Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Minneapolis imposes an annual vacant building registration fee on owners of vacant buildings “to recover all costs incurred by the city for monitoring and regulating vacant buildings, including nuisance abatement, enforcement and administrative costs.” If unpaid, the city can levy and collect the fee as a special assessment against the property. DRB owns a vacant building in Minneapolis and for several years failed to pay that registration fee. In 2011, DRB received notice the city intended to assess $6,550 for DRB’s unpaid 2010 fee. After a hearing attended by DRB, an administrative hearing officer levied the fee. This process repeated in 2012 and a fee of $6,746 was levied. DRB did not appeal either assessment, but brought a separate suit, on behalf of itself and similarly situated landowners. A magistrate judge recommended judgment in favor of the city, concluding the city had provided DRB with proper notice of the assessments and DRB did not bring its challenges to the assessments within the statutory 30-day appeal period. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s adoption of the recommendation. View "DRB #24, LLC v. City of Minneapolis" on Justia Law

Townsend worked as an Arkansas pharmaceutical sales representative for Bayer, selling Mirena, a contraceptive device. Townsend visited physicians, including Dr. Shrum. Townsend learned Shrum was importing from Canada a version of Mirena that was not FDA-approved, at half the cost of the approved version. Shrum had submitted Medicaid claims at the same rate as the approved version and bragged about $50,000 in extra profit. Townsend sought guidance from his superiors. Bayer told Townsend not get involved. Townsend called the Medicaid Fraud Hotline, although he feared losing his job. Shrum was charged with Medicaid fraud. Meanwhile, Bayer changed its method of reimbursing sales expenses. Not understanding the change, Townsend’s wife spent funds intended for those expenses, causing Townsend’s account to be closed temporarily. Although Townsend's account had been reactivated, Bayer fired him, claiming his closed account prevented him doing his job. Townsend sued, citing anti-retaliation provisions of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3730(h).). A jury awarded Townsend back pay, doubled to $642,746, and $568,000 in emotional distress damages. The court denied front pay and ordered Bayer to reinstate Townsend. The Eighth Circuit affirmed on all issues except the emotional distress damage award and remanded to allow Townsend the option of accepting a remittitur of $300,000, or a new trial on emotional distress damages. View "Townsend v. Bayer HealthCare Pharm. Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants pled guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States by submitting false applications for loan-deficiency payments and were ordered to pay restitution. The United States then filed suit against defendants under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729-33, and the district court granted summary judgment for the United States, ordering defendants and their business to pay a penalty. Defendants appealed. The court rejected defendants' argument that their guilty pleas are not preclusive because no issues were actually litigated in the criminal proceeding because collateral estoppel applies equally whether the previous criminal conviction was based on a jury verdict or a plea of guilty, and defendant Slominski cites no authority that sentencing findings negate the preclusive effect of guilty pleas or admissions; the $1.3 million judgment is not punishment barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause where the Act is not so punitive that it is a criminal sanction; and the $1.3 million judgment is not an unconstitutionally excessive fine violating the Excessive Fines Clause where the monetary sanction here is not grossly disproportional. View "United States v. Aleff" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the denial of her application for disability insurance benefits, asserting that she had difficulty breathing and painful joints. The court concluded that the ALJ did not err in giving greater weight to a medical expert's testimony than to the testimony of other experts; the ALJ did not err in not seeking clarifications to plaintiff's expert's opinion where the ALJ expressly refused to give the expert opinion "great weight" and then explaining its reasons for doing so; the ALJ's decision was based on substantial evidence; the ALJ considered plaintiff's obesity and made findings about the demands of her prior work as a file clerk; and the ALJ did not err in relying on the vocational expert's testimony that plaintiff's mental and physical condition, age, and education support her ability to perform "unskilled occupations." Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of benefits. View "Grable v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Relator filed a qui tam action against Planned Parenthood, alleging that it violated the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, and the Iowa False Claims Act (IFCA), Iowa Code Ann. 685.1-.7, by submitting false or fraudulent claims for Medicaid reimbursement. The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 9(b). The court concluded that relator has pled sufficiently particularized facts to support her allegations that Planned Parenthood violated the FCA by filing claims for (1) unnecessary quantities of birth control pills, (2) birth control pills dispensed without examinations or without or prior to a physician's order, (3) abortion-related services, and (4) the full amount of services that had already been paid, in whole or in part. The court affirmed the dismissal of relator's claim that Planned Parenthood violated the FCA by instructing patients who experienced abortion-related complications to give false information to medical professionals at other hospitals, causing those medical professionals to unknowingly file claims for services performed in connection with abortions. Because relator failed to provide a factual basis for her knowledge of these alleged false claims, the court was unable to infer that false claims were submitted. Further, the court affirmed the dismissal of relator's upcoding claim. The court's holding with respect to the Rule 9(b) issue, however, should not be read as in any way expressing a view on Planned Parenthood's Rule 12(b)(6) arguments.View "Thayer v. Planned Parenthood" on Justia Law

