Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs, Sandeep and Sarvani Thigulla, were lawful nonimmigrant workers seeking to become lawful permanent residents (LPRs) in the United States and had applied for approval of their Form I-485 applications with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). When the Department of State decreased the number of applications it would adjudicate, the Thigullas sought a temporary restraining order against the Director of USCIS, compelling the prompt adjudication of their applications under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court denied this order, and the Thigullas appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit dismissed the case due to a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court found that the decision to delay adjudicating the Thigullas' applications falls under the Attorney General’s discretionary authority as stated in 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) and that this authority is protected from judicial review by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that this interpretation went against congressional intent, citing clear textual evidence in the statute. The court concluded that it lacked the jurisdiction to review the decision to delay adjudication of the applications, even under the Administrative Procedure Act. Consequently, the court dismissed the case and remanded it to the district court for proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Thigulla v. Jaddou" on Justia Law

Hector Herrera-Elias, a Honduran citizen, entered the United States unlawfully and was charged with removability. In response, he petitioned for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture, claiming he feared persecution and torture in Honduras due to his involvement with the MS-13 gang and his sexual orientation. An Immigration Judge (IJ) found him ineligible for asylum due to an untimely application, and deemed him barred from asylum and withholding of removal due to his having committed a serious nonpolitical crime (transporting firearms and drugs for criminal organizations in Honduras). The IJ also found that Herrera-Elias failed to prove that he would likely face torture if returned to Honduras.Upon appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ's decision, concluding that Herrera-Elias knowingly participated in serious criminal activity and that no duress exception applied to the serious nonpolitical crime bar. One panel member dissented, arguing that Herrera-Elias's age and limited involvement in gang operations should not constitute a serious nonpolitical crime.On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the BIA's judgment. The court found substantial evidence supporting the IJ’s and BIA’s findings regarding Herrera-Elias's involvement in serious nonpolitical crime. Additionally, the court rejected Herrera-Elias's attempt to introduce a duress exception to the serious nonpolitical crime bar, noting that the elements of this bar and the persecutor bar (where the duress exception has been debated) are different, and that Herrera-Elias did not explain how duress is relevant to this specific bar. View "Hererra-Elias v. Garland" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed a petition by Israel Amador-Morales, a Mexican citizen, challenging the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to deny his motion to reopen his case. Morales had entered the United States without inspection in 2003, was voluntarily departed in 2012, and then re-entered without inspection in 2013. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sought his removal and issued a Notice to Appear alleging his removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Morales admitted the allegations and conceded removability in 2016. However, in 2019, he withdrew his admission and concession, and moved to terminate the proceedings. The Immigration Judge denied the motion, ordered his removal, and the BIA dismissed his appeal and denied the motion to reopen.Morales argued that the BIA should have granted his motion to reopen, erred in ruling his objection to the Notice to Appear as untimely, and misconstrued his motion as asking it to compel DHS to exercise prosecutorial discretion. The court, however, found that Morales's objections to the Notice to Appear were untimely as they occurred after the closing of pleadings. The court also determined that the BIA's decision that it lacked the authority to compel the DHS to exercise prosecutorial discretion did not constitute an abuse of discretion.The court denied the petition for review, upholding the BIA's decision to deny the motion to reopen and maintaining Morales's removal order. View "Amador-Morales v. Garland" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision to deny Peter David Davis's appeal to reopen his case. Davis, a Liberian citizen, was admitted as an asylee to the United States in 2008. However, following multiple criminal convictions, his asylum status was terminated and removal proceedings were initiated. Davis conceded his removability but requested a waiver of inadmissibility for humanitarian purposes, which was denied. His appeal to the BIA was also unsuccessful.On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Davis argued that the BIA erred by not providing a reasoned explanation for its application of the motion-to-reopen standard. The Court of Appeals agreed, stating that the BIA's single sentence explanation did not meet the requirements for reasoned decision-making, as it did not explain how the elements of a motion to reopen applied to Davis's case. The Court held that the BIA's decision was an abuse of discretion as it was without rational explanation and failed to consider all factors presented by Davis. Consequently, the Court granted Davis's petition for review and remanded the case back to the BIA for further proceedings. However, the Court did not address Davis's other arguments regarding due process and competency as they were related to the request to submit new evidence, which would be considered upon remand. View "Davis v. Garland" on Justia Law

Sergio Mencia-Medina, a native and citizen of Honduras who entered the United States as a child with his mother, petitioned for a review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Mencia-Medina was charged as removable due to his presence in the country without admission, and his request for a form of cancellation of removal available to children who have been battered by lawful permanent resident parents was denied by the BIA. Mencia-Medina's record showed contacts with law enforcement both as a juvenile and as an adult, which the BIA decided outweighed the favorable factors in his record.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied Mencia-Medina's petition for review. The court found that the BIA properly applied the law and exercised its discretion in denying a favorable exercise of discretion to Mencia-Medina. The court ruled that even if an individual meets the statutory criteria for eligibility for cancellation of removal, the Attorney General's decision to grant or deny relief is discretionary. The court also concluded that the BIA did not make an error by citing and applying the factors applicable to cases concerning cancellation of removal for certain permanent residents. The petitioner's argument that the BIA's decision was unreasoned and internally inconsistent was also rejected by the court. View "Mencia-Medina v. Garland" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied petitioner Paul Jack Cobby Essel's appeal against an order from the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Essel, a citizen of Ghana, entered the United States on a non-permanent student visa in 2003 and obtained conditional permanent resident status in 2009 through marriage to a U.S. citizen. However, his application for citizenship was denied as the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) found that he was not living with his citizen-spouse and had made false statements about his marriage to garner immigration benefits. Consequently, the USCIS charged him with removability, which was upheld by an immigration judge and the BIA. Essel filed two motions to reopen his case in 2019 and 2021, which the BIA denied on the grounds of untimeliness and merit.In the present case, Essel petitioned the court to review the BIA's decision. He sought to use the BIA's sua sponte authority to reopen his removal proceedings and asked the BIA to apply equitable tolling to reopen his case based on two Supreme Court decisions, Pereira v. Sessions and Niz-Chavez v. Garland. However, the court found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's refusal to grant sua sponte relief and denied Essel's request for equitable tolling as he had not articulated these arguments as grounds for equitable tolling in his motions to the BIA. Consequently, the court upheld the BIA's decision and denied Essel's petition for review. View "Essel v. Garland" on Justia Law

