Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Gallegos, a citizen of Mexico, gained Lawful Permanent Resident status through her marriage to a U.S. citizen. After Gallegos petitioned to dissolve the marriage, DHS concluded that the marriage was fraudulent. DHS filed a Notice to Appear, charging Gallegos as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(A) as an alien who was inadmissible at the time she adjusted her LPR status because she procured admission through fraud (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i)); under section 1227(a)(1)(A) because she did not possess valid immigration documents when she sought readmission as an LPR (1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)); and under 1227(a)(1)(G)(ii) for failing or refusing to fulfill a marital agreement which was made for the purpose of procuring admission as an immigrant.The immigration court later mailed an amended Notice, informing Gallegos her hearing was rescheduled. Gallegos failed to appear at the rescheduled hearing. The IJ ordered Gallegos removed in absentia. Gallegos argued that exceptional circumstances prevented her from attending the hearing. Gallegos admitted to receiving the amended Notice but explained that she misplaced it and incorrectly remembered the hearing date because of mental health issues, claiming she was treated for depression and anxiety and was involuntarily hospitalized. The BIA affirmed the denial of relief, finding that Gallegos did “not show that her mental condition was causally related to her failure to appear.” The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review, finding no exceptional circumstances justifying Gallegos’s failure to appear. View "Gallegos v. Garland" on Justia Law

Chol, a citizen of South Sudan, was born in a refugee camp in Uganda. At age five, he was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident. Twelve years later, he was convicted of two counts of robbery and sentenced to seven-15 years. Charged with removability, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony, Chol applied for asylum and withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Chol appeared pro se. The IJ explained that he was ineligible for asylum due to his criminal record, but alerted him that he would be eligible for CAT relief if he could prove that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured by the government (or with its acquiescence) in South Sudan and Uganda.After testimony from Chol, his mother, and a prison official, the IJ determined he was not entitled to CAT relief and ordered removal, finding that it is not more likely than not that Chol would be tortured in South Sudan because he is a member of the governing Dinka tribe, and not a politician, journalist, or humanitarian worker. The BIA dismissed his appeal. The Eighth Circuit denied Choi’s petition for review, rejecting arguments that the IJ erred by failing to fully develop the record about Choi’s tribal faction, provide the State Department’s country reports for South Sudan and Uganda, and tell Choi the definition of “torture” under the CAT. View "Chol v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied the petition for review of an order of the BIA upholding the denial of his motion to reopen proceedings and to rescind an order of removal entered in absentia. The court concluded that the agency reasonably concluded that petitioner's explanations left "too many questions" unanswered, and that he failed to overcome the presumption that mail sent to his address in Lincoln was delivered and received. Therefore, the agency did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to reopen proceedings and to rescind the removal order entered in petitioner's absence. View "Hesso v. Garland" on Justia Law

He, a 28-year-old native of China, entered the U.S. in 2012 without inspection. He applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture, claiming past persecution and well-founded fear of future persecution and torture in China because of his Christian faith. An Immigration Judge denied relief. The IJ found his testimony credible but noted that He did not know the denomination of the faith that was practiced during the two gatherings he attended and had never heard of anyone getting in trouble for attending a Christian government-authorized church. The IJ found that the evidence of the harm He described during two detentions, including an assault by police, does not rise to the level of persecution contemplated by the” Act. He failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution, presenting no evidence that "anyone associated with the Chinese government is looking for him, or that he would be harmed or persecuted . . . if he practices his Christian religion in China.”The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review. Substantial evidence supported the finding that HE failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his religious beliefs. He failed to establish eligibility for asylum and necessarily cannot meet the more rigorous standard for proof of withholding of removal. View "He v. Garland" on Justia Law

