Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Madel sued the Department of Justice and Drug Enforcement Administration for a response to Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552, requests that sought information on oxycodone transactions in Georgia by five private companies. DEA withheld some documents as confidential commercial information. The district court granted summary judgment to DEA, finding it produced all non-exempt information. The court denied declaratory and injunctive relief and attorney fees. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. Rejecting a claim that DEA did not justify withholding the five documents under FOIA Exemption 4, the court concluded that DEA showed that substantial competitive harm was likely. DEA did not make “barren assertions” that the documents were exempt, but linked each document to identifiable competitive harms. The court remanded for consideration of FOIA’s segregability requirement. DEA did not show “with reasonable specificity why documents withheld pursuant to a valid exemption cannot be further segregated.” Its Declaration does not address how disclosure of the data from, for example, 2007, leads to the proffered substantial competitive harms of a competitor “target[ing] specific markets” or “forecast[ing] potential business of new locations.” View "Madel v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law

Hawkes wishes to mine peat from wetland property owned by affiliated companies in northwestern Minnesota. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers issued an Approved Jurisdictional Determination (JD) that the property constitutes “waters of the United States” within the meaning of the Clean Water Act, requiring a permit to discharge dredged or fill materials into the “navigable waters,” 33 U.S.C. 1344(a), 1362(7). The district court dismissed a challenge, holding that an approved JD, though the consummation of the Corps’ jurisdictional decision-making process, was not a “final agency action” within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 704. While the appeal was pending, a panel of the Fifth Circuit reached the same conclusion. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that both courts misapplied the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision, Sackett v. EPA. A “properly pragmatic analysis of ripeness and final agency action principles compels the conclusion that an Approved JD is subject to immediate judicial review. The Corps’s assertion that the Revised JD is merely advisory and has no more effect than an environmental consultant’s opinion ignores reality.” View "Hawkes Co., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs" on Justia Law

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) creates “navigators,” to assist consumers in purchasing health insurance from exchanges, 42 U.S.C. 18031(i), and authorizes the Department of Health and Human Services to establish standards for navigators and exchanges. HHS regulations recognize: federal navigators, certified application counselors (CACs), and non-navigator assistance personnel. They conduct many of the same activities, but federal navigators have more extensive duties. Plaintiffs, federally-certified counselor designated organizations, employ CACs. The federal government established a Missouri Federally Facilitated Exchange. The Health Insurance Marketplace Innovation Act (HIMIA), Mo. Rev. Stat. 376.2000, regulates “person[s] that, for compensation, provide[] information or services in connection with eligibility, enrollment, or program specifications of any health benefit exchange.” Regulatory provisions dictate what state navigators and cannot do. Plaintiffs challenged: the definition of state navigators; three substantive provisions; and penalty provisions. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the ACA preempted HIMIA. The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, finding likelihood of success in challenges to HIMIA requirements that: state navigators refrain from providing information about health insurance plans not offered by the exchange; that in some circumstances, the navigator must advise consultation with a licensed insurance producer regarding private coverage; and that CACs provide information about different health insurance plans and clarify the distinctions. The court vacated the preliminary injunction, holding that ACA does not entirely preempt HIMIA. View "St. Louis Effort For AIDS v. Huff" on Justia Law

The Festus City Council terminated Draper from his position as City Administrator six months into a three-year employment contract, after the election of a council member who was critical of Draper’s performance. The city had refused to reschedule or continue the hearing regarding Draper’s job performance. Neither Draper nor his attorney was present. Several witnesses testified. The council concluded that Draper had manipulated the evaluation process to choose an engineering firm to complete a road project; that Draper had authorized heating system repairs and the purchase of new windows without competitive bidding, in violation of Festus policy; that Draper had sent a memorandum stating that the sick-leave-bonus program had been abolished when it had not been; and that Draper had requested reimbursement for a hotel room he had paid for with his Festus credit card. The district court entered summary judgment, rejecting claims of violations of procedural and substantive-due-process rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983, a section 1983 conspiracy claim, breach of contract, and violation of the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 536.010-536.160. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The evidence supported the city’s decision to terminate Draper, so and that its decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. View "Draper v. City of Festus" on Justia Law

Argonaut sued Audrain County Joint Communications (ACJC) alleging ACJC's negligence in monitoring a security alarm panel caused or contributed to damages arising out of the burglary and fire of a grocery store insured by Argonaut. Public employees at the ACJC call center monitored a private security company's alarm panels. The panels were defective. ACJC argued that it was entitled to sovereign immunity as a Missouri state entity, and to statutory immunity as a 911 call center. The district court denied summary judgment after finding ACJC had waived its sovereign and statutory immunity by purchasing insurance. The Eighth Circuit dismissed part of an interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction, but otherwise affirmed. Missouri Revised Statutes Section 537.600 generally preserves "sovereign or governmental tort immunity as existed at common law" and specifically refers to "the immunity of [a] public entity from liability and suit." Section 190.307, however, does not create a substantive right to be free from the burdens of litigation. There was no clear error in the district court's determination under section 537.600 that ACJC did not prove the existence of a pre-existing agreement between itself and the insurer to include the sovereign immunity endorsement with the original policy. View "Argonaut Great Cent. Ins. Co. v. Audrain Cnty. Joint Commc'ns." on Justia Law

