Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Siouxland, a group practice of obstetrician-gynecologists, terminated Hagen, its President and an equity owner, invoking the for-cause termination provision in Hagen’s 1993, Employment Agreement, after an incident during which Hagen yelled at Dr. Eastman (another Siouxland doctor) and hospital staff, accusing them of neglecting a patient, resulting in a stillbirth. Hagen also reported the incident to hospital administration and told the Siouxland partners that he was considering reporting to the Iowa state medical board. Hagen advised the patient to sue for malpractice. Hagen filed suit, alleging wrongful retaliatory discharge in violation of Iowa public policy. The other doctors testified about Hagen’s history of workplace conflicts and outbursts and about concern that his suspension by the hospital would hurt the reputation of the practice. A jury awarded Hagen $1,051,814 in compensatory damages. The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that Hagen failed to prove he was an at-will employee who may assert a tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The exclusive remedy of a medical professional practicing under Hagen’s Employment Agreement would be a breach of contract claim, which would permit inquiry into the professional conduct the district court found separately protected by the tort of wrongful termination in violation of public policy. View "Hagen v. Siouxland Obstetrics & Gynecology, PC" on Justia Law

Robinson worked as a sandblaster for decades. Sand sometimes breaks down into silica dust, which, if inhaled, can cause the incurable lung disease silicosis. By 1997, Robinson knew that sandblasting could cause silicosis. In 1998, he saw Dr. Ragland, after coughing up white mucus. In 2002, he went to Ragland for bronchitis. In 2007, Robinson went to an emergency room for chest pain. The report listed three possibilities: tuberculosis, sarcoidosis, or a pneumonoconiosis disease (e.g., silicosis) caused by inhaling dusts. Medical notes reflect an “impression” of “silicosis related to sandblasting.” Robinson saw a respiratory specialist, to “follow up his silicosis.” Ridgeway’s notes, shared with Ragland, list an “impression” of silicosis. In 2011 Ridgeway biopsied Robinson’s lung. According to Robinson, Ridgeway then first told him he had silicosis. In 2012, Robinson sued entities that “sold, designed, manufactured, or marketed . . . silica related products.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed that the suit was time-barred. Arkansas’s three-year limitations period for product-liability actions applied, subject to a discovery rule: the period “does not commence running until the plaintiff knew or, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the causal connection between the product and the injuries suffered.” Robinson should have known in 2007 that silica-related products had damaged his lungs. View "Robinson v. Mine Safety Appliances Co." on Justia Law

Taylor was injured while attempting to secure a vehicle on a Cottrell car-hauling trailer. Dr. Odor operated on Taylor to complete a two-level cervical fusion. More than two years later, Taylor was again injured when he fell approximately 10 feet from a Cottrell trailer. He was taken to the emergency room and was discharged home with pain medication. The same month, Taylor reported to Dr. Odor with neck and back pain. After testing, Dr. Odor observed several disc protrusions and a disc desiccation. These injuries led to another complex spinal surgery with Dr. Odor, the cost of which exceeded $450,000. Two weeks before trial Cottrell claimed it had uncovered copies of agreements between Taylor's counsel and Dr. Odor which evidenced an impermissible contingent-fee agreement. The court found there was a contingency agreement and excluded Odor’s testimony as an expert witness, dismissed claims for Taylor's neck and back injuries, and stayed claims related to shoulder injuries. The Eighth Circuit reversed; the district court failed to articulate the precise interest Odor had in the outcome of the litigation and failed to explain why any such interest overcomes the general rule that Odor's bias and credibility should be resolved by the jury. View "Taylor v. Cottrell, Inc." on Justia Law

