Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves Noah’s Ark Processors, LLC, and the United Food and Commercial Workers’ Union. After the expiration of their previous collective-bargaining agreement, the parties began negotiations for a new one. The company's representative, however, had no decision-making authority, and the negotiations were brief and ineffective. Frustrated, the union filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRB filed a petition against Noah’s Ark in federal district court for injunctive relief, which was granted, ordering the company to return to the negotiating table. However, the company declared it was unwilling to negotiate and presented another final offer. The district court issued a contempt finding, and the NLRB determined that Noah’s Ark had failed to bargain in good faith.The parties met seven more times over the next two months, but the negotiations were unsuccessful. Noah’s Ark extended another final offer, which included terms the union had already rejected. The company declared another impasse and made changes unilaterally. The union filed another complaint, and an administrative-law judge found that Noah’s Ark had both bargained in bad faith and prematurely declared an impasse. The NLRB ordered Noah’s Ark to continue negotiating, provide backpay to its employees, reimburse the union for its bargaining expenses, and have its CEO read a remedial notice at an all-employee meeting.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that substantial evidence supported the NLRB's order and granted enforcement. The court found that Noah’s Ark did not take the negotiations seriously and did not approach the renewed negotiations with an open mind and sincere intention to reach an agreement. The court also agreed with the NLRB's finding that there was no good-faith impasse. The court did not consider Noah’s Ark's objections to the remedies imposed by the NLRB, as the company had not raised these specific objections before the NLRB. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Noah's Ark Processors, LLC" on Justia Law

In the case, Sease Beard, a transgender inmate, alleges mistreatment and retaliation by prison officials. Beard, who identifies as a transgender woman, has been provided hormone-replacement therapy by the Missouri Department of Corrections since 2019. The issue in the case centers on whether the prison officials are shielded by qualified immunity.Beard was involved in multiple incidents with guards. In one particular incident, when a guard expressed disapproval of Beard's attire, Beard refused to change. Subsequently, several guards physically restrained Beard, used pepper spray, removed Beard's clothes, and carried Beard through the prison's hallways in view of other inmates. Following this incident, Beard filed a lawsuit against nearly everyone involved, claiming violations of state law and the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.The lower court, the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, denied the officials' motion to dismiss the case, asserting their claim to qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision in part and reversed in part. The court found that certain prison officials were not entitled to qualified immunity for some of Beard's claims, including a Fourth Amendment claim regarding a strip search and First Amendment retaliation claims related to denial of a promotion, restriction of shower access, and confiscation of personal property. However, the court found that other officials were entitled to qualified immunity for claims related to the denial of mental health treatment and the supervisors' inaction. The case was sent back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Beard v. Falkenrath" on Justia Law

The case involves the death of Andrew Dawson Bell, who committed suicide while detained at the Washington County Detention Center (WCDC) in Fayetteville, Arkansas. Bell's mother, Judy Lynn Smith-Dandridge, filed a lawsuit against several Fayetteville Police Department officers, WCDC employees, nurses, and Washington County itself, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to Bell's serious medical needs, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, Arkansas Code Ann. § 16-123-105. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants, and Smith-Dandridge appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.Bell had a history of mental illness and substance abuse. On the day he died, Bell had called the police several times, reporting hallucinations of people trying to break into his apartment. Officers responded but found no evidence of a break-in. They arrested Bell for terroristic threats, disorderly conduct, and carrying a weapon. When Bell was processed into WCDC, he informed the intake officers of his mental health history, including a history of suicidal ideation. Despite this, he was placed in the general population.The main issue on appeal was whether the police officers and WCDC personnel had knowledge of Bell's substantial risk of suicide and deliberately disregarded it. Smith-Dandridge argued that the officers’ interactions with Bell and their review of his arrest history established they had the requisite knowledge to establish deliberate indifference. However, the court found that while Bell's behavior put the officers on notice of signs of mental illness, it did not make it obvious to them that Bell had a substantial risk of suicide. Similarly, the court found that the WCDC personnel's inaction to prevent Bell's suicide did not constitute criminal recklessness.The court also dismissed Smith-Dandridge's claim that Washington County was deliberately indifferent in its failure to train jail staff. The court found that Smith-Dandridge failed to show that the alleged deficient training caused WCDC personnel to be deliberately indifferent to Bell's substantial risk of suicide. As such, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of all defendants. View "Smith-Dandridge v. Geanolous" on Justia Law

