Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

From 1978 to 2008 Stanley worked as a hauler for Allied and was responsible for loading and unloading cars from his trailer. In 2008, Stanley attempted to unload a car from the upper deck of a 55 foot, eight car trailer manufactured by Cottrell. He lifted himself onto the upper deck railing of the trailer, moved sideways across the railing, and placed his right hand on the trunk of the car. As he reached for the car door with his left hand, he lost his hold and fell, landing on his back and leg. His back was not seriously injured, but his leg has been operated on seven times, resulting in $642,797.38 in medical costs. Stanley sued, alleging negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, and outrage, claiming that his trailer was defective under Missouri law because it was not equipped with additional fall protections such as ladders, handholds, and extended catwalks. After contrasting expert testimony, a jury found for Cottrell. Stanley moved for a new trial, arguing that the court erred by refusing to allow the testimony of rebuttal witnesses and by its jury instructions on his negligence and strict liability claims. The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of his motions and award of $11,171.92 in costs to Cottrell. View "Stanley v. Cottrell Inc." on Justia Law

A fire destroyed the Kostecki home. Their insurer, AAIC, reimbursed their loss, received an assignment of rights, and filed a products liability action against Omega, the manufacturer of TracPipe, a corrugated stainless steel tubing product that brought propane gas from an underground storage tank into the Kosteckis’ home. The court granted Omega summary judgment on breach of warranty and failure to warn. The case proceeded to trial on claims of negligent design and strict liability for an unreasonably dangerous product. All experts agreed that the fire started when lightning struck a tree near the underground propane tank, causing electric energy to enter the Kostecki home and ignite combustible materials in the space between the basement and the first floor. Fire investigators found holes in the TracPipe running through that space. A jury returned a verdict for Omega, finding that it did not fail to use ordinary care in designing the product or sell the product in an unreasonably dangerous and defective condition. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that the court abused its discretion when it excluded the opinion of AAIC’s metallurgical expert, that the product was defectively designed, and admitted testimony by a defense expert, criticizing the fire causation theory. View "Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Omega Flex, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2005 E3’s predecessor began construction of an ethanol plant, to be powered, in part, by methane, and contracted with Biothane for a boiler system. Biothane, an expert in systems integration but not in boilers specifically, subcontracted with PEI to install and integrate the boilers. Biothane retained overall responsibility. Both are engineering companies. In 2007, PEI’s engineer repeatedly tried and failed to light the main flame of one of the boilers. The repeated attempts caused gas to build up and explode. E3 claims that the boiler never worked properly afterward and that the plant failed as a result. The plant’s owners eventually reorganized in bankruptcy. In 2011 (3 years and 364 days after the explosion) E3 sued, alleging torts against both companies and breach of contract against Biothane. The district court granted defendants summary judgment, finding all of E3’s claims time-barred under Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-222, Nebraska’s two-year limitations period for actions based on professional negligence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Regardless of whether the chain of events ultimately led to the breach of a contract, E3 still sued Biothane “for an action performed in a professional capacity.” View "E3 Biofuels, LLC v. Biothane, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2007, while operating a truck, Yelder, an employee of Yelder-N-Son Trucking, collided with a Tri-National truck, causing extensive property damage. Tri-National filed a claim with its insurer, Harco, which paid $91,100 and retained a subrogation interest. Yelder was insured by Canal with an MCS-90 endorsement, mandated by the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 793. In 2010, Canal sought a declaratory judgment against the Yelder defendants and Harco. An Alabama court entered default judgment against the Yelder defendants only, stating Canal had no duty to defend or indemnify them under the Canal policy. The court made no declaration about whether the MCS-90 endorsement requires a tortfeasor’s insurer to compensate an injured party when the injured party has already been compensated by its own insurer. Tri-National then sued the Yelders in Missouri and obtained a $91,100 default judgment. Tri-National sought equitable garnishment against Canal, apparently on behalf of Harco. Canal removed the action to the federal district court, which granted Tri-National’s motion. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the MCS-90 does require such compensation. The circumstance of Tri-National carrying its own insurance did not absolve Canal of its obligations under the endorsement View "Tri-National, Inc. v. Canal Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2006, Sletten, an orthodontist practicing in Minnesota and Wisconsin, bought general liability and personal injury liability insurance from Continental through Wells Fargo. The next year, Sletten formed S&B, which opened an office in Hudson, Wisconsin and employed Brettin to practice orthodontics there. Sletten notified Wells Fargo that he had opened the Hudson office and requested coverage for the location. Wells Fargo added the Hudson office as an additional insured location but never added S&B as a named insured. In 2012, St. Croix Dental and Wolff sued, that Brettin, acting “on behalf of and with the knowledge and consent of” S&B, used his neighbor’s wireless network to post defamatory comments about St. Croix to the Internet. Brettin allegedly posed as a patient of St. Croix and criticized Wolff’s orthodontia. St. Croix alleged defamation and libel, civil conspiracy, and unfair competition. Continental refused to defend because the policy did not identify S&B as a named insured. S&B and Sletten then sued Continental and Wells Fargo. The Eighth Circuit affirmed dismissal, holding that the policy excluded coverage for acts done with the intent to injure; every claim pleaded that S&B and Brettin acted with the intent to injure. View "Sletten & Brettin Orthodontics, LLC v. Cont'l Cas. Co." on Justia Law