Stephens visited the Oaklawn Club for gambling. After winning, playing slot machines, Stephens cashed out and left the casino. He returned later that evening and purchased another ticket for use in the slot machines. He was approached by uniformed security personnel and Jessup, a uniformed Hot Springs police officer. They accused Stephens of stealing the cashed-out ticket and detained Stephens while employees reviewed surveillance footage. Stephens alleges that Jessup threatened to “take him to jail immediately” if he did not return the money. Jessup recited Miranda warnings, escorted Stephens to his vehicle, and retrieved the money. An Arkansas state court granted Oaklawn summary judgment. Neither Jessup nor Amtote was a party to that action. Stephens then filed a federal suit against Jessup and Amtote, alleging the same causes of action against these new defendants. The court dismissed, citing issue preclusion. The Eighth Circuit reversed in part, finding that Stephens did not perfect an appeal with respect to Amtote. The court expressed no view on the merits of the Jessup claims, stating that the record is not clear that Stephens is trying to relitigate an issue that was previously decided or that Jessup and Oaklawn represent the same legal right. View "Stephens v. Jessup" on Justia Law

On August 20, 2013, Lee, an Arkansas citizen, sued VTI and 10 John Does, alleging that while preparing for a welding project on August 21, 2010, he attached a newly purchased oxygen tank to his existing pressure regulator, manufactured by VTI. Lee “tried without success to adjust the regulator pressure” when “[s]uddenly, and without warning, the metal crimped end of the oxygen hose came loose from the metal handpiece, striking him in the right eye” and causing blindness in that eye. On December 18, 2013, Lee dismissed VTI and moved for leave to amend his complaint to substitute Airgas LLC and Airgas-Mid South (the alleged supplier of the tank) for two Doe defendants. The district court denied the motion, noting Lee failed to allege Airgas-Mid South’s principal place of business, the citizenship of Airgas LLC’s members, and the citizenship of any John Doe defendants. The order imposed a deadline by which Lee was to correct these errors. The district court permitted amendment as to Airgas Mid-South but ultimately dismissed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that Lee’s claims against Airgas Mid-South were time-barred and the district court lacked diversity jurisdiction over the claims against the John Does. View "Lee v. Airgas - Mid South, Inc." on Justia Law

Lopez was a passenger in a car driven in St. Louis by Pyron. The lane in which they were driving ended at an intersection. Pyron merged into the lane where Cleveland's postal truck was traveling; the vehicles collided. The collision pushed Pyron's car a short distance into the intersection, but its air bags did not deploy. She pulled over and later drove her car home. Photographs show only minor damage to her car. Lopez filed a negligence claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671–2680. Officer McKern testified that based on her investigation she believed Cleveland's account of the collision and that in her experience similar accidents occurred frequently at the intersection. At the close of trial Lopez argued that under Missouri law there is a presumption of negligence on the part of the driver of a vehicle colliding into the rear of another and that no evidence had been presented to rebut this presumption. The district court rejected the argument, finding that Lopez was not credible, that Pyron's own testimony showed she was at fault, and that Officer McKern was believable. Cleveland had died of unrelated causes. The Eighth Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of the government. View "Lopez v. United States" on Justia Law

