Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jacob Plassmeyer incurred medical expenses during a collegiate baseball practice, and his college provided its student athletes insurance with FA. Jacob's father was also insured by the Dakotas, an employee welfare benefit plan, and Jacob was covered under this Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) plan as a dependent of his father. In this case, the trustees of Dakotas brought this declaratory judgment action against FA under section 502(a)(3) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3), seeking an order enforcing the coordination of benefits (COB) provisions in the Dakotas plan by declaring that FA's policy provided primary coverage of Jacob's claim for medical expenses already incurred. The district court denied FA's motion to dismiss and granted Dakotas' motion for summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit held that a declaratory judgment action to enforce the Dakotas plan as it applied to the claim for benefits was both consistent with the plain language of section 502(a)(3), as construed in light of historical equitable remedies available to trustees; the court agreed with the district court that FA's coverage was primary; but the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Dakotas and Western Minnesota Electrical Industry Health & Welfare Fund v. First Agency, Inc." on Justia Law

HRA appealed the district court's order declining to grant pre-award interest on an insurance appraisal award. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the Minnesota Supreme Court subsequently ruled that Minnesota Statute section 549.09 provides for pre-award interest on such awards. On remand, the district court may decide in the first instance how to calculate the pre-award interest. View "Housing and Redevelopment Authority of Redwood Falls v. Housing Authority Property Insurance" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision upholding National Union's denial of benefits. The court held that National Union did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's claims for accidental death and spousal benefits, because National Union's interpretation of the policy was not unreasonable. In this case, the policy gave National Union full discretionary authority to interpret its terms. View "Donaldson v. National Union Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the insurers' motion to dismiss, reversed and vacated the award of prejudgment interest, and affirmed the rejection of Simmons' claims for statutory damages and attorney fees. The court applied Arkansas law and held that the district court properly denied the insurers' motion to dismiss because Simmons's suit was timely. However, the district court's entry of judgment and prejudgment interest was not appropriate where Simmons' damages were not capable of exact determination until the jury spoke. Finally, the district court properly denied Simmons' request for statutory damages and attorney fees, because Simmons did not recover the statutory threshold of at least 80% of the amount it demanded in the suit. View "Simmons Foods, Inc. v. Industrial Risk Insurers" on Justia Law

3M filed an insurance claim to recover losses incurred on a number of investments due to fraud perpetrated by its own investment advisors. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Insurers, holding that the ownership requirement of Endorsement 8 applies to the Employee Dishonesty provision. Therefore, 3M does not own the stolen earnings and cannot seek coverage for the earnings under the Policy. Until the earnings were distributed to the partners, the stolen earnings were property of WG Trading, not 3M. The court explained that it is fundamental that property acquired with partnership funds is partnership property, and individual partners do not own partnership assets until the winding up of the partnership. Finally, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., does not alter general commercial property rights, but merely defines the nature and scope of the fiduciary duties owed to plan participants. View "3M v. National Union Fire Insurance" on Justia Law

The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Underwriters after Underwriters denied coverage based on the flood exclusion of the insurance policy at issue. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hudson's motion to strike Underwriters' expert's opinion, because only a few days had passed at most between when Underwriters obtained their expert's opinion and disclosed it to Hudson; the term "flood" in this insurance contract was unambiguous and the court adopted the definition of "flood" given in Ebbing v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.; and Hudson's submission of lay testimony that the storm generated strong wind gusts and a photograph of the downed utility pole did not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether wind or flood caused the damage to the docks, nor that the force generated from the flood waters directly or indirectly caused the damage to the marina's docks. View "Hudson Enterprises v. Certain Underwriters" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against F&G, an insurance company and its affiliates, under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1964(c), alleging that F&G committed numerous acts of mail and wire fraud in the course of a bookcooking scheme. The district court granted F&G's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted based on the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. 1012(b). The court concluded that plaintiff's RICO claims would interfere with state regulation of the insurance business, and the claims were thus barred by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ludwick v. Harbinger Group, Inc." on Justia Law

After Kelly D. Williams died when her car was hit by Dylan A. Meyer's vehicle, her parents submitted a claim for underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage. AMCO filed suit seeking a declaration of no coverage under Kelly's auto policy, and the district court granted summary judgment for AMCO. Under Missouri law, the court applied the general rules of contract construction when interpreting the policy. In this case, the court concluded that, because the bodily-injury liability for Meyer's vehicle was greater than the policy's UIM liability limit, Meyer's vehicle was not an "underinsured motor vehicle." The court rejected plaintiffs' claims that the policy was ambiguous and concluded that the district court did not err in finding the policy was neither ambiguous nor misleading. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "AMCO Insurance v. Williams" on Justia Law

After he was injured, an ARI employee filed a civil suit against ARI and was awarded over $1.5 million in damages. ARI then sought insurance coverage against Hartford. The district court granted summary judgment for Hartford. The court affirmed, concluding that ARI did not strictly comply with the policy's notification provision and forfeited any right to recover from Hartford. Furthermore, the Hartford attorney did not unambiguously deny coverage and thus Hartford is not estopped from enforcing its notice provision. View "American Railcar Industries v. Hartford Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Adam Fetzer, a delivery driver for the Papa John's restaurant chain, was killed in a car accident in the course of his employment when another driver ran a red light and struck his vehicle. Mary Hegel, the personal representative of Fetzer's estate, sought underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage under a business auto insurance policy issued by American Fire to Papa John's. After American Fire denied the claim, the district court granted summary judgment against American Fire. The court concluded that the district court erred in applying North Dakota law and thus finding American Fire was required to provide UIM coverage to Papa John's. Rather, the policy is subject to Kentucky law, which does not require such coverage. Therefore, American Fire is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law. The court reversed and remanded. View "American Fire and Casualty Co. v. Hegel" on Justia Law