Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Barton Hankins was hired by Crain Automotive Holdings, LLC in 2019 as Chief Operating Officer and was offered a deferred compensation plan (DCP). After four years, Hankins resigned and sought compensation under the DCP, which Crain denied. Hankins then filed a lawsuit under the Employee Income Retirement Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) to claim his benefits. The DCP stipulated that Hankins could earn a percentage of Crain’s fair market value upon his exit, with full vesting at five years. Having served four years, Hankins was entitled to 80% of the benefits.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted judgment in favor of Hankins, concluding that the DCP did not require the creation of an Employment Agreement or a Confidentiality, Noncompete, and Nonsolicitation Agreement for enforceability. The court found that Crain’s claims of misconduct by Hankins were unsubstantiated and awarded Hankins attorney’s fees, determining that Crain’s conduct was sufficiently culpable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that Crain’s interpretation of the DCP was unreasonable. The court found that the DCP’s Article 4, which mentioned the Employment and Confidentiality Agreements, did not create a condition precedent but rather a condition subsequent. The court also upheld the award of attorney’s fees, noting that Crain’s actions lacked merit and were raised only after Hankins sought his vested compensation. The appellate court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings. View "Hankins v. Crain Automotive Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

Erica Barrett and other employees of O’Reilly Automotive, Inc. alleged that the company’s 401(k) plan managers breached their fiduciary duty by imposing high recordkeeping expenses and inflated expense ratios on the plan, resulting in less money for the participants. They claimed that these high costs were due to either incompetence or laziness on the part of the plan managers.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri dismissed the complaint. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to provide meaningful benchmarks to support their claim that the plan’s fees were excessive. Specifically, the court noted that the plaintiffs did not adequately compare the costs of O’Reilly’s plan with those of similar plans offering the same services.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, agreeing that the plaintiffs did not provide meaningful benchmarks to show that the plan’s fees were excessive. The court emphasized that the plaintiffs’ comparisons were flawed because they did not account for the different services included in the fees of the comparator plans. Additionally, the court found that aggregate data from the Investment Company Institute was insufficient to establish a plausible claim of mismanagement. The court also dismissed the failure-to-monitor claim against O’Reilly and its board of directors, as it was derivative of the primary claim. Finally, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint with prejudice, as the plaintiffs did not formally request leave to amend their complaint. View "Barrett v. O'Reilly Automotive, Inc." on Justia Law

Mychal Byrd was injured in an automobile accident caused by an unknown motorist and subsequently died from his injuries. Byrd's medical expenses, totaling $474,218.24, were covered by the Gilster-Mary Lee Corporation Group Health Benefit Plan, a self-funded plan subject to ERISA. Byrd had an automobile insurance policy with Nationwide Insurance Company, which provided $50,000 in uninsured-motorist coverage. After Byrd's death, his family sued Nationwide in state court to collect the insurance proceeds. The Plan intervened, removed the case to federal court, and claimed an equitable right to the insurance proceeds.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment in favor of the Plan, determining that the Plan was entitled to the insurance proceeds under the plan document. The plaintiffs, initially proceeding pro se, did not respond to the motion for summary judgment. After obtaining counsel, they moved for reconsideration, which the district court denied. The plaintiffs then appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The appellate court determined that the plaintiffs' claim did not fall within the scope of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions because the plaintiffs were neither plan participants nor beneficiaries. Consequently, the claim was not completely preempted by ERISA, and the federal court did not have jurisdiction. The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to return it to Missouri state court. View "Kellum v. Gilster-Mary Lee Corporation Group Health Benefit" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company under 29 U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(1)(B), seeking to recover long-term disability benefits. The district court granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied Reliance’s cross-motion. Reliance appealed, and the Eighth Circuit reversed.   The court explained that the cases cited do not demonstrate that Reliance has a history of biased claims administration. Nor do they show some other systemic flaw in its claims review process that affected Reliance’s review of Plaintiff’s claim. On the other hand, Reliance does not argue that it maintained structural separations to minimize its conflict of interest. Therefore, the conflict of interest, in this case, deserves “some weight,” but the court concluded that it does not indicate that Reliance abused its discretion. The court wrote that substantial evidence supports Reliance’s decision, and neither the decisional delay in this case nor the purported conflict of interest leads us to conclude that Reliance abused its discretion. View "Melissa McIntyre v. Reliance Standard Life" on Justia Law

Plaintiff underwent bariatric surgery to lose weight. A few months later, Plaintiff began working for Zimmerman Transfer, Inc. and became a participant in its self-insured employee benefit plan. Zimmerman is the plan administrator, and Benefit Plan Administrators of Eau Claire, LLC (“BPA”) served as the third-party administrator until January 2020. After exhausting his administrative appeals, Plaintiff sued BPA and Zimmerman for benefits under Section 1132(a)(1)(B). He then moved for summary judgment against BPA and Zimmerman. Both Defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment, which the district court granted.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because Plaintiff’s plan specifically excludes coverage of treatment for complications of weight-reduction surgery, neither Iowa law nor the ACA requires that his treatment be covered. It is undisputed that Plaintiff’s treatment was due to a complication of his prior bariatric surgery. Thus, Iowa law and the ACA do not require that his treatment be covered. Further, the court wrote that imposing and enforcing coverage limitations, even if it results in a plan participant paying large medical bills, is not inconsistent with the plan’s goal because the plan must allocate limited resources among all plan participants. Accordingly, the court concluded that there was no abuse of discretion in denying Plaintiff’s claim for benefits because the interpretation of the plan was reasonable, and the decision to deny benefits was supported by substantial evidence. View "Darrin Shafer v. Zimmerman Transfer, Inc." on Justia Law

The Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension Trust Board of Trustees (“Board”) denied Plaintiff’s application for disability pension benefits under a plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). Plaintiff argued the Board’s stated reason for denying his application was unreasonable and the Board violated its fiduciary duties. The district court granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the Board did not breach its fiduciary duty when it did not notify Plaintiff the Notice of Decision he submitted on appeal was insufficient. The initial letter the Board sent to Plaintiff noting the absence of the document clearly stated Plaintiff needed to submit a “Notice of Award.” When the plain language of the Plan and the Board’s other communications are consistent, there is no obvious unfairness to Plaintiff if his claim is denied because he submitted the wrong document. Further, the court found that there is no evidence the Board knew silence would harm Plaintiff because, in the May 2018 phone call, Plaintiff himself asked about how waiting to receive the pension would affect the annuity amount and ultimately requested estimates for retirement at later ages. Moreover, Plaintiff has not identified anything that should have caused the Board to know he misunderstood his rights. Under these circumstances, Plaintiff failed to establish a violation of the duty of loyalty. View "Adam Ruessler v. Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension Trust" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Minnesota Life Insurance Company and Securian Life Insurance Company, alleging that their denial of her claim for life insurance benefits violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). The district court dismissed her complaint under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s Section 1132(a)(3) claim. First, her contention that Minnesota Life and Securian failed to notify her husband of his conversion right does not amount to a breach of fiduciary duty because the terms of her husband’s policy did not require notice, and Plaintiff points to no provision of ERISA that would require such notice. Second, her assertion that Minnesota Life and Securian misrepresented that her husband’s conversion window would be extended rests on a misreading of the February 24 letter; Minnesota Life and Securian made no such representation. View "Kristina Powell v. Minnesota Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

After her husband died of a heroin overdose, Plaintiff sought accidental death benefits under an employer-sponsored benefit plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The plan’s insurer, Symetra Life Insurance Company, denied her claim, and Plaintiff sued. The district court granted summary judgment in Plaintiff’s favor. Symetra appealed, arguing that Plaintiff’s suit is barred by her failure to exhaust internal review procedures and that her husband’s death otherwise falls under an exclusion to coverage.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Symetra contends that the exclusion applies to Plaintiff’s husband’s death because he “purposely” used heroin. But just because the act of using an illegal substance is purposeful does not mean that an injury stemming from that act, including a fatal overdose, was too. Symetra also maintains that Plaintiff’s husband, as a “longtime drug user,” was surely aware of the risks of using heroin and that his “generalized knowledge” of such risks is sufficient for his death to fall under the “intentionally self-inflicted injury” exclusion. The court reasoned that even assuming Symetra’s characterization of Plaintiff’s husband’s drug use is accurate, the argument attempts to replace an exclusion that applies only to “intentionally self-inflicted” injuries with one that also includes injuries resulting from reckless, or even negligent, conduct. The court wrote that the plain language of Symetra’s “intentionally self-inflicted injury” exclusion does not apply to unintended injuries like Plaintiff’s husband’s heroin overdose. Thus, Symetra’s denial of Plaintiff’s claim for accidental death benefits based on that exclusion was erroneous. View "Terri Yates v. Symetra Life Insurance Company" on Justia Law

A collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) required RoadSafe Traffic Systems, Inc. to contribute to four employee benefits Funds. The Funds sued for unpaid contributions, alleging that the CBA unambiguously requires contributions for all hours worked by covered employees, regardless of the type of work performed. RoadSafe countered that the CBA unambiguously requires contributions only for construction and highway work. The district court granted summary judgment to RoadSafe. The issue on appeal was whether the CBA obligates RoadSafe to make contributions to the Funds for all or only specified types of work   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that by its plain language, Article V of the CBA limits RoadSafe’s contribution obligations to “Building Construction” and “Highway/Heavy” categories of work. Because work coded as NON or “shop hours” is not within the definitions of either “Building Construction” or “Highway/Heavy,” the CBA does not require RoadSafe to make contributions for the coded work. Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment to RoadSafe. View "Cons. Laborers Welfare Fund v. RoadSafe Traffic Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in these 177 consolidated appeals1 were participants in a 401(k) Profit Sharing Plan (the “Plan”) provided to employees by DST Systems, Inc. (“DST”), a financial and healthcare services company based in Kansas City, Missouri. At the time in question, DST was the Plan’s sponsor, administrator, and a designated fiduciary. Ruane Cunniff & Goldfarb Inc. (“Ruane”) was a Plan fiduciary involved in managing the Plan’s investments. Between October and December 2021, the district court issued seven largely identical orders confirming the arbitration awards to 177 claimants and granting their requests for substantial costs and attorneys’ fees. Defendants appealed, raising numerous issues.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment including the awards of attorney’s fees, and the consolidated cases are remanded to the district court for determination of transfer and subject matter jurisdiction issues, to the extent necessary. The court concluded that transfer under Section 1631 is an issue that can be addressed before the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction is resolved. The court declined to consider the issue because Badgerow has changed underlying circumstances that may affect whether transfer “is in the interest of justice.” View "Theresa Hursh v. DST Systems, Inc" on Justia Law