The Arkansas DHS regulates child care facility licensing and administers the USDA Child Care Food Program. Sparkman day care facility provided disability services funded by DHS and participated in the Program through DHS. The Program prohibits placement of disqualified individuals in a position of authority, 7 C.F.R. 226.6(c)(3)(ii)(B). DHS Policy states that violations can result in exclusion of a provider from further funding. DHS alleged that Sparkman placed a disqualified individual, Whitaker, in a position of authority. Sparkman believed that racial animus motivated DHS to place Whitaker on the disqualification list, but did not raise an equal protection claim at the hearing. Before the hearing was complete, the ALJ resigned, stating "as an African American male I cannot continue to work in a[n] office where racism and harassment continue to exist." Another ALJ, a Caucasian present as an observer, upheld DHS's termination of funding. With state appeals pending, Sparkman filed a federal complaint. The district court stayed proceedings. Following state court remand, DHS appointed a private attorney to serve as hearing officer; Sparkman agreed to the selection. Sparkman again made no equal protection or due process claims. The hearing officer decided in DHS's favor. Sparkman’s state court appeal alleged ex parte communications between DHS and the hearing officer. The state courts upheld the decision. The federal court concluded that claim preclusion barred Sparkman's due process and equal protection claims. The Eight Circuit affirmed, holding that the claims could have been brought during the state administrative proceeding and judicial review. View "Sparkman Learning Ctr. v. Ark. Dep't. Human Servs." on Justia Law

Bailey was convicted of federal prostitution charges in 2004. Minneapolis police officers took trial exhibits to a locked police storage facility, including $2,036 in cash, a wallet, and a cell phone. Years later Bailey moved for return of the property, but the government could not locate it. Bailey sought damages. The government agreed to pay Bailey $2,500 "by a check . . . made payable to Robert Bailey" to be mailed to the address of his lawyer. The Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services notified Bailey that he owed past due support of $45,956.48 and announced the state's "intent to collect this amount through the federal administrative offset process and by withholding . . . [tax refunds] or other federal or state payment(s)." The notice cited 31 U.S.C. 3716, indicating that "certain federal payments which might otherwise be paid to you will be intercepted for payment of current and past due support." It advised Bailey of his rights, such as having the debt redetermined. Bailey unsuccessfully moved to vacate his settlement agreement. He was advised that the $2,500 had been administratively offset against his child support obligation. The Eighth Circuit affirmed; the government did not breach Bailey's settlement agreement View "United States v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Minneapolis imposes an annual vacant building registration fee on owners of vacant buildings “to recover all costs incurred by the city for monitoring and regulating vacant buildings, including nuisance abatement, enforcement and administrative costs.” If unpaid, the city can levy and collect the fee as a special assessment against the property. DRB owns a vacant building in Minneapolis and for several years failed to pay that registration fee. In 2011, DRB received notice the city intended to assess $6,550 for DRB’s unpaid 2010 fee. After a hearing attended by DRB, an administrative hearing officer levied the fee. This process repeated in 2012 and a fee of $6,746 was levied. DRB did not appeal either assessment, but brought a separate suit, on behalf of itself and similarly situated landowners. A magistrate judge recommended judgment in favor of the city, concluding the city had provided DRB with proper notice of the assessments and DRB did not bring its challenges to the assessments within the statutory 30-day appeal period. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s adoption of the recommendation. View "DRB #24, LLC v. City of Minneapolis" on Justia Law

Townsend worked as an Arkansas pharmaceutical sales representative for Bayer, selling Mirena, a contraceptive device. Townsend visited physicians, including Dr. Shrum. Townsend learned Shrum was importing from Canada a version of Mirena that was not FDA-approved, at half the cost of the approved version. Shrum had submitted Medicaid claims at the same rate as the approved version and bragged about $50,000 in extra profit. Townsend sought guidance from his superiors. Bayer told Townsend not get involved. Townsend called the Medicaid Fraud Hotline, although he feared losing his job. Shrum was charged with Medicaid fraud. Meanwhile, Bayer changed its method of reimbursing sales expenses. Not understanding the change, Townsend’s wife spent funds intended for those expenses, causing Townsend’s account to be closed temporarily. Although Townsend's account had been reactivated, Bayer fired him, claiming his closed account prevented him doing his job. Townsend sued, citing anti-retaliation provisions of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3730(h).). A jury awarded Townsend back pay, doubled to $642,746, and $568,000 in emotional distress damages. The court denied front pay and ordered Bayer to reinstate Townsend. The Eighth Circuit affirmed on all issues except the emotional distress damage award and remanded to allow Townsend the option of accepting a remittitur of $300,000, or a new trial on emotional distress damages. View "Townsend v. Bayer HealthCare Pharm. Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants pled guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States by submitting false applications for loan-deficiency payments and were ordered to pay restitution. The United States then filed suit against defendants under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729-33, and the district court granted summary judgment for the United States, ordering defendants and their business to pay a penalty. Defendants appealed. The court rejected defendants' argument that their guilty pleas are not preclusive because no issues were actually litigated in the criminal proceeding because collateral estoppel applies equally whether the previous criminal conviction was based on a jury verdict or a plea of guilty, and defendant Slominski cites no authority that sentencing findings negate the preclusive effect of guilty pleas or admissions; the $1.3 million judgment is not punishment barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause where the Act is not so punitive that it is a criminal sanction; and the $1.3 million judgment is not an unconstitutionally excessive fine violating the Excessive Fines Clause where the monetary sanction here is not grossly disproportional. View "United States v. Aleff" on Justia Law