Argonaut sued Audrain County Joint Communications (ACJC) alleging ACJC's negligence in monitoring a security alarm panel caused or contributed to damages arising out of the burglary and fire of a grocery store insured by Argonaut. Public employees at the ACJC call center monitored a private security company's alarm panels. The panels were defective. ACJC argued that it was entitled to sovereign immunity as a Missouri state entity, and to statutory immunity as a 911 call center. The district court denied summary judgment after finding ACJC had waived its sovereign and statutory immunity by purchasing insurance. The Eighth Circuit dismissed part of an interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction, but otherwise affirmed. Missouri Revised Statutes Section 537.600 generally preserves "sovereign or governmental tort immunity as existed at common law" and specifically refers to "the immunity of [a] public entity from liability and suit." Section 190.307, however, does not create a substantive right to be free from the burdens of litigation. There was no clear error in the district court's determination under section 537.600 that ACJC did not prove the existence of a pre-existing agreement between itself and the insurer to include the sovereign immunity endorsement with the original policy. View "Argonaut Great Cent. Ins. Co. v. Audrain Cnty. Joint Commc'ns." on Justia Law

Patterson's mother called police after an argument. Officers approached Patterson, who sat on the porch, and told him, repeatedly, to leave. Patterson became agitated when they suggested that he go to a homeless shelter. They stated that he was under arrest and would be physically removed. The officers attempted to lift him. Patterson resisted. Patterson and an officer fell against a barbeque grill "with considerable force." Officer Hasiak punched Patterson in the stomach. That failing, Officer Hiatt used her taser; its probes did not connect. Hasiak thrust his knee into Patterson's thigh. Hasiak attempted to kick Patterson's leg, missed, and contacted Patterson's torso. Patterson stopped resisting. The officers put Patterson in their police cruiser and took him to the hospital. Medical staff diagnosed fractured ribs but believed that they would heal without further treatment. Patterson pleaded guilty to failing to leave his mother's property and was released. He collapsed outside of the jail and was returned to the hospital. Doctors discovered a torn intestine. He underwent surgery and was released a week later. Patterson sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. A jury found excessive force, yet only awarded $1. The district court and Eighth Circuit affirmed. A jury may reasonably conclude that compensatory damages are inappropriate despite finding that excessive force was used if it finds that both justifiable and unjustifiable force might have been used and the injury may have resulted from justifiable force. View "Patterson v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law

In 2011, after about two weeks of reporting symptoms and being treated for constipation and gas, Allard, a prisoner at the Clarinda Correctional Facility of the Iowa Department of Corrections , suffered a bowel obstruction and perforation. Allard had emergency surgery where a colostomy bag was installed and his bowel was repaired. Allard filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment to the prison staff. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that material questions of fact existed regarding the appropriateness of the care Allard received. Although Allard demonstrated that CCF medical staff failed to properly diagnose his bowel obstruction, and demonstrated that failure to treat the bowel obstruction led to a bowel perforation, Allard failed to put forward evidence to support a finding of deliberate indifference. View "Allard v. Baldwin" on Justia Law

Draper, age 18, suffered traumatic brain injury in a 2006 car accident. Draper executed a durable power of attorney, authorizing her parents to collect money; compromise claims; and “fund, transfer assets to, and to instruct and advise the trustee of any trust wherein [Draper is] or may be the trustor, or beneficiary.” Draper began receiving Supplemental Security Income payments. In February 2008, father signed a personal-injury settlement. Draper received $429,259.41. Her parents signed documents creating a Special Needs Trust, intended to qualify under 42 U.S.C. 1396p(d)(4)(A), to provide for Draper’s needs without “displac[ing] or supplant[ing] public assistance or other sources of support that may otherwise be available” and transferred $429,259.41. In September 2008, Draper received notice that she had been overpaid $3,000 in SSI benefits because her trust exceeded the SSI-eligibility limit of $2,000, and that her SSI payments would cease. An ALJ found that for the trust to be exempt from consideration as a personal asset, Draper’s parents had to act as third-party creators when establishing it, but instead acted as agents under the power of attorney. Draper’s parents obtained a state court order modifying the trust, which retroactively listed the state court, rather than Draper’s parents, as the settlor. The Appeals Council denied review, finding that the order did not provide a basis for altering the ALJ’s decision. The district court and Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Draper v. Colvin" on Justia Law

For about three years ending in 2009, five schemers bilked unsuspecting investors of an estimated $190 million in a Minnesota Ponzi scheme. They took more than $79 million of the investors’ funds with the help of Associated Bank. After the scheme was exposed, the district judge in a related case appointed a receiver to take custody of funds owned by the schemers’ estates and by organizations under their control (receiver entities). The receiver filed suit on behalf of the receiver entities, alleging Associated Bank aided and abetted the scheme. The district court granted Associated Bank’s motion to dismiss. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, stating that, while it could not predict whether a jury will find Associated Bank either had actual knowledge of or substantially assisted in the asserted torts, the facts alleged in the complaint give the receiver’s claims “facial plausibility.” The receiver pled “factual content that allows the court [and a jury] to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” View "Zayed v. Associated Bank, N.A." on Justia Law