Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The City of Osceola purchases wholesale energy from Entergy Arkansas under an agreement filed with and approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Osceola sued Entergy in Arkansas state court, seeking reimbursement for charges allegedly in violation of their agreement. Entergy removed the case to the federal district court which denied Osceola's motion to remand, granted summary judgment to the defendant energy providers, and dismissed the case. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that FERC has primary jurisdiction to determine the appropriate treatment of the bandwidth payments under the parties' agreement. View "City of Osceola v. Entergy Ark., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2009, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration of the Department of Transportation (tasked with regulating the transportation of hazardous materials) finalized extensive amendments to the regulations for the transportation of toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) materials, 7 49 C.F.R. 171-174 & 179). The regulations included substantial background information regarding the safety issues concerning the transportation of hazardous materials and prior train derailments leading to tragic harms. Chemical and fertilizer entities sought to enjoin the railway (CP) from imposing a requirement that any TIH materials transported on CP's railways be transported in normalized steel rail cars. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the district court held the Surface Transportation Board should address whether CP's requirement is reasonable in the first instance, denied the request for injunctive relief, and dismissed without prejudice. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding no likelihood of irreparable harm. The court rejected an argument that CP's requirement would amount to a national crisis for an adequate water supply or fertilizer for crops. Any minimum reduction in the ability to transport TIH materials by rail does not outweigh the real concerns which prompted CP to implement the requirement. View "Chlorine Institute, Inc. v. Soo Line R.R." on Justia Law

Pursuant to the Missouri Transportation Development District Act (Mo. Rev. Stat. 238.200), St. Louis City and University City passed resolutions and filed a petition, seeking to create the proposed District to build a trolley-car rail system and to fund the project by imposing up to a one percent sales tax on retail sales in the proposed District. Notice was published in two newspapers for four weeks. No one opposed the proposal or sought to join the suit. In 2007, the court found that the proposal neither illegal nor unconstitutional and certified a ballot question for registered voters residing or owning property within the proposed District. Voters approved the ballot question and, in 2008, the court entered final judgment. The sales tax was imposed and has been paid and collected since 2008. In 2013, plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the District was not lawfully created and a permanent injunction barring the District from building and operating the trolley-car system. The district court dismissed some plaintiffs for lack of standing and granted the District summary judgment on another claim as precluded by state judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a plaintiff’s claim that he did not receive constitutionally adequate notice of the state lawsuit. View "Glickert v. Loop Trolley Transp. Dev. Dist." on Justia Law

Shields and Wilson are Indians with interests on the Bakken Oil Shale Formation in the Fort Berthold Reservation in North Dakota, allotted to them under the Dawes Act of 1887. Such land is held in trust by the government, but may be leased by allottees. Shields and Wilson leased oil and gas mining rights on their allotments to companies and affiliated individuals who won a sealed bid auction conducted by the Board of Indian Affairs in 2007. After the auction, the women agreed to terms with the winning bidders, the BIA approved the leases, and the winning bidders sold them for a large profit. Shields and Wilson filed a putative class action, claiming that the government had breached its fiduciary duty by approving the leases for the oil and gas mining rights, and that the bidders aided, abetted, and induced the government to breach that duty. The district court concluded that the United States was a required party which could not be joined, but without which the action could not proceed in equity and good conscience, and dismissed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The United States enjoys sovereign immunity for the claims and can decide itself when and where it wants to intervene. View "Two Shields v. Wilkinson." on Justia Law

Billings, Golden Valley, McKenzie, and Slope Counties in North Dakota, and the state, sued the United States under the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. 2409a, seeking to quiet title to alleged rights-of-way along section lines that run through lands owned by the federal government in the Dakota Prairie Grasslands and managed by the U.S. Forest Service. They alleged that in North Dakota, with a few exceptions, a public easement provides a right-of-way for public travel within 33 feet on either side of the section lines. The federal government does not recognize these rights-of-way. Nonprofit environmental organizations sought to intervene as defendants as of right under FRCP 24(a) or permissive intervention under Rule 24(b). They alleged that they possess important aesthetic, recreational, and environmental interests in preserving the Grasslands. The district court denied the motion to intervene as of right, finding that they failed to show injury in-fact or a recognized interest in the suit’s subject matter and that the United States adequately represented any legally protectable interest. The court also denied the alternative request for permissive intervention. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the groups did not overcome the presumption of adequate representation and noting that permissive intervention is “wholly discretionary.” View "North Dakota v. Badlands Conservation Alliance" on Justia Law

