Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioners, the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association and one of its members, seek review of regulatory guidance issued by the FMCSA, which exempts from federal accident-reporting regulations certain accidents involving commercial motor vehicles known as attenuator trucks. The court dismissed the petition for lack of an Article III case or controversy because petitioners have failed to identify a concrete and particularized injury that would give them standing to proceed. View "OOIDA v. US Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Compart, a producer of breeding swine, filed a negligence suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq. Compart intended to export over three hundred pigs to China but China suspended all imports from Compart after it was notified by the United States government that the test results from a small set of the blood samples were "inconclusive" for Porcine Reproductive and Respiratory Syndrome virus (PRRSv). The district court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. The court affirmed, concluding that the discretionary function exemption precludes jurisdiction over Compart's negligence claims because the testing and reporting of Compart's swine was governed by discretionary governmental procedures and susceptible to policy analysis. View "Compart's Boar Store, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former federal inmate, appealed the district court’s preservice dismissal of his action seeking relief under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552. The court concluded that, while it agrees that a litigant must exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a FOIA action in federal court, because FOIA is silent as to whether exhaustion is a pleading requirement or an affirmative defense, the argument of non-exhaustion is an affirmative defense rather than a pleading requirement. Therefore, plaintiff was not required to plead exhaustion in his complaint. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Moon v. Federal Bureau of Prisons" on Justia Law

FedEx petitioned for review of the Board's orders forcing it to bargain with the unions, arguing that the Specialty Healthcare and Rehabilitation Center of Mobile standard violates the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 159(a); circuit law; and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq. Determining that the court has jurisdiction to review FedEx's claims, the court concluded that the first step in the analysis described by Specialty Healthcare, in which the Board analyzes the union's proposed bargaining unit under the traditional community of interest test, is not a departure from the Board's precedent and is consistent with the requirements of section 9(b) of the NLRA; because the Specialty Healthcare framework does not make the extent of union organization "controlling," the court concluded that it does not violate section 9(c)(5); and the Board did not violate the APA by announcing the overwhelming community of interest standard in the course of adjudicating Specialty Healthcare rather than by notice and comment rulemaking. In this case, the court concluded that the Board's decisions to certify bargaining units consisting of the road and city drivers were supported by substantial evidence and were not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court denied FedEx's petitions for review and granted the Board's cross-petitions for enforcement. View "FedEx Freight v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former special agent with the FBI, filed suit against the DOJ under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A), alleging that the Deputy Attorney General’s decision affirming the OARM's finding that she had not been constructively discharged and denying her back pay was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. Plaintiff had previously filed a suit in district court alleging that OPR had not conducted its investigation as required by the applicable regulations and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief under the APA. The court concluded that both of plaintiff's suits relied on the same basis of subject matter jurisdiction and so the issues are the same for collateral estoppel purposes. Factual differences between the two underlying causes of action are immaterial, because those differences do not affect the common question, namely, whether Congress intended the CSRA to proscribe unique and exclusive remedial procedures for FBI employees alleging retaliation. Even if the court were to construe application of different sections of the APA as raising potentially different issues, collateral estoppel would still bar the action because both actions involve application of the same legal standard. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Turner v. DOJ" on Justia Law

Defendant, the Director of Industry Operations for the Kansas City Field Division of the ATF, denied Harris News' application for a federal license to sell guns based on the ground that Harris News and co-owners willfully allowed a felon to possess firearms. The district court affirmed. The court, however, reversed the judgment of the district court, concluding that the ATF had no authority to deny the license application under 18 U.S.C. 923(d)(1)(C) because the ATF did not show that the Harris News officers and owners did anything to further the felon’s possession of firearms. View "Harris News Agency, Inc. v. Bowers" on Justia Law

