Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner is a twenty-three-year-old Guatemalan citizen who fears returning to his home country. Petitioner believed that, due to the large and interconnected network of gang members in the country, nowhere in Guatemala was safe for him. At age seventeen, Petitioner left Guatemala and came to the United States. The Attorney General initiated removal proceedings against him. Petitioner conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. He claimed that he was persecuted on account of his membership in the social group “Guatemalan children who are witnesses of gang crime.” The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied each of his applications. The BIA rejected Petitioner’s applications for asylum and withholding of removal because Petitioner failed to identify a cognizable particular social group. Specifically, the BIA concluded that his proposed group lacked particularity because the term “children” is “vague and amorphous,” and the broader group of “witnesses to gang crime” lacked social distinction. Petitioner appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained Petitioner’s proposed social group fails for lack of social distinction. The court explained that if it grants Petitioner the benefit of the broader definition of “children,” the proposed social group is, in effect, all Guatemalan “witnesses to gang crime.” Petitioner did not introduce evidence establishing that Guatemalan society “in general perceives, considers, or recognizes persons sharing the particular characteristic” of gang crime witnesses as a distinct group. Accordingly, the court explained that because Petitioner failed to establish membership in a cognizable particular social group, the BIA did not err in denying his applications for asylum and withholding of removal. View "Cesar Pacheco-Mota v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

The BIA denied Petitioner’s request for cancellation of removal based on the failure to show “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his United States-citizen children. The BIA granted voluntary departure to Mexico. Petitioner then discovered evidence of substandard attorney performance by his attorney before the IJ and filed a timely motion to reopen, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner also submitted evidence obtained between the final order and the motion to reopen, asserting that two of his children suffered from emotional- and mental-health issues that could not be adequately addressed in Mexico. The BIA denied the motion to reopen, holding that even if counsel had been unprepared before the IJ, different counsel represented Petitioner in the initial appeal to the BIA.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court found no abuse of discretion. The court explained that here, considering all of the evidence presented, the BIA rationally determined that the addition of the later-submitted evidence of emotional- and mental health issues failed to establish exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. The evidence demonstrated neither that the health issues were severe nor that treatment would be unavailable in Mexico. The BIA also rationally determined there had been no showing of prejudice associated with the claim of attorney ineffectiveness. Further, on appeal, Petitioner failed to articulate how the initial counsel’s failures affected the outcome. View "Ignacio Trejo-Gamez v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a Sudanese national born in 1991 in modern-day South Sudan. He entered the United States as a refugee in 2003. In 2012, following juvenile felony and misdemeanor convictions, the Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings when Petitioner was convicted of attempted murder and unlawful firearm possession and sentenced to 264 months imprisonment. Petitioner conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found Petitioner ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal because the latest conviction was an aggravated felony and a particularly serious crime. Petitioner appealed the denial of CAT relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed the appeal.   The Eighth Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review. The court explained that Petitioner presented no specific evidence that the government attacks “political opponents” because they were child soldiers in a civil war that ended before South Sudan’s independence. Next, the court wrote that it agrees with the BIA that Petitioner has not shown in his “hypothetical chain of events” that “it was more likely than not that each link in the chain would occur.” Moreover, the court found that even if Petitioner were incarcerated, he presented no evidence showing that conditions inside the prison would amount to torture. View "Mongong Deng v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Africa who became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 2012, pleaded guilty to aggravated identity theft predicated on wire fraud. In the plea agreement, Petitioner admitted that she “aided and abetted” her mother in the mother’s scheme of “defrauding” the State of California of $475,350.28.The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") charged Petitioner as removable, characterizing her conviction as a conviction for an offense involving “fraud or deceit” with a loss to the victim exceeding $10,000, thus qualifying as an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). In so holding, the BIA determined that the elements of the identity theft offense included a reference in the alternative to several qualifying felony offenses, and required as an element that the identity theft be committed “during and in relation to” one of the other qualifying felonies.Petitioner appealed, arguing her conviction did not qualify under the categorical approach as an offense involving fraud or deceit. She also sought relief under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). An immigration judge rejected Petitioner's arguments, as did the BIA. Petitioner appealed.On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that the BIA appeals did not err in concluding that Petitioner's conviction was a qualifying aggravated felony based on her express admission that she had aided and abetted a scheme to defraud a victim of more than $475,000. Further, the Eighth Circuit found that the BIA did not apply the wrong legal standard in finding Petitioner ineligible for withholding of removal and did not err in denying CAT relief. View "Chantelle Robbertse v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner initially entered the United States on a traveler’s visa, but he later became a permanent resident after marrying a United States citizen. Then, roughly a decade later, he and his accomplices robbed a delivery van belonging to “an ATM vendor.” Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of Hobbs Act robbery and spent five years in prison. Once immigration officials found out about the conviction, they started removal proceedings. As relevant here, the government argued he was removable because Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence. The immigration judge and the Board agreed and refused to waive inadmissibility.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Hobbs Act robbery requires proof of an “unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person . . . of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force.” Thus, Petitioner is removable for having committed a “crime of violence.” Moreover, the court wrote that the decision in Taylor “does not change our position” that a completed Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence. View "Garfield Green v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her conviction for having knowingly procured her naturalization contrary to law in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1425(a). Defendant made several false statements in procuring her naturalization. The issues on appeal are whether the government met its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the false statements were material, as that element of the Section 1425(a) offense was defined in Maslenjak v. United States, 582 U.S. 335 (2017), and whether they were made “under oath.”
