of the section lines. The federal government does not recognize these rights-of-way. Nonprofit environmental organizations sought to intervene as defendants as of right under FRCP 24(a) or permissive intervention under Rule 24(b). They alleged that they possess important aesthetic, recreational, and environmental interests in preserving the Grasslands. The district court denied the motion to intervene as of right, finding that they failed to show injury in-fact or a recognized interest in the suit’s subject matter and that the United States adequately represented any legally protectable interest. The court also denied the alternative request for permissive intervention. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the groups did not overcome the presumption of adequate representation and noting that permissive intervention is “wholly discretionary.” View "North Dakota v. Badlands Conservation Alliance" on Justia Law

Hawkes wishes to mine peat from wetland property owned by affiliated companies in northwestern Minnesota. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers issued an Approved Jurisdictional Determination (JD) that the property constitutes “waters of the United States” within the meaning of the Clean Water Act, requiring a permit to discharge dredged or fill materials into the “navigable waters,” 33 U.S.C. 1344(a), 1362(7). The district court dismissed a challenge, holding that an approved JD, though the consummation of the Corps’ jurisdictional decision-making process, was not a “final agency action” within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 704. While the appeal was pending, a panel of the Fifth Circuit reached the same conclusion. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that both courts misapplied the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision, Sackett v. EPA. A “properly pragmatic analysis of ripeness and final agency action principles compels the conclusion that an Approved JD is subject to immediate judicial review. The Corps’s assertion that the Revised JD is merely advisory and has no more effect than an environmental consultant’s opinion ignores reality.” View "Hawkes Co., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs" on Justia Law

Arkansas imposed more stringent limits on the dissolved minerals EDCC could discharge into two unnamed tributaries (UTA and UTB), and granted EDCC three years to comply. EDCC then initiated a Third Party Rulemaking to increase the levels of dissolved minerals permitted in both UTA and UTB. Arkansas adopted these revisions but the EPA rejected the changes. On appeal EDCC, argued that EPA overstepped its authority in considering the effects on aquatic life in the two creeks at issue. The court concluded that the EPA's reading of its own regulations - that it may look at downstream waters when evaluating a state's water quality standards - was not plainly erroneous; the EPA's refusal to approve the proposed water quality criteria on the basis of incomplete information was not arbitrary or capricious and there was a rational basis for the EPA's disapproval; and the EPA's disapproval of the mass balance approach was not arbitrary or capricious.View "El Dorado Chemical Co. v. EPA, et al." on Justia Law

Asarco filed suit against UP alleging breach of contract and seeking contribution regarding a dispute about environmental liability for a lead refinery and smelter which polluted Omaha, Nebraska. The district court granted UP's motion to dismiss, ruling that UP did not breach the agreement and consent decree that protected UP from Asarco's claims. Despite receiving notice of UP's settlement, Asarco did not object before the district court issued the consent decree. Asarco waited until after entry of the consent decree and brought this collateral case. The court concluded that the district court correctly recognized that all of Asarco's claims were prohibited contribution claims even though some were disguised as breach of contract claims. In light of the consent decree, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601-9675, protected UP against any contribution claim related to the site. Further, the district court correctly concluded that UP neither waived CERCLA's contribution protection nor breached the tolling agreement by invoking that protection. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "ASARCO v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the EPA seeking to impose emission-control technology on NSP's Sherco power plant. NSP moved to intervene but the district court denied the motion. The court concluded that NSP has sufficient Article III standing to intervene. Moreover, NSP's interests are not adequately represented by the existing parties and, thus, NSP is entitled to intervene as a right under Rule 24(a). Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to enter an order granting NSP's motion for leave to intervene as of right. View "National Parks Conservation, et al. v. Northern States Power Co." on Justia Law