The Swecker farm in Iowa has a wind generator and is a qualifying power production facility certified by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The Sweckers sell surplus electric energy to Midland Power Cooperative at a rate established by the Iowa Utilities Board (IUB), implementing FERC rules and regulations, 16 U.S.C. 824a-3(f). For many years, the Sweckers and Midland have litigated rate disputes. The district court dismissed their current suit against Midland and its primary supplier, Central Iowa Power Cooperative (CIPCO), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief requiring Midland “to purchase available energy from plaintiffs . . . at Midland’s full avoided cost, rather than CIPCO’s avoided cost.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed. FERC’s interpretation is controlling and forecloses the contrary interpretation of 18 C.F.R. 292.303(d) urged by the Sweckers. View "Swecker v. Midland Power Coop." on Justia Law

B.S., a 16-year-old with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, had an individualized education program (IEP). A dispute arose and the parents requested a due process hearing. The parties settled several issues, so the only claim remaining was whether B.S. was entitled to compensatory education services for alleged past denial of a free appropriate public education (FAPE). On the first day of the hearing, B.S.’s counsel spent five hours examining the special education administrator. The district objected, noting the allotted nine hours of time. The ALJ subsequently reminded B.S.'s counsel that the time limit set at the pretrial conference would be enforced, and offered an opportunity to reorder the evidence. B.S. objected to enforcement of the time limits and continued with the lengthy examination of the case manager. B.S's time expired and B.S. was not allowed to question witnesses further or cross-examine district witnesses. B.S. made an informal offer of proof of additional evidence that B.S. had intended to present. After an unfavorable decision, B.S. appealed, also alleging that state defendants established an unpromulgated "best practices" rule restricting the length of testimony in violation of the Due Process Clause. The court dismissed the state defendants, finding that B.S. was challenging only one ALJ's discretionary decision, so the state was not a proper party. The Eighth Circuit affirmed that B.S. did not suffer a legally cognizable injury for which the state could be liable and had not been denied a FAPE. View "B.S. v. Anoka Hennepin Pub. Sch." on Justia Law

To obtain a driver’s license or motor vehicle registration from a state motor vehicle department (DMV), individuals must disclose personal information. The 1994 Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721-2725, prohibits disclosure of personal information, “that identifies an individual, including an individual’s photograph, social security number, driver identification number, name, address (but not the 5-digit zip code), telephone number, and medical or disability information,” except for use by a government agency, in carrying out its functions; by a private person acting on behalf of a government agency in carrying out its functions; in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral proceeding; or for investigation in anticipation of litigation. DPPA establishes penalties for improper use. Drivers alleged that the Minnesota Department of Public Safety databases were accessible to law enforcement officers, government agents, and other individuals through an internet portal, and that the information was being accessed for improper purposes. Drivers requested audits detailing past accesses of their motor vehicle records. Audits showed that each Driver’s’ personal information had been accessed hundreds of times, primarily through police departments, sheriff’s offices, or other agencies. District courts dismissed Drivers’ suits. The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, noting that several claims were untimely, but reversed in part, finding that certain claims alleged patterns of access sufficient to establish improper purpose. View "McDonough v. Anoka Cnty." on Justia Law

Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, local exchange carriers such as Windstream must connect calls made to their customers by the customers of national telecommunications companies such as Sprint. Until 2009, Sprint paid Windstream state access charges for connecting non-nomadic intrastate long-distance VoIP calls-- made by cable telephone customers over the Internet in Iowa, delivered to Sprint for format conversion, and transferred to Windstream for delivery to its Iowa telephone customers. Beginning in 2009, Sprint withheld state access charges for these calls, claiming that VoIP calls were “information services” and that payment should be governed by a reciprocal compensation agreement, not by state access charges. In 2011, the Iowa Utilities Board found that the calls were telecommunications services subject to state regulation, not information services. Sprint sought state court review and filed a federal action, seeking to enjoin the Board’s decision. The district court abstained because of the parallel state proceedings. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed. By the time the case returned to the district court, the state court had upheld the Board’s decision. The district court dismissed Sprint’s complaint, holding that issue preclusion barred Sprint from raising the same arguments in federal court. The Eighth Circuit reversed, reasoning that Congress did not intend that issue-preclusion principles bar federal-court review of the issue of whether the non-nomadic intrastate long-distance VoIP calls at issue are information services, payment for which should be governed by a reciprocal compensation agreement, or telecommunications services subject to state access charges. View "Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. Jacobs" on Justia Law