Key Medical filed suit alleging that the Agency exceeded its statutory authority when implementing a competitive-bidding system for Medicare's pricing of medical equipment and supplies. Key Medical acknowledges that the governing statute, 42 U.S.C. 1395w-3(b)(11), contains a strongly worded ban on administrative and judicial review. Because the Agency's action was not ultra vires, and because there is an absence of a protected property or liberty interest, Key Medical cannot overcome the bar on review. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.View "Key Medical Supply, Inc. v. Sebelius, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an orthopedic surgeon and former consultant at Stryker, filed suit alleging that Stryker and I-Flow violated the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, by marketing their pain pumps to encourage the placement of pain pumps directly into patients' joint spaces after orthopedic procedures. The court concluded that the district court did not err in concluding that plaintiff's allegations had been publicly disclosed and that plaintiff was not excepted under section 3730(e)(4)(B) as an "original source" of the information. The court rejected plaintiff's claim of procedural error and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claims under section 3730(e)(4)(A). View "Paulos v. Stryker Corp., et al." on Justia Law

Nyffeler, a residential construction company, petitioned for review of an adverse agency decision by the Review Commission. The court concluded that the petition was untimely and the district court never had authority to transfer the case to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1631. Therefore, the court concluded that it had no jurisdiction and dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction. View "Nyffeler Construction, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, both individually and as the administrator of Bradley Gladden's estate, filed suit against officers and the police chief, alleging that the officers violated Bradley's rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, Ark. Code Ann. 16-123-101 et seq., as well as committed the tort of wrongful death under the Arkansas Wrongful Death Act, Ark. Code Ann. 16-62-101 et seq. Bradley had requested that the officers give him a ride to his sister's house in the next county because he was intoxicated, but the officers instead left him at an isolated off-ramp at the county line, which was the edge of the officers' jurisdiction. The officers instructed Bradley to seek help at a nearby factory. Bradley ended up dying of hypothermia a half-mile from the drop-off, in the opposite direction of the factory. Where the Fourteenth Amendment generally does not give private citizens a constitutional right to police assistance, the court concluded that plaintiff could not establish that a special relationship existed because Bradley accepted a ride from the officers and was sober enough to make this decision rationally; and Bradley cannot avail himself of the constitutional right to police assistance based on a custodial relationship with the state. The court also concluded that Bradley's official capacity claims failed where, assuming that it was the Police Department's custom to give rides to persons in its jurisdictions, plaintiff could not demonstrate an affirmative duty of care. Consequently, plaintiff's state law claims also failed. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not err in granting the officers summary judgment based on qualified immunity, in granting official immunity to all defendants, and dismissing the state-law claims. View "Gladden, Jr. v. Richbourg, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a qui tam suit under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, alleging that KCP&L fraudulently induced the GSA to install an all-electric heating-and-cooling system at the Richard Bolling Federal Building. The court concluded that the district court did not grossly abuse its discretion or make pretrial proceedings fundamentally unfair to relator. On the merits, the court concluded that the district court properly dismissed the building life cycle cost analysis and false-rate claims as publicly disclosed, and correctly granted summary judgment on the gratuities claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States ex rel. Kraxberger v. Kansas City Power & Light Co." on Justia Law