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant argued that the false statements were immaterial because they did not necessarily establish she lacked good moral character. The court disagreed, reasoning that 8 U.S.C. Section 1101(f) provides that “no person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person of good moral character who” gives false testimony to obtain an immigration benefit in violation of Section 1101(f)(6). Moreover, Defendant argued that “false testimony” is limited to false statements given verbally under oath. As the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the false statements in her N-400 Application for Naturalization were given orally and under oath, the government failed to present sufficient evidence, and we “need not even address materiality.” The court explained that the district court t was free to find the testimony of a USCIS supervisory officer more credible than the contrary opinion of Defendant’s expert, who admitted she had never attended a naturalization interview in Des Moines. Accordingly, the court concluded that a reasonable factfinder could find she acted to obtain immigration benefits for her spouse. View "United States v. Deanah Cheboss" on Justia Law

Petitioners petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) June 17, 2022, decision denying their motion for reconsideration of the Board’s July 29, 2021 decision. In the July 29, 2021 decision, the Board granted the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) motion to reinstate Petitioners’ removal proceedings and reissued the Board’s prior October 15, 2013 decision, which dismissed Petitioners’ appeal of a decision denying their applications for asylum and related protection.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it discerned no abuse of discretion. The court explained that the Board offered a rational explanation for rejecting Petitioners’ request for clarification. The Board’s July 29, 2021 decision—by Petitioners’ own acknowledgment—reissued the October 15, 2013 decision. This decision, in turn, permitted voluntary departure consistent with the IJ’s February 9, 2012 decision. Both the Board’s October 15, 2013 decision and the IJ’s February 9, 2012 decision warned Petitioners of the consequences of filing a motion for reconsideration: automatic termination of voluntary departure and immediate effect of the alternative order of removal. Here, Petitioners chose to move for reconsideration. Their action automatically terminated the voluntary departure that the October 15, 2013 decision authorized. View "Tsatsral Bekhbat v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Sudan and citizen of South Sudan, petitions this Court for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order affirming the immigration judge’s (IJ) decision ordering Petitioner removed and reversing the IJ’s decision granting Petitioner deferral of removal to South Sudan. Petitioner argued that the BIA erred by (1) limiting its review on remand to address only whether he had been convicted of a theft offense, (2) determining that the Nebraska shoplifting statute constitutes an aggravated felony as a theft offense, and (3) reversing the IJ’s grant of deferral of removal to South Sudan.   The Eighth Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA’s order, and remanded the matter to the BIA for further proceedings. The court explained that for Nebraska’s shoplifting statute to be a categorical match to the generic definition of theft, it must criminalize only those who act with the specific intent to “deprive the owner of the right and benefits of ownership.” The court wrote that contrary to the BIA’s order, that appropriation “necessarily deprives the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership” does not mean that the offender acted with the specific intent for that deprivation to occur. Accordingly, the BIA erred in finding that Petitioner was removable for having committed a theft offense—and, thus, an aggravated felony—based upon his Nebraska shoplifting convictions. View "Ruachkuoth Thok v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review from two orders of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and denying his request to reopen and reconsider the denial of his applications.   The Eighth Circuit denied the petitions. The court explained that although Petitioner argued the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s denial of his asylum application, Petitioner failed to challenge before the BIA the IJ’s alternative, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to asylum because his application was untimely, and the BIA deemed that this argument was waived. Further, the court wrote that Petitioner similarly failed to offer any argument regarding the timeliness of his asylum application before this Court. And, in any event, the court wrote that it will not disturb the BIA’s conclusion that this issue has been waived and is dispositive of the asylum application. View "Alexander Arroyo-Sosa v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a rancher from Mexico who fears returning. He gives several reasons why. Twice, his uncles were kidnapped and held for ransom. The second time, the kidnapping was reported to the police. And though the police said they would “try to help,” they were ultimately unable to “do anything.” On another occasion, someone took pictures of Petitioner’s family home and then demanded money and threatened to kidnap a family member. And once, when he was driving from his family’s ranch to his home, two vans began chasing him. Shortly after Petitioner entered the United States, the Attorney General began removal proceedings against him. Petitioner conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied his applications.  The BIA explained that it agreed with the IJ’s social-group-recognizability and nexus rulings, as well as the IJ’s determination regarding CAT relief.   The Eighth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition. The court explained that here, the record does not support Petitioner’s contention that the Mexican government has turned a blind eye to criminal-gang-inflicted torture. When one of Petitioner’s uncles was kidnapped, the police offered to help. The fact that they were unable to “do anything” does not evidence acquiescence. And when Petitioner sought help from the police after the car chase, they provided it. Petitioner counters that country conditions reports show that criminal organizations have infiltrated the Mexican police and government. Yet he does not explain how this “general infiltration” makes the Mexican government “likely to acquiesce in his torture.” View "Efren Uriostegui-Teran v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law