Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Festus City Council terminated Draper from his position as City Administrator six months into a three-year employment contract, after the election of a council member who was critical of Draper’s performance. The city had refused to reschedule or continue the hearing regarding Draper’s job performance. Neither Draper nor his attorney was present. Several witnesses testified. The council concluded that Draper had manipulated the evaluation process to choose an engineering firm to complete a road project; that Draper had authorized heating system repairs and the purchase of new windows without competitive bidding, in violation of Festus policy; that Draper had sent a memorandum stating that the sick-leave-bonus program had been abolished when it had not been; and that Draper had requested reimbursement for a hotel room he had paid for with his Festus credit card. The district court entered summary judgment, rejecting claims of violations of procedural and substantive-due-process rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983, a section 1983 conspiracy claim, breach of contract, and violation of the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 536.010-536.160. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The evidence supported the city’s decision to terminate Draper, so and that its decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. View "Draper v. City of Festus" on Justia Law

Argonaut sued Audrain County Joint Communications (ACJC) alleging ACJC's negligence in monitoring a security alarm panel caused or contributed to damages arising out of the burglary and fire of a grocery store insured by Argonaut. Public employees at the ACJC call center monitored a private security company's alarm panels. The panels were defective. ACJC argued that it was entitled to sovereign immunity as a Missouri state entity, and to statutory immunity as a 911 call center. The district court denied summary judgment after finding ACJC had waived its sovereign and statutory immunity by purchasing insurance. The Eighth Circuit dismissed part of an interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction, but otherwise affirmed. Missouri Revised Statutes Section 537.600 generally preserves "sovereign or governmental tort immunity as existed at common law" and specifically refers to "the immunity of [a] public entity from liability and suit." Section 190.307, however, does not create a substantive right to be free from the burdens of litigation. There was no clear error in the district court's determination under section 537.600 that ACJC did not prove the existence of a pre-existing agreement between itself and the insurer to include the sovereign immunity endorsement with the original policy. View "Argonaut Great Cent. Ins. Co. v. Audrain Cnty. Joint Commc'ns." on Justia Law

The Arkansas DHS regulates child care facility licensing and administers the USDA Child Care Food Program. Sparkman day care facility provided disability services funded by DHS and participated in the Program through DHS. The Program prohibits placement of disqualified individuals in a position of authority, 7 C.F.R. 226.6(c)(3)(ii)(B). DHS Policy states that violations can result in exclusion of a provider from further funding. DHS alleged that Sparkman placed a disqualified individual, Whitaker, in a position of authority. Sparkman believed that racial animus motivated DHS to place Whitaker on the disqualification list, but did not raise an equal protection claim at the hearing. Before the hearing was complete, the ALJ resigned, stating "as an African American male I cannot continue to work in a[n] office where racism and harassment continue to exist." Another ALJ, a Caucasian present as an observer, upheld DHS's termination of funding. With state appeals pending, Sparkman filed a federal complaint. The district court stayed proceedings. Following state court remand, DHS appointed a private attorney to serve as hearing officer; Sparkman agreed to the selection. Sparkman again made no equal protection or due process claims. The hearing officer decided in DHS's favor. Sparkman’s state court appeal alleged ex parte communications between DHS and the hearing officer. The state courts upheld the decision. The federal court concluded that claim preclusion barred Sparkman's due process and equal protection claims. The Eight Circuit affirmed, holding that the claims could have been brought during the state administrative proceeding and judicial review. View "Sparkman Learning Ctr. v. Ark. Dep't. Human Servs." on Justia Law

Bailey was convicted of federal prostitution charges in 2004. Minneapolis police officers took trial exhibits to a locked police storage facility, including $2,036 in cash, a wallet, and a cell phone. Years later Bailey moved for return of the property, but the government could not locate it. Bailey sought damages. The government agreed to pay Bailey $2,500 "by a check . . . made payable to Robert Bailey" to be mailed to the address of his lawyer. The Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services notified Bailey that he owed past due support of $45,956.48 and announced the state's "intent to collect this amount through the federal administrative offset process and by withholding . . . [tax refunds] or other federal or state payment(s)." The notice cited 31 U.S.C. 3716, indicating that "certain federal payments which might otherwise be paid to you will be intercepted for payment of current and past due support." It advised Bailey of his rights, such as having the debt redetermined. Bailey unsuccessfully moved to vacate his settlement agreement. He was advised that the $2,500 had been administratively offset against his child support obligation. The Eighth Circuit affirmed; the government did not breach Bailey's settlement agreement View "United States v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Minneapolis imposes an annual vacant building registration fee on owners of vacant buildings “to recover all costs incurred by the city for monitoring and regulating vacant buildings, including nuisance abatement, enforcement and administrative costs.” If unpaid, the city can levy and collect the fee as a special assessment against the property. DRB owns a vacant building in Minneapolis and for several years failed to pay that registration fee. In 2011, DRB received notice the city intended to assess $6,550 for DRB’s unpaid 2010 fee. After a hearing attended by DRB, an administrative hearing officer levied the fee. This process repeated in 2012 and a fee of $6,746 was levied. DRB did not appeal either assessment, but brought a separate suit, on behalf of itself and similarly situated landowners. A magistrate judge recommended judgment in favor of the city, concluding the city had provided DRB with proper notice of the assessments and DRB did not bring its challenges to the assessments within the statutory 30-day appeal period. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s adoption of the recommendation. View "DRB #24, LLC v. City of Minneapolis" on Justia Law