DHS placed Robles in removal proceedings following his arrest for injuring a pedestrian while driving under the influence. Urrutia applied for cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1229b. An IJ found that Urrutia satisfied the four eligibility requirements, concluded that Urrutia’s “significant negative factors” were outweighed by positive factors, and granted relief. Reviewing that discretionary determination de novo, the BIA denied cancellation of removal, ordered Urrutia removed to Mexico, then denied his timely motion to reopen proceedings. In 2019, the Eighth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to overturn the initial discretionary decision and that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Urrutia’s motion to reopen.Urrutia filed a second motion to reopen, citing newly-discovered evidence and his due diligence and extraordinary circumstances as “compelling statutory tolling of the time and number limits on motions to reopen. The BIA denied that motion, stating “[w]e balanced the respondent’s equities and negative factors" concluding that he did not warrant discretionary relief, given his repeated DUI offenses and that “supplemental evidence is not likely to change the outcome of the proceedings.” The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review. Motions to reopen removal proceedings are disfavored because there is a “strong public interest” in finality. View "Robles v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied the petition for review of the BIA's decision upholding the IJ's denial of petitioner's application for cancellation of removal. Petitioner testified regarding his daughter's suicide attempt and cited it as evidence that his removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to her.The court concluded that the BIA did not misapply the standard for exceptional and extremely unusual hardship by focusing on the daughter's current conditions. The court explained that the BIA's future-oriented analysis shows that the BIA applied the correct legal standard. Furthermore, the court lacks jurisdiction to review the IJ's findings. In this case, the cause of the daughter's declining mental health is a factual matter involving credibility assessments—precisely the sort of discretionary, fact-finding exercise that Congress has shielded from judicial review in cancellation disputes. The court also concluded that the BIA's decision not to address the IJ's misstatement about petitioner's eligibility for reentry is also outside the court's jurisdiction. View "Garcia-Ortiz v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review challenging the BIA's dismissal of petitioner's appeal from an IJ's decision denying her request to terminate proceedings based on Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), and denying her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that precedent forecloses petitioner's argument, based on Pereira, that the immigration court never acquired jurisdiction over her proceedings because her Notice to Appear (NTA) was deficient. The court also concluded that the agency properly denied petitioner's asylum application because her proposed particular group of "family unaffiliated with any gangs who refuse to provide any support to transnational criminal gangs in Guatemala" was not legally cognizable because it lacked particularity and social distinction. Even assuming that her proposed particular social group of her nuclear family was cognizable, the court further concluded that substantial evidence supports the agency's finding that she failed to demonstrate the requisite nexus between any persecution or fear of persecution and her membership in the group. Furthermore, petitioner failed to establish her eligibility for withholding of removal, and she failed to exhaust her CAT claim. View "Osorio Tino v. Garland" on Justia Law

After settling with the liability carrier, plaintiff filed an Underinsured Motorist (UIM) claim with her insurer, Farmers. Farmers made a settlement offer that was rejected by plaintiff when she presented a significantly higher counteroffer. In response to the counteroffer, Farmers continued its investigation by requesting updated medical documents and informing plaintiff that she needed to submit to an examination under oath (EUO). Plaintiff refused and filed this action.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Farmers, concluding that, by commencing suit, plaintiff materially breached the cooperation clause with Farmers. The court explained that nothing in the language of the policy draws a distinction between an initial investigation or a reopened investigation, and plaintiff has cited nothing in either her policy or Missouri law supporting her claim that her duty to cooperate was extinguished under these circumstances. Furthermore, plaintiff waived her argument that she was excused from waiving her duty to cooperate and the evidence does not support her claim that Farmers waived its right to request an EUO. The court concluded that when plaintiff failed to submit to the requested EUO, she prevented Farmers from continuing its investigation of her claim. Consequently, her refusal prejudiced Farmers. Finally, the record demonstrates that Farmers was reasonably diligent in its decision to require plaintiff's participation at an EUO. View "McClune v. Farmers Insurance Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the government in an action where the government sought to revoke defendant's citizenship because he entered the country and sought asylum using a false identity and then concealed this deception when later applying for naturalization under his true identity.The court concluded that the plain language of the U.S. Attorney Rule, 8 U.S.C. 1451(a), which requires the local U.S. Attorney to institute an action to revoke naturalization, and its placement in the statute, indicate that the U.S. Attorney Rule is not jurisdictional, and there is an absence of Supreme Court decisions treating similar provisions as invoking subject matter jurisdiction. In this case, the district court did not err in holding that the undisputed evidence showed that revocation of defendant's citizenship was warranted based on illegal procurement of his naturalization and procurement of his naturalization by concealment or misrepresentation of a material fact. View "United States v. Daifullah" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review challenging the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court rejected petitioner's challenge to the non-per-se-PSC (particularly serious crime) term under 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii)) as unconstitutionally vague, concluding that the statute's text, while ambiguous, does more than apply to a crime's imagined, ordinary case and it imposes standards that must reference underlying facts. The court also rejected petitioner's alternative, non-refoulement claim. In this case, after determining that petitioner committed a PSC (past), the IJ did not need to conduct a separate danger-to-the-community analysis (present or future). Finally, the court concluded that petitioner was not entitled to CAT relief where he concedes that his evidence does not meet the more-likely-than-not standard of proof for being tortured if he were returned to Somalia. View "Mumad v. Garland" on Justia Law