Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Immigration Law
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Plaintiff sought review of the the USCIS revocation of an I-140 petition and denial of his I-485 adjustment-of-status application. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider whether USCIS failed to comply with disclosure requirements under regulation 8 C.F.R. 103.2(b)(16). The court also found that plaintiff is not statutorily eligible to adjust status where plaintiff could not port his I-140 because the I-140 was not valid to begin with: USCIS found numerous petition deficiencies in its investigation fraud. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal. View "Rajasekaran v. Hazuda" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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Petitioner, a Kenyan citizen, petitioned for review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's decision that petitioner had waived his application to adjust his status to that of lawful permanent resident and denial of his request for a continuance. In this case, the IJ explained to petitioner that in order to proceed, petitioner would have to pay a filing fee, get fingerprinted, submit an affidavit of support, and bring his wife to testify on his behalf at his next hearing. When petitioner showed up to his hearing ten months later, he had failed to do these things. The court exercised its discretion under 8 U.S.C. 1252 and denied the petition for review, finding no abuse of discretion. View "Choge v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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Petitioner, a citizen and national of Honduras, petitioned for review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's denial of his application for cancellation of removal. Petitioner claimed that the IJ and the BIA failed to consider evidence of the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship his children would suffer if he were removed from the United States. The court concluded that petitioner's challenge to the agency’s weighing of the evidence in support of his claim for cancellation of removal is outside the court's jurisdiction to review. The court concluded, though the agency’s consideration of the particular hardship factors that petitioner believed decisive may have been perfunctory, that is insufficient to establish legal or constitutional error. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Lemuz-Hernandez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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In 2011, Singh entered the U.S. through Texas, without a valid entry document, violating 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). Singh is a Sikh and a member of the Shirmoani Akali Dal Amritsar (Mann Party). Detained by DHS, Singh asserted he feared persecution by the rival India Congress Party if returned to India. Singh stated that members of the Congress Party had twice beaten him for refusing to switch parties. The officer found Singh had “a credible fear of persecution” and referred Singh’s application for further consideration. Singh applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. An IJ continued Singh’s removal hearing to permit Singh to obtain new counsel. Singh’s retained counsel did not attend the rescheduled hearing, instead sending an unprepared associate. The IJ chastised counsel, but granted another continuance. At the rescheduled hearing Singh testified through an interpreter and provided documents to support his request for asylum. The IJ denied Singh’s application, finding Singh “not credible” because his testimony contradicted information he gave at his interview; he was evasive during cross-examination. The IJ alternatively found that, even if credible, Singh’s accounts of minor beatings and short detentions did “not rise to the level of persecution.” The BIA affirmed. The Eighth Circuit denied relief, rejecting claims of ineffective assistance. View "Singh v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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Muiruri, a native of Kenya, overstayed his student visa. Immigration officials apprehended him. In a sworn statement, Muiruri admitted to falsely representing himself as a U.S. citizen. The Department of Homeland Security charged him with two counts of removability: overstaying his visa, INA 237(a)(1)(C)(I), and falsely representing himself as a U.S. citizen, INA 237(a)(3)(D). He applied for adjustment-of-status based on marriage to a U.S. citizen. A month before his removal hearing, Muiruri filed a “Motion to Suppress,” arguing he had been illegally searched and seized, and his sworn statement coerced, and a lack of sufficient evidence for the false-representation charge. Two weeks later, the government submitted “to be considered by the Immigration Court at [Muiruri’s] hearing” I-9 forms and an employment application. In each, Muiruri checked the box indicating U.S. citizenship. A week before the removal hearing the immigration judge denied the Motion to Suppress and found a violation of INA 237(a)(3)(D). The BIA affirmed. The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review, View "Muiruri v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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Mowlana, a native of Somalia, was admitted to the United States as a refugee in 2000 and became a lawful permanent resident in 2002. He was ordered removed from the U.S. after the Board of Immigration Appeals concluded that he had been convicted of an aggravated felony. The Board cited Mowlana’s prior conviction under 7 U.S.C. 2024(b), which forbids the knowing use, transfer, acquisition, alteration, or possession of benefits in a manner contrary to the statutes and regulations of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (food stamps). The Eighth Circuit dismissed his petition for review, agreeing that his offense was an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). View "Mowlana v. Holder" on Justia Law

