Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A mother and her minor daughter, both citizens of El Salvador, entered the United States in 2017 without valid entry documents. The mother applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, claiming that a criminal gang in El Salvador had repeatedly threatened her family with violence and kidnapping in attempts to extort money. Although her family partially complied with the gang’s demands and was not physically harmed, she asserted that returning to El Salvador would put her and her children at risk, as the gang had widespread influence and the Salvadoran government could not protect them.An immigration judge found the mother's testimony not credible due to inconsistencies and determined that, even if her testimony were credible, the threats did not amount to past persecution, the alleged social groups were not cognizable, and she could relocate within El Salvador. The judge denied all claims for relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, concluding that she had not established past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The BIA also determined that her argument that the immigration judge was biased was waived because she raised it only in a conclusory manner and abandoned it in her appellate brief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision as the final agency action. The court held that the BIA properly applied its waiver rule and did not err in finding the due process claim waived, as the argument was inadequately raised and not meaningfully pursued. The court also concluded it lacked jurisdiction to review the Department of Homeland Security’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion regarding enforcement priorities. The petition for review was denied. View "Quijano-Duran v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A Mexican citizen was apprehended during a traffic stop in Minneapolis in August 2025 after admitting to entering the United States illegally and lacking valid entry documents. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) arrested him, detained him without bond, and initiated removal proceedings, charging him with being present in the country without admission or valid documents. After his bond request was denied by an immigration judge, he filed a habeas petition in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, seeking his release or a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).The district court granted the petition, reasoning that the statutory provision authorizing detention without bond, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), did not apply to him because he was not “seeking admission,” having lived in the country for years without pursuing lawful status. The court concluded that this provision was intended for those at the border or actively seeking entry, not for those already present in the United States. As a result, the district court ordered either his release or a bond hearing, after which he was released on bond. The Government appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo and reversed it. The appellate court held that under the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) and (b)(2)(A), any alien present in the United States who has not been admitted is both an “applicant for admission” and “seeking admission,” making them subject to mandatory detention without bond under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The court rejected arguments that the statute applied only at the border or rendered other immigration detention statutes superfluous. The judgment of the district court was reversed and the case remanded. View "Avila v. Pamela Bondi" on Justia Law

A Mexican national entered the United States unlawfully over ten years ago and settled in Missouri with his wife. After being placed in removal proceedings, he conceded removability but sought cancellation of removal, arguing that his two U.S.-born children would suffer “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” if he were deported. To bolster his claim, he requested a continuance to obtain additional medical records regarding injuries from a fall, contending these documents would show the risk of insufficient medical care and his inability to work in Mexico. The immigration judge denied the request for lack of good cause, finding the record already contained relevant medical evidence. At his hearing, only he and his wife testified about the potential hardships their children would face, including diminished education and economic opportunities in Mexico.The Immigration Judge denied cancellation of removal, finding that while several requirements were met, the evidence did not demonstrate that his children would face “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed both the denial of a continuance and the ruling on hardship, dismissing his appeal.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit addressed two issues. First, it held that denying a continuance did not violate due process, as there was no fundamental procedural error or resulting prejudice; the record already contained substantial medical documentation, and the missing report was not shown to be outcome-determinative. Second, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Wilkinson v. Garland, the Eighth Circuit clarified that the standard of review for the hardship determination is “substantial evidence.” Applying this deferential standard, the court found the record supported the agency’s decision that the hardship to the petitioner’s children was not “exceptional and extremely unusual.” The court denied the petition for review. View "Alonso-Juarez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Rodriguez Irias, a Honduran national, entered the United States without valid entry documentation in January 2019. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, and a hearing was scheduled for February 2023 with notices sent to her last address on record. Rodriguez Irias did not appear at the hearing, and the immigration judge ordered her removal in absentia. In October 2023, her attorney filed a motion to reopen the proceedings, claiming ineffective assistance for failing to file an appearance and not informing Rodriguez Irias of the hearing date. The attorney submitted a letter he claimed to have sent to the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board, but provided no proof of receipt.The Immigration Judge denied the motion to reopen, finding that Rodriguez Irias had not demonstrated lack of notice and that her ineffective assistance claim was both untimely and unsupported by exceptional circumstances. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, holding that the ineffective assistance claim was procedurally deficient under Matter of Lozada because there was no evidence that the disciplinary board had received the attorney’s self-report. The BIA also determined Rodriguez Irias had constructive notice of her hearing and declined to reopen the case sua sponte, noting the relief sought could not be granted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision for abuse of discretion. The court held that Rodriguez Irias had not satisfied the procedural requirements of Matter of Lozada, specifically the requirement to provide proof that her counsel’s complaint was submitted to the appropriate disciplinary authorities. The court also determined it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary decision not to reopen the case sua sponte. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit denied the petition for review. View "Irias v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A citizen of the Ivory Coast immigrated to the United States as a child refugee and later became a lawful permanent resident. As an adult, he was convicted in North Dakota of robbery, a Class B felony, for brandishing a gun and menacing others during a theft. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, charging him with removability based on two convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude and for the robbery conviction, which it classified as an aggravated felony for attempted theft.The Immigration Judge initially found the individual removable for the moral-turpitude convictions but determined he was eligible for cancellation of removal, concluding that the North Dakota robbery statute was overbroad compared to the federal definition of theft. The Department appealed, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) disagreed, finding the statute not facially overbroad and instructing the Immigration Judge to apply the “realistic probability” test to determine if the statute was applied to conduct beyond the generic federal definition. On remand, the Immigration Judge found the petitioner failed to show a realistic probability that the statute covered nongeneric conduct and ordered removal. The BIA dismissed the appeal, upholding the order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed only the legal and constitutional claims, as required by statute. It held that North Dakota’s robbery statute is not unambiguously broader than the federal generic definition of attempted theft and that the petitioner had not demonstrated North Dakota actually prosecutes robbery based on conduct beyond that definition. Thus, the court found the robbery conviction to be an aggravated felony, rendering the petitioner ineligible for cancellation of removal, and denied the petition for review. View "Banyee v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Abrahim Fofana, a Liberian national, attempted to enter the United States with fraudulent documents in 2001. After disclosing his fundraising activities for the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) and claiming fear of persecution due to his affiliation, he was granted asylum by an immigration judge. In 2002, Fofana applied to adjust his status to lawful permanent resident. In 2018, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied his application, determining he was inadmissible because he had solicited funds for ULIMO, which was classified as a Tier III terrorist organization under federal law.Fofana challenged the denial in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, arguing that USCIS’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and that collateral estoppel precluded his inadmissibility finding. The district court initially ruled in his favor on collateral estoppel grounds, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the case. On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment to Fofana, rejecting the government’s argument that it lacked jurisdiction, and finding that Fofana was not inadmissible for engaging in terrorist activity. The court also concluded that USCIS’s determination regarding ULIMO was arbitrary and capricious and that the record did not support the finding that Fofana knew or should have known of ULIMO’s terrorist activities.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review the Secretary’s decision on adjustment of status, finding that federal law precludes judicial review of both discretionary and non-discretionary determinations made by the Secretary regarding such applications. The appellate court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. View "Fofana v. Noem" on Justia Law

Aguilar-Hernandez, a citizen of Guatemala, began a relationship with Arreaga Soto at age fifteen. After the birth of their child, Jose, she experienced repeated sexual and physical abuse from Arreaga Soto, who threatened her life and verbally abused her. Despite multiple attempts to leave, she reconciled with him each time, but the abuse continued. In 2016, Aguilar-Hernandez and her son left Guatemala and were apprehended at the U.S. border. She applied for asylum, humanitarian asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, with her son seeking derivative relief.An Immigration Judge denied all applications, finding that Aguilar-Hernandez failed to establish a nexus between the alleged persecution and her membership in the proposed social groups. The judge concluded that the abuse stemmed from a personal relationship and not from her membership in a particular social group. The judge also found no evidence that the Guatemalan government acquiesced in torture. On administrative appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed all findings and denials.