Townsend worked as an Arkansas pharmaceutical sales representative for Bayer, selling Mirena, a contraceptive device. Townsend visited physicians, including Dr. Shrum. Townsend learned Shrum was importing from Canada a version of Mirena that was not FDA-approved, at half the cost of the approved version. Shrum had submitted Medicaid claims at the same rate as the approved version and bragged about $50,000 in extra profit. Townsend sought guidance from his superiors. Bayer told Townsend not get involved. Townsend called the Medicaid Fraud Hotline, although he feared losing his job. Shrum was charged with Medicaid fraud. Meanwhile, Bayer changed its method of reimbursing sales expenses. Not understanding the change, Townsend’s wife spent funds intended for those expenses, causing Townsend’s account to be closed temporarily. Although Townsend's account had been reactivated, Bayer fired him, claiming his closed account prevented him doing his job. Townsend sued, citing anti-retaliation provisions of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3730(h).). A jury awarded Townsend back pay, doubled to $642,746, and $568,000 in emotional distress damages. The court denied front pay and ordered Bayer to reinstate Townsend. The Eighth Circuit affirmed on all issues except the emotional distress damage award and remanded to allow Townsend the option of accepting a remittitur of $300,000, or a new trial on emotional distress damages. View "Townsend v. Bayer HealthCare Pharm. Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants pled guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States by submitting false applications for loan-deficiency payments and were ordered to pay restitution. The United States then filed suit against defendants under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729-33, and the district court granted summary judgment for the United States, ordering defendants and their business to pay a penalty. Defendants appealed. The court rejected defendants' argument that their guilty pleas are not preclusive because no issues were actually litigated in the criminal proceeding because collateral estoppel applies equally whether the previous criminal conviction was based on a jury verdict or a plea of guilty, and defendant Slominski cites no authority that sentencing findings negate the preclusive effect of guilty pleas or admissions; the $1.3 million judgment is not punishment barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause where the Act is not so punitive that it is a criminal sanction; and the $1.3 million judgment is not an unconstitutionally excessive fine violating the Excessive Fines Clause where the monetary sanction here is not grossly disproportional. View "United States v. Aleff" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the denial of her application for disability insurance benefits, asserting that she had difficulty breathing and painful joints. The court concluded that the ALJ did not err in giving greater weight to a medical expert's testimony than to the testimony of other experts; the ALJ did not err in not seeking clarifications to plaintiff's expert's opinion where the ALJ expressly refused to give the expert opinion "great weight" and then explaining its reasons for doing so; the ALJ's decision was based on substantial evidence; the ALJ considered plaintiff's obesity and made findings about the demands of her prior work as a file clerk; and the ALJ did not err in relying on the vocational expert's testimony that plaintiff's mental and physical condition, age, and education support her ability to perform "unskilled occupations." Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of benefits. View "Grable v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Relator filed a qui tam action against Planned Parenthood, alleging that it violated the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, and the Iowa False Claims Act (IFCA), Iowa Code Ann. 685.1-.7, by submitting false or fraudulent claims for Medicaid reimbursement. The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 9(b). The court concluded that relator has pled sufficiently particularized facts to support her allegations that Planned Parenthood violated the FCA by filing claims for (1) unnecessary quantities of birth control pills, (2) birth control pills dispensed without examinations or without or prior to a physician's order, (3) abortion-related services, and (4) the full amount of services that had already been paid, in whole or in part. The court affirmed the dismissal of relator's claim that Planned Parenthood violated the FCA by instructing patients who experienced abortion-related complications to give false information to medical professionals at other hospitals, causing those medical professionals to unknowingly file claims for services performed in connection with abortions. Because relator failed to provide a factual basis for her knowledge of these alleged false claims, the court was unable to infer that false claims were submitted. Further, the court affirmed the dismissal of relator's upcoding claim. The court's holding with respect to the Rule 9(b) issue, however, should not be read as in any way expressing a view on Planned Parenthood's Rule 12(b)(6) arguments.View "Thayer v. Planned Parenthood" on Justia Law

Key Medical filed suit alleging that the Agency exceeded its statutory authority when implementing a competitive-bidding system for Medicare's pricing of medical equipment and supplies. Key Medical acknowledges that the governing statute, 42 U.S.C. 1395w-3(b)(11), contains a strongly worded ban on administrative and judicial review. Because the Agency's action was not ultra vires, and because there is an absence of a protected property or liberty interest, Key Medical cannot overcome the bar on review. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.View "Key Medical Supply, Inc. v. Sebelius, et al." on Justia Law