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Shoyombo, a native of Nigeria, entered the U.S. illegally in 1993 and filed two fraudulent asylum applications. The second, in his own name, was denied and he was ordered deported in absentia in 1995. Shoyombo married a U.S. citizen. His second motion to reopen, filed while he applied for adjustment of status, was granted in 2002. After DHS discovered Shoyombo had filed another asylum application, the proceedings were reopened on the Immigration Court’s own motion. An IJ denied adjustment of status but granted voluntary departure. The BIA affirmed. He did not depart, but married a second U.S. citizen in 2010. His attorney filed a new I-130 Visa Petition, but failed to file a third motion to reopen removal proceedings and apply for adjustment of status. ICE arrested Shoyombo in 2012. He hired a new attorney. In 2013, a new I-130 application was approved. In 2014, Shoyombo filed a third motion to reopen his removal proceedings to request adjustment of status based on the I-130 approval, asserting that the delay was due to the previous attorney abandoning his case. The BIA denied the motion. The Eighth Circuit dismissed a petition for review: because the decision to reopen sua sponte is explicitly left to the BIA’s discretion, with “no meaningful standard” against which to judge the exercise of that discretion, courts lack jurisdiction to review the denial of a such motion. View "Shoyombo v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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Etenyi, a citizen of Kenya, came to the U.S. on a student visa in 2006. After he graduated in 2011, he remained and married a U.S. citizen. Etenyi’s wife sought an immediate-relative visa on Etenyi’s behalf. Etenyi concurrently applied to adjust his status to that of a lawful permanent resident, 8 U.S.C. 1255(a). DHS denied Etenyi’s application on grounds that he had falsely claimed that he was a U.S. citizen on a Form I-9 when he applied for a job in 2009. At a removal hearing, Etenyi admitted that he did not comply with the student visa, but denied that he had falsely claimed citizenship. Etenyi contended that the form had been pre-populated with his personal information and that he did not notice the checked box asserting, under penalty of perjury, that he was a citizen. The IJ considered the signed Form I-9, Etenyi’s testimony, Etenyi’s social security card that stated DHS authorization was required before Etenyi could work, and evidence of Etenyi’s efforts to ensure that his social security card was accurate, and concluded that Etenyi’s testimony was not credible. The BIA affirmed. The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review, holding that substantial evidence supported a finding that Etenyi falsely claimed citizenship on a Form I-9, View "Etenyi v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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Romero was arrested in Kansas City for multiple traffic offenses. Officers identified Romero as a citizen of Mexico who had not been admitted or paroled for entry into the U.S. The immigration judge found that Romero was not eligible for cancellation of removal because he had been convicted in 1993 of violating California Penal Code 472, which criminalizes forgery and related conduct. The BIA agreed that section 472 is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude that carries a potential sentence of one year or more in prison, so that Romero was ineligible for cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2). The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting Romero’s argument that section 472 criminalizes both acts requiring a specific intent to defraud and acts without this mens rea. The court held that that conviction under section 472 always includes the element of a specific intent to defraud. View "Miranda-Romero v. Lynch" on Justia Law

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Ortiz, a native of Mexico, became a lawfully-admitted permanent resident of the U.S. in 2002. In 2006, Ortiz pled guilty to obstruction of legal process—a crime committed when he was 18 years old. Ortiz was sentenced to 1 year in a workhouse—with a 2-year stay on 320 days of the sentence—and a $50.00 fine. More than seven years later, DHS charged Ortiz as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for committing an “aggravated felony” and under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) for committing a crime involving “moral turpitude.” The IJ found Ortiz’s conviction was an “aggravated felony” because it was a “crime of violence.” The BIA upheld the IJ’s determination. The Eighth Circuit vacated. Minnesota precedent plainly shows the words “force or violence,” in the statute under which Ortiz was convicted, encompass a broader scope of conduct than the “physical force” required to be a categorical “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. 16. View "Ortiz v. Lynch" on Justia Law