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision, applying de novo review to legal questions and substantial evidence review to factual findings. The Eighth Circuit held that substantial evidence supported the Board’s conclusion that Aguilar-Hernandez’s membership in the proposed social groups was incidental or tangential to the motive for abuse, and that she did not show persecution “on account of” such membership. The court further found that she failed to meet the higher standard required for withholding of removal and did not provide particularized evidence that she would more likely than not be tortured with government acquiescence upon return. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit denied both petitions for review. View "Aguilar-Hernandez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Iowa enacted a law making it a state crime for certain noncitizens who had previously been denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed from the United States to enter or be found in Iowa. The law also required state judges to order such individuals to return to the country from which they entered and prohibited state courts from pausing prosecutions based on pending or possible federal immigration status determinations. Two noncitizens residing in Iowa, both of whom had previously been subject to federal removal orders but later lawfully reentered the United States, along with a membership-based immigrant advocacy organization, challenged the law, arguing it was preempted by federal immigration law.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa found that the plaintiffs had standing and granted a preliminary injunction, concluding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the Iowa law was preempted by federal law under both conflict and field preemption doctrines. The district court also found that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm if the law went into effect and that the balance of equities and public interest favored an injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion, reviewing legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction, holding that the plaintiffs had standing and were likely to succeed on the merits because every application of the Iowa law would conflict with federal immigration law by interfering with the discretion Congress grants to federal officials. The court also found that the other factors for a preliminary injunction were met. The Eighth Circuit remanded for the district court to determine the appropriate scope of the injunction in light of recent Supreme Court guidance. View "IA Migrant Movement for Justice v. Bird" on Justia Law

Philip Myers, a native and citizen of Liberia, was adopted by a U.S. citizen and entered the United States as a child. He later sustained several criminal convictions, including for aggravated felonies. In 2021, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him. Myers claimed derivative citizenship through his adoptive mother, who had become a naturalized U.S. citizen, and also alleged that he had been abused by her. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) had previously denied his derivative citizenship application, finding insufficient evidence that he was in his adoptive mother’s legal and physical custody at the relevant time. During removal proceedings, Myers, sometimes represented by counsel and sometimes pro se, was found competent to proceed without safeguards. He applied for various forms of relief, including asylum and protection under the Convention Against Torture, but these were denied.The Immigration Judge ordered Myers removed to Liberia. Myers appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing that the competency determination was flawed and that he should have been found incompetent to proceed pro se. The BIA found no clear error in the Immigration Judge’s competency finding and dismissed the appeal. Myers then moved to reopen the proceedings, citing a pending motion with USCIS regarding derivative citizenship, alleged errors in the competency determination, a new asylum claim based on his sexual orientation, and a pending T-visa application as a victim of sex trafficking. The BIA denied the motion to reopen, and Myers was removed to Liberia.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen for abuse of discretion and found none. The court also rejected Myers’s constitutional challenge to the statutory requirements for derivative citizenship and found no genuine issue of material fact regarding his nationality claim. The petition for review was denied. View "Myers v. Bondi" on Justia Law

In October 2018, Veronica Pineda De Aquino used a false identity to apply for a U.S. passport, submitting fraudulent documents. Investigators, with the cooperation of the real identity holder, A.E., determined Pineda was a Mexican citizen who had entered the U.S. in 1999. In June 2023, a grand jury indicted Pineda for making a false statement in a passport application and using another person’s social security number. Pineda initially pled not guilty but later entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to the first count in exchange for the dismissal of the second count.The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas accepted Pineda’s guilty plea but deferred the decision on the plea agreement until reviewing the presentence investigation report (PSR). The PSR detailed Pineda’s difficult background and calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 0 to 6 months of imprisonment. At sentencing, the district court adopted the PSR without objection but varied upward, sentencing Pineda to 32 months of imprisonment, citing the seriousness of her offense and the need for deterrence. The court dismissed the second count as per the plea agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Pineda argued that the district court erred by not expressly accepting or rejecting the plea agreement and by imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence. The appellate court found that the district court constructively accepted the plea agreement and that any error was not plain. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Pineda above the Guidelines range, considering the aggravating factors and the need for deterrence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. De Aquino" on Justia Law