Guatemalan citizens Miguel Pascual-Miguel and his daughter, Erika Gabriela Pascual-Miguel, sought review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) decision affirming the denial of their asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture requests by an immigration judge. They also sought review of the BIA’s denial of motions to reopen for ineffective assistance of counsel and Mendez Rojas class membership. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied the petition, affirming the BIA's decisions. The court held that the denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief was supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, the court noted that the petitioners failed to show any evidence of persecutory motive related to their home in Guatemala being burned down, as they didn't know who did it or why. The court also held that the BIA's denial of the motions to reopen was not an abuse of discretion. The court noted that the attorney's misconduct did not prejudice the outcome of the removal proceedings and that the petitioners failed to demonstrate a nexus between the harm suffered and any protected ground, even if they were members of the Mendez Rojas class. View "Pascual-Miguel v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a citizen of Guatemala. He says that from elementary school through adulthood, his classmates and coworkers touched his “private parts” and subjected him to homophobic slurs because he is bisexual. He left university because of verbal abuse, and he quit his job at a restaurant after his coworkers harassed him. But he testified that he never suffered a physical injury, and he never reported the harassment to the police or to authorities at his school or workplace. After his friend was murdered, Petitioner left for the United States. He was detained at the U.S. border after he entered without inspection. He applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protections under the Convention Against Torture. An immigration judge (IJ) denied his application, and he appealed to the BIA. The BIA dismissed his appeal. Petitioner petitioned for review of the denial of his application for asylum.   The Eighth Circuit denied the petition, holding that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s determination. The court explained that Petitioner cited evidence of impunity for crimes against transgender women and alleged that police regularly extort and harass male and transgender sex workers. But as the BIA reasoned, he is neither a transgender woman nor a sex worker. He also testified that a gay man was once beheaded when Petitioner was a child. But there is no record evidence that gay men are regularly killed in Guatemala such that there is a pattern or practice of it. So a reasonable fact-finder could adopt the BIA’s implicit position that Petitioner did not show a pattern or practice of persecution. View "Robinson Juarez-Vicente v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a twenty-three-year-old Guatemalan citizen who fears returning to his home country. Petitioner believed that, due to the large and interconnected network of gang members in the country, nowhere in Guatemala was safe for him. At age seventeen, Petitioner left Guatemala and came to the United States. The Attorney General initiated removal proceedings against him. Petitioner conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. He claimed that he was persecuted on account of his membership in the social group “Guatemalan children who are witnesses of gang crime.” The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied each of his applications. The BIA rejected Petitioner’s applications for asylum and withholding of removal because Petitioner failed to identify a cognizable particular social group. Specifically, the BIA concluded that his proposed group lacked particularity because the term “children” is “vague and amorphous,” and the broader group of “witnesses to gang crime” lacked social distinction. Petitioner appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained Petitioner’s proposed social group fails for lack of social distinction. The court explained that if it grants Petitioner the benefit of the broader definition of “children,” the proposed social group is, in effect, all Guatemalan “witnesses to gang crime.” Petitioner did not introduce evidence establishing that Guatemalan society “in general perceives, considers, or recognizes persons sharing the particular characteristic” of gang crime witnesses as a distinct group. Accordingly, the court explained that because Petitioner failed to establish membership in a cognizable particular social group, the BIA did not err in denying his applications for asylum and withholding of removal. View "Cesar Pacheco-Mota v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

The BIA denied Petitioner’s request for cancellation of removal based on the failure to show “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his United States-citizen children. The BIA granted voluntary departure to Mexico. Petitioner then discovered evidence of substandard attorney performance by his attorney before the IJ and filed a timely motion to reopen, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner also submitted evidence obtained between the final order and the motion to reopen, asserting that two of his children suffered from emotional- and mental-health issues that could not be adequately addressed in Mexico. The BIA denied the motion to reopen, holding that even if counsel had been unprepared before the IJ, different counsel represented Petitioner in the initial appeal to the BIA.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court found no abuse of discretion. The court explained that here, considering all of the evidence presented, the BIA rationally determined that the addition of the later-submitted evidence of emotional- and mental health issues failed to establish exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. The evidence demonstrated neither that the health issues were severe nor that treatment would be unavailable in Mexico. The BIA also rationally determined there had been no showing of prejudice associated with the claim of attorney ineffectiveness. Further, on appeal, Petitioner failed to articulate how the initial counsel’s failures affected the outcome. View "Ignacio Trejo-Gamez v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law