Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case involved a dispute over the rights to an extensive collection of Elvis Presley memorabilia. The collection was amassed by Sterling Gary Pepper, Jr. (Gary), who suffered from cerebral palsy and was cared for by his mother, Nell Pepper. Gary and Nell died in 1980 and 1982, respectively. A friend of Gary's and Nell's (Nancy) gave the collection to her sister, who sold it at an auction in 2009. Gary's and Nell's estates (the Estates) filed a complaint against Nancy and the partnership formed to transfer the collection, bringing claims for, inter alia, conversion by a bailee. Defendants filed a counterclaim for recovery of the value of preserving the collection. The district court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims, concluding that the statute of limitations for the Estates' claims had expired. At issue on appeal was whether Iowa's discovery rule applied, which tolls the statute of limitations until the plaintiff has discovered the injury or should have discovered it. The Eighth Circuit reversed with respect to the conversion claim, holding that conflicting inferences created genuine issues of material fact concerning whether the Estates should have been on inquiry notice whether the collection had been converted by Defendants. View "Estate of Pepper v. Whitehead" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs developed breast cancer after taking Prempro, a drug manufactured by Defendant. Plaintiffs filed separate lawsuits against Wyeth, alleging that the use of Prempro increased the risk of breast cancer and that Wyeth failed to adequately warn of the drug's adverse effects. On behalf of Plaintiffs, Dr. Donald Austin opined that short-term Prempro use increased breast cancer risk. The magistrate judge concluded that Dr. Austin's opinion was not sufficiently reliable under Daubert and granted Wyeth's motion to preclude the expert testimony. The court then granted Wyeth's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the two cases. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the magistrate judge abused his discretion in precluding Dr. Austin's expert testimony, as the opinion was admissible. Remanded. View "Kuhn v. Wyeth, Inc." on Justia Law

Patrick McGinness, driving a vehicle owned by his adult daughter, negligently struck and injured Marie DeMeo. DeMeo obtained a $350,000 state-court judgment against McGinness. McGinness's daughter's insurer, American Family Insurance Company, paid its $100,000 policy limit under an owner's liability policy that covered McGinness as a permitted driver. State Farm insured McGinness under four liability policies issued for the cars he owed. Each policy provided coverage to McGinness when operating a non-owned vehicle such as his daughter's. Invoking the policies' "anti-stacking" provisions, State Farm paid the per-person limit of one policy, $50,000. De Meo filed this action to recover an additional $150,000, the combined limits of the other three policies. The district court held that the anti-stacking provisions did not conflict with Missouri's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act (MVFRL) requirements, which mandate that motor vehicle owners and operates maintain minimum levels of financial responsibility for damages arising out of their ownership or use of a motor vehicle, and granted summary judgment in State Farm's favor. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was no basis to conclude that the MVFRL demands stacking when there are multiple policies. View "DeMeo v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs developed breast cancer after taking Prempro, a drug manufactured by Defendant. Plaintiffs filed separate lawsuits against Wyeth, alleging that the use of Prempro increased the risk of breast cancer and that Wyeth failed to adequately warn of the drug's adverse effects. On behalf of Plaintiffs, Dr. Donald Austin opined that short-term Prempro use increased breast cancer risk. The magistrate judge concluded that Dr. Austin's opinion was not sufficiently reliable under Daubert and granted Wyeth's motion to preclude the expert testimony. The court then granted Wyeth's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the two cases. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the magistrate judge abused his discretion in precluding Dr. Austin's expert testimony, as the opinion was admissible. Remanded. View "Davidson v. Wyeth, Inc." on Justia Law