Priesendorf, distraught and drunk, asked Purscell for a ride to a cemetery. On the return trip, Priesendorf's behavior became erratic. She put her foot on the accelerator, on top of Purscell's foot. Purscell got her to stop. Later, Priesendorf unbuckled her seat belt, scooted over, and repeated the behavior. Purscell was unable to remove his foot. Approaching a stop sign, he put his other foot on the brake, with no effect. Purscell saw the Carrs' vehicle. Priesendorf continued to press the accelerator. Purscell swerved, but the vehicles collided and overturned. The Carrs' vehicle caught fire. Priesendorf was dead at the scene. Later, Purscell learned the gravesite Priesendorf had visited belonged to a person who had been killed in an accident while Priesendorf was driving drunk. Priesendorf had attempted suicide following her friend's death; none of her other friends would give her a ride because of her erratic behavior. Infinity insured Purscell's vehicle with policy limits of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident for bodily injury. Infinity immediately put the full amount on reserve, with $25,000 designated to Priesendorf's fatality and $25,000 designated to the Carrs. Infinity immediately received a settlement offer from the Carrs, seeking policy limits. Tim's medical expenses were over $97,000 and ongoing. Amy had separate claimes. Infinity stated that it needed to investigate coverage. Infinity informed Purscell of his right to seek independent counsel. The Carrs withdrew their settlement offer. Infinity eventually filed an interpleader, depositing policy limits in court. A jury awarded Tim Carr $830,000 and Carr $75,000; Priesendorf's wrongful death claim settled for $7,764.50, leaving Purscell with a substantial judgment against him. Purscell sued Infinity, alleging bad faith and breach of fiduciary duty. The district court first and Eighth Circuit rejected the claims. View "Purscell v. Tico Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Snyder was on parole after serving sentences for possession of a controlled substance and automobile theft. The Missouri Board of Probation and Parole determined that Snyder had absconded and issued a warrant for his arrest. Julian, an employee of the Board’s Fugitive Apprehension Unit, received a telephone call informing him that Snyder was at an apartment in Cape Girardeau. Julian drove to the address and positioned his car in a well-lighted parking lot in front of the apartment. Julian saw Snyder, got out of his car, and informed Snyder that he was a parole officer with a warrant for Snyder’s arrest. Snyder placed his hands on the back of Julian’s car. Julian approached, stood to Snyder’s left, and placed his left hand on Snyder’s left shoulder. Snyder then turned to his right and began to run. After Snyder took two steps, Julian fired one shot, killing him. In a suit by Snyder’s estate, the jury rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, but awarded $1 million for wrongful death. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that there was sufficient evidence to defeat Julian’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, and that the damages award did not require a new trial. View "Estate of Snyder v. Julian" on Justia Law

Wagner worked for Gallup for 12 years before his 2011 termination at age 50. Wagner co-authored two books for Gallup. The first became a New York Times bestseller. Gallup still sells both books. Wagner received positive verbal feedback from individuals in management. Gallup presented him with many awards during his employment. In 2011, Bogart became Wagner's supervisor. Bogart was 35, but had worked for Gallup longer than Wagner. Wagner stated that he and Bogart only interacted twice while Bogart was his supervisor. Bogart called Wagner and discussed the ongoing transitional situation of Wagner’s position and Bogart's difficulty finding a place for Wagner on a team given the perception that Wagner was too "self-referential." During a second call, Bogart terminated Wagner, informing Wagner that his position had been eliminated. Wagner sued, alleging age discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act and invasion of privacy based on appropriation of his name or likeness. Wagner submitted declarations from two former Gallup employees who had worked with Wagner. Both stated that Gallup had initiated a "youthful movement" and targeted older employees for termination. The district court granted judgment in favor of Gallup. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Wagner was unable to establish a question of fact as to Gallup's motives for his termination and did not establish intentionality with respect to his privacy clam. View "Wagner v. Gallup, Inc." on Justia Law

Ideker sued, alleging she developed non-Hodgkins lymphoma from exposure to benzene while working in HD’s paint department. The district court dismissed, predicting that the Missouri Supreme Court would require Ideker to raise her claim before Missouri’s labor and industrial relations commission because it was covered by Missouri’s Workers’ Compensation Law. Ideker then filed a workers’ compensation claim, which is pending. The dismissal became final. Less than 30 days later, the Missouri Court of Appeals issued an opinion that cast doubt on that prediction. Although Ideker’s counsel was aware of the decision before time to appeal expired, counsel stated that “there was little incentive for Ideker to seek appellate review requiring a second federal court to predict how Missouri courts would rule.” Ideker filed a complaint in state court, reasserting her occupational disease claim. Harley-Davidson removed the case to federal court. The court dismissed without prejudice on collateral estoppel grounds, concluding that its prior decision was binding because Missouri law precluded Ideker “from relitigating issues finally decided in [an] incorrect order[].” The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Any purported “mistake” the court made in predicting Missouri law does not enable Ideker to circumvent the dismissal by refiling the same injury claim based on the same historical facts in a second case. View "Ideker v. Harley-Davidson, Inc." on Justia Law