Three shareholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac sued the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and the Department of the Treasury, alleging harm from the unconstitutional removal restriction of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008. Their claims were based on the premise that if President Trump had been able to remove the FHFA Director without restrictions, he would have ended a provision that, in the event of liquidation, allowed the Treasury to recover its full preference before any other shareholder. The district court dismissed the shareholders' claims, finding that they did not sufficiently demonstrate any harm.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court noted that to challenge agency action, a party must not only show that the removal restriction is unconstitutional but also that the provision caused or would cause them harm. The court found that the shareholders' assertions did not satisfy this standard. They relied heavily on a post-presidency letter from President Trump expressing his desire to have removed the FHFA Director during his presidency. The court determined that this letter did not meet the criteria of a "public statement expressing displeasure" as outlined by the Supreme Court in Collins v. Yellen. Furthermore, the court found the shareholders' circumstantial evidence of harm speculative and insufficient to state a claim for relief. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of the claims. View "Bhatti v. Fed. Housing Finance Agency" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court's grant of summary judgment, based on qualified immunity, in favor of government attorneys Michael Spindler-Krage and Thomas Canan. The plaintiff, Michael Davitt, had brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Spindler-Krage and Canan, alleging they violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they advised police that Davitt could be removed from his hotel room without eviction proceedings.During the COVID-19 pandemic, Olmsted County, Minnesota, arranged temporary, non-communal housing for elderly and vulnerable homeless individuals. Davitt, who was 69 years old and homeless, was moved into a Super 8 hotel room. When the county stopped paying for his room, Davitt refused to leave, citing a Minnesota governor's executive order temporarily prohibiting evictions. Spindler-Krage and Canan, after reviewing the relevant state law, the executive order, and the Agreement for Hotel Guests, advised the police that Davitt was a hotel guest, not a tenant protected by the executive order.In granting Spindler-Krage and Canan summary judgment based on qualified immunity, the district court found that no case law, statute, or other legal authority clearly established that Davitt was a tenant with a constitutionally protected right to his hotel room. The court also found that the advice provided to the police was objectively reasonable. The Court of Appeals agreed, ruling that Spindler-Krage and Canan did not violate Davitt’s clearly established rights and were thus entitled to qualified immunity. View "Davitt v. Krage" on Justia Law

Christine M. Nordgren's parental rights were terminated in a Minnesota state court. Instead of appealing this decision, she filed a federal lawsuit against the Minnesota Department of Human Services, Hennepin County, and various other parties involved in her case, alleging a range of constitutional, federal, and state claims. She sought multiple forms of damages, as well as attorney’s fees and costs. The district court dismissed all federal claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims. Nordgren then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which the district court interpreted as a request to reconsider and amend her pleadings, and denied it. Nordgren appealed this decision.The Hennepin County defendants moved to dismiss Nordgren's appeal as untimely, arguing that she did not appeal the judgment in a timely manner and that the district court's order denying her motion for reconsideration was not separately appealable and did not extend the appeal period. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed with the defendants, determining that Nordgren's motion did not qualify as an appealable motion under Rule 59(e), which is designed to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. As such, the appeal period began on the date the judgment was entered, and Nordgren's notice of appeal, filed beyond the 30-day appeal period, was untimely.Therefore, the Court of Appeals dismissed Nordgren's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Nordgren v. Hennepin County" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit was asked to determine whether Arkansas Code § 23-92-604(c), also known as Act 1103, was preempted by federal law. Act 1103 prohibits pharmaceutical manufacturers from limiting the ability of healthcare providers, who are eligible for drug pricing discounts under the Section 340B Program, to contract with outside pharmacies for drug distribution.The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) sued the Commissioner of the Arkansas Insurance Department, arguing that Act 1103 was unconstitutional because it was preempted by the Section 340B Program and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, under theories of field, obstacle, and impossibility preemption.The court, however, disagreed with PhRMA's arguments. The court found that Act 1103 did not create an obstacle for pharmaceutical manufacturers to comply with 340B, rather it assisted in fulfilling the purpose of 340B. The court also found that Act 1103 did not make it impossible for drug manufacturers and wholesale distributors to comply with the Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) Program under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.Therefore, the court held that Act 1103 was not preempted by either the Section 340B Program or the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. As such, the court affirmed the district court’s decision in favor of the Intervenors and against PhRMA. View "Pharmaceutical Research and Mfrs of America v. McClain" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Sandeep and Sarvani Thigulla, were lawful nonimmigrant workers seeking to become lawful permanent residents (LPRs) in the United States and had applied for approval of their Form I-485 applications with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). When the Department of State decreased the number of applications it would adjudicate, the Thigullas sought a temporary restraining order against the Director of USCIS, compelling the prompt adjudication of their applications under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court denied this order, and the Thigullas appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit dismissed the case due to a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court found that the decision to delay adjudicating the Thigullas' applications falls under the Attorney General’s discretionary authority as stated in 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) and that this authority is protected from judicial review by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that this interpretation went against congressional intent, citing clear textual evidence in the statute. The court concluded that it lacked the jurisdiction to review the decision to delay adjudication of the applications, even under the Administrative Procedure Act. Consequently, the court dismissed the case and remanded it to the district court for proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Thigulla v. Jaddou" on Justia Law

The Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation (MHA), an Indian nation of three affiliated tribes, appealed the U.S. Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM) approval of eight applications for oil drilling by the Slawson Exploration Company, Inc. next to Lake Sakakawea, MHA's sole source of drinking water. MHA challenged the approvals under the Administrative Procedure Act, arguing that BLM's approval of the project was arbitrary and capricious due to an insufficient record and by precluding MHA from further developing the record about the threat the project posed to MHA's health and welfare.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to BLM and Slawson, dismissing the case with prejudice. The court found that BLM had engaged in reasoned decision-making and had evaluated all relevant factors. It noted that the agency placed the responsibility on Slawson to comply with tribal law without impeding MHA's ability as a sovereign to enforce its laws. The court also found that BLM's decision not to evaluate tribal law did not impact tribal sovereignty. The court concluded that MHA's jurisdiction over Slawson's project was not a relevant factor to the approvals and therefore further development of the record was not required.Furthermore, the court found that MHA was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing as there was no dispute of material fact and MHA had adequate opportunities to submit evidence. Therefore, the court ruled that MHA had received all process required by the Constitution, laws, and agency regulation. View "Mandan, Hidatsa & Arikara Nation v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior" on Justia Law

The case was an appeal by the Continental Cement Company (Continental) against a decision by the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission. The Commission had determined that Continental had acted discriminatorily towards one of its employees, Tara Otten, by paying her less than she would have earned had she been working, instead of accompanying mine inspectors during an inspection, an activity known as her "walkaround right".Otten was a miner and designated miners' representative who had been trained to operate mobile equipment. Normally, she would receive a higher wage when operating this equipment. However, when she was performing her walkaround duty, Continental had stopped paying her the higher wage. This action was directed by a human resources specialist at Continental, who based the decision on the collective bargaining agreement.Otten subsequently filed a complaint against Continental with the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), and the Secretary of Labor filed a discrimination claim on Otten's behalf with the Commission. The Commission sided with the Secretary, agreeing that Continental had discriminated against Otten by causing her to suffer a loss of pay because she exercised her walkaround right. The Commission further held that Continental's decision was motivated by Otten's protected activity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, however, disagreed with the Commission's decision. The Court held that while Otten did suffer a loss of pay, which was a violation of the law, it did not automatically mean that Continental had discriminated against Otten. The Court clarified that discrimination occurs when an employer intentionally treats a person worse because of a protected characteristic. In this case, the Court found no evidence that Continental paid Otten less for the reason that she exercised her walkaround right. The Court, therefore, reversed the Commission's determination that Continental violated the discrimination law. View "Continental Cement Company v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law