This negligence action grew out of a highway collision. Kala Holtkamp was driving at night with her fiance, Christopher Davis, and her two-year-old son, K.H., when she collided with the rear of a semi truck driven by Vanya Atanasova. Davis was killed, K.H. was seriously injured, and Holtkamp was injured. Holtkamp, K.H.'s father, and representatives for Davis and K.H. (collectively, Appellees) brought this action for negligence and loss of consortium against Atanasova and Venture One, Inc., the truck's dispatcher. A jury found both Atanasova and Holtkamp negligent, apportioning ninety percent of the fault to Atanasova and ten percent to Holtkamp. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err by giving certain jury instructions; (2) the district court did not err in excluding evidence of Holtkamp's drug use and of the citation she received for following too closely; (3) the jury's allocation of fault between Atanasova and Holtkamp was not against the weight of the evidence; (4) the district court did not err in denying Appellants' motion for judgment as a matter of law on Finley's claim for loss of consortium with K.H.; and (5) the damage awards did not require judicial interference with the jury's verdict. View "Two Rivers Bank & Trust v. Atanasova " on Justia Law

This case involved a wire transfer from Plaintiff's bank account to Defendant's wife. Plaintiff claimed that Defendant, a former employee of Plaintiff, initiated the transfer unlawfully. Defendant moved for summary judgment, offering evidence of another explanation for the transfer. Plaintiff did not offer any evidence in response, and the district court entered summary judgment for Defendant. At issue on appeal was whether Defendant made the initial showing required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, thereby shifting the burden to Plaintiff to present affirmative evidence showing that a genuine issue of material fact existed. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant made the required showing.

After JPMorgan Chase Bank (Chase) initiated foreclosure proceedings on Appellants' home and subsequently bought the property at a sheriff's sale, Appellants filed suit against Chase, doing business as Washington Mutual, seeking damages under theories of promissory estoppel and negligence. The district court dismissed the claims. Appellants subsequently filed a second suit against Chase and Washington Mutual, alleging causes of action relating to purported misrepresentations and alleged failure to disclose information and Chase's alleged failure to provide adequate notice of the sheriff's sale and to respond to two qualified written requests in violation of the Real Estate Settlement Practices Act (RESPA). The district court dismissed all claims against Washington Mutual without prejudice and all claims against Chase with prejudice. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) other than their claim under RESPA, the claims set forth in Appellants' complaint were barred by the doctrine of res judicata; and (2) as for the RESPA claims, Appellants failed to show how the complaint could be amended to survive a motion to dismiss.

Jason McCann was involved in an automobile accident with Jeffrey Kreml. McCann's insurer, Auto Club Insurance Association, defended McCann against Kreml's personal injury action. After Kreml and McCann settled, Auto Club sought contribution from Sentry Insurance, the insurer for McCann's employer, claiming Sentry was obligated to provide co-primary coverage for McCann. The court granted summary judgment to Sentry, finding the Sentry policy only obligated Sentry to provide excess liability coverage, and McCann had no excess exposure because he settled within the limits of the Auto Club policy. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court's interpretation of the policy was reasonable.

Wescott Agri-Products, Inc., a Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA)-licensed wholesale supplier of perishable agricultural commodities, sold produce to a company that later ceased business operations after Sterling State Bank seized the company's assets because it failed to make scheduled loan payments. Wescott demanded payment from the bank, claiming the bank had seized assets subject to trust under the PACA, but the bank refused. Wescott sued the bank, asserting various claims, including violations of the PACA and a conversion claim. The district court granted the bank summary judgment on Wescott's conversion claim and summary judgment in favor of Wescott on its PACA claim. Wescott then appealed the district court's denial of attorney fees on costs. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to award Wescott attorney fees and costs, as the fees were excessive and unreasonable, and Wescott's unprofessional conduct in the case did not warrant an award of fees.

After Juston Pohl was injured in an automobile accident in Furnas County, Pohl brought this negligence action against the County, alleging that the accident was caused by the County's failure to have a properly placed and maintained road sign at the scene. The County responded that the accident was caused by Pohl's own negligent driving. The district court found both parties negligent, apportioning sixty percent of the negligence to the County and forty percent to Pohl, and awarding Pohl $407,163 in damages. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) finding the County was negligent in its maintenance and placement of the sign; (2) finding that the County's negligence was a proximate cause of the accident; (3) finding that Pohl's negligence was a proximate cause of his injuries; and (4) apportioning negligence between the parties.