The State, in consolidated petitions for review, challenged the EPA's final rule approving in part and disapproving in part two state implementation plans (SIPs) submitted by the State to address its obligations under sections 110 and 169A of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401-7671q. The final rule also promulgated a federal implementation plan (FIP) to address those portions of the SIPs that were disapproved. The court concluded that, even assuming that the State's interpretation of section 7607(d)(3) was correct, the State has failed to demonstrate that the EPA's error in this regard was so serious and related to matters of such central relevance to the rule that there was a substantial likelihood that the rule would have been significantly changed if the error had not been made; the EPA's refusal to consider the existing pollution control technology in use at the Coal Creek Station because it had been voluntarily installed was arbitrary and capricious and its FIP promulgating selective non-catalytic reduction (SNCR) as the best available retrofit technology (BART) for the Coal Creek Station was therefore vacated; the State's petition for review of the EPA's disapproval of the State's SIP and promulgating of a FIP was denied because the EPA properly disapproved the State's reasonable progress determination; the Environmental Groups' motion to dismiss their petition for review was moot; and the State's petition for review of the EPA's disapproval of the interstate transport SIP was denied because the EPA properly disapproved portions of the State's regional haze SIP. Accordingly, the court granted the State's and Great River Energy's petitions for review to the extent that they challenged the EPA's BART determination for the Coal Creek Station promulgated in EPA's FIP; vacated and remanded that portion of the final rule to the EPA for further proceedings; and denied the remainder of the State's, Great River Energy's, and the Environmental Groups' petitions for review, as well as the Environmental Groups' motion for voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b). View "State of North Dakota v. EPA" on Justia Law

The EPA filed suit under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq. against Land O'Lakes, alleging that Land O'Lakes was responsible for cleanup costs at a contaminated refinery site. Land O'Lakes subsequently filed suit against its insurers, Wausau and Travelers, seeking payment of defense costs and indemnification under commercial general liability (CGL) policies that the insurers issued in connection with the CERCLA suit. The court concluded that Land O'Lakes's 2009 duty-to-defend claims were barred by the Minnesota statute of limitations where the 2001 Potentially Responsible Party (PRP) letter was a "suit" for arguably-covered damages as contemplated under the pertinent CGL policies. The court also concluded that Land O'Lakes's costs to remediate the refinery site fell within the owned-property exclusion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Land O'Lakes, Inc. v. Employers Ins. Co., et al." on Justia Law

Doe Run commenced a declaratory action seeking to enforce Lexington's contractual duty to defend Doe Run per its Commercial General Liability (CGL) policies in two underlying lawsuits (the Briley Lawsuit and the McSpadden Lawsuit). These underlying lawsuits sought damages arising out of Doe Run's operation of a five-hundred-acre waste pile (Leadwood Pile). The court concluded that the pollution exclusions in the CGL policies precluded a duty to defend Doe Run in the Briley Lawsuit. The court concluded, however, that the McSpadden Lawsuit included allegations and claims that were not unambiguously barred from coverage by the pollution exclusions in the policies. The McSpadden Lawsuit alleged that the distribution of toxic materials harmed plaintiffs, without specifying how that harm occurred. The McSpadden complaint also alleged that Doe Run caused bodily injury or property damage when it left the Leadwood Pile open and available for use by the public without posting warning signs. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Doe Run Resources Corp. v. Lexington Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Doe Run commenced a declaratory judgment action seeking to enforce Lexington's contractual duty to defend Doe Run per its Commercial General Liability (CGL) policies in an underlying lawsuit. The underlying lawsuit alleged environmental property damage resulting from Doe Run's mine and mill operations. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that Lexington had no duty to defend because the policies' absolute pollution exclusions unambiguously barred coverage of all claims asserted in the underlying lawsuit. View "Doe Run Resources Corp. v. Lexington Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The League sought direct appellate review of two letters sent by the EPA to Senator Charles Grassley, arguing that these letters effectively set forth new regulatory requirements with respect to water treatment processes at municipally owned sewer systems. The League argued that the EPA lacked statutory authority to impose these regulations and violated the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., by implementing them without first proceeding through the notice and comment procedures for agency rulemaking. The court concluded that the case was ripe for judicial review and the League had standing to assert its claims; the court vacated both the mixing zone rule in the June 2011 letter and the blending rule in the September 2011 letter as procedurally invalid; and the court vacated the blending rule as an excess of statutory authority insofar as it would impose the effluent limitations of the secondary treatment regulations internally, rather than at the point of discharge into navigable waters. The court remanded to the EPA for further consideration. View "Iowa League of Cities v. EPA" on Justia Law