Schell filed a qui tam suit under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, alleging Bluebird made false statements to the government to secure a three-year grant from the National Telecommunications and Information Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce for increasing broadband accessibility in northern Missouri and retaliated against Schell, a former Bluebird employee, for reporting fraudulent or illegal conduct. The alleged fraud concerned a requirement for matching funds, changing the purpose of the grant, and disclosure of management. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s entry of summary judgment in Bluebird’s favor. Schell did not show that Bluebird knew that changes would be necessary and obscured the true information or otherwise presented their grant application with the mens rea the FCA requires. View "Schell v. Bluebird Media, LLC" on Justia Law

Trinity operates on its church premises a licensed preschool and daycare, the Learning Center, which has an open admissions policy. It teaches a Christian world view and incorporates daily religious instruction in its programs. The Missouri Department of Natural Resources (DNR) offers Playground Scrap Tire Surface Material Grants, a solid waste management program, providing funds for the purchase of recycled tires to resurface playgrounds. In 2012, Trinity applied for a grant, disclosing that the Learning Center was part of Trinity. DNR denied the application, stating that the Missouri Constitution specifically provides that “no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, section or denomination of religion.” Trinity’s application ranked fifth out of 44 applications and 14 projects were funded. Trinity sued, citing the Equal Protection Clause; its right to free exercise of religion; the Establishment Clause, and its right of free speech. The district court dismissed and declined to reconsider in light of evidence that the DNR had previously given Scrap Tire grants to 15 religious organizations, including churches. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, citing precedent that concluding that Missouri Constitution Article I, section 7 does not conflict with the First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. View "Trinity Lutheran Church v. Pauley" on Justia Law

Papesh had a GED and worked as a bakery helper. She reported long-term, low-back pain, which radiated to her hips and legs. She said the pain “is worse with working” because the bakery has concrete floors. She began treatment in 2009 (the year she turned 50) with Dr. Cash, who observed “tenderness throughout the lumbar spine to palpation, as well as pain with some spasm in the low back.” Papesh was also caring for her mother, who had severe dementia and suffered “worsened depression and anxiety” after her mother’s death. Papesh applied for disability and for supplemental security income in early 2010, alleging she was disabled due to degenerative disc disease, fibromyalgia, depression, anxiety, and other impairments. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the denial of benefits because the record contained two substantially similar residual function capacity opinions from a treating physician and neutral medical expert plus a consistent opinion from a second treating physician—all consistent with Papesh’s descriptions of her daily functioning. The ALJ’s determination that Papesh can perform light work was outside the available zone of choice. The substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports a finding that Papesh is capable of sedentary work only. View "Papesh v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Askew, a military veteran and a former U.S. Postal Service employee, underwent a cardiac stent placement at the St. Louis Veterans Administration Medical Center. He was readmitted with an infection and the medical center responded negligently. As a result of the infection and attendant loss of blood, Askew suffered severe anoxic brain injury and amputation of his right leg. In Askew’s suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2674, the government did not dispute liability. The government requested that the court structure an award for future medical damages as a trust to provide periodic payments to Askew, with a reversionary interest in favor of the government upon Askew’s death. The district court declined to order a reversionary trust, awarded $253,667 in past economic damages, $525,000 in past non-economic damages, $4,000,000 in future economic damages, and $2,000,000 in future non-economic damages to Dirk Askew. The court awarded $1,525,000 to Askew’s wife for loss of consortium. The Eighth Circuit vacated and remanded, describing the reversionary trust remedy as the most reasonable analogy to the relief available against a private individual in like circumstances under Missouri law. View "Askew v. United States" on Justia Law

While fishing with his son-in-law and grandson near Gavins Point Dam on the Missouri River in Cedar County, Nebraska, Metter was struck and killed when a parked pickup truck came out of gear and rolled down an unprotected river bank. Metter’s widow, personal representative of his estate, brought survival and wrongful death actions under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346, against the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, asserting the Corps negligently maintained the site. The grandson brought a separate suit against the Corps raising the same theories of liability for the mental and physical harms to Justin caused by witnessing his grandfather’s death. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding the claims barred by the FTCA’s discretionary function exception, and that the United States did not waive sovereign immunity. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Corps removed the guardrails and posts itself to save money and to expedite a project, reasons that reflect the discretionary exercise of choice and judgment “susceptible to policy analysis.” View "Metter v. United States" on Justia Law