Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, through his guardian, sought to recover from an insurance policy of ACE. Plaintiff is developmentally disabled and requires a personal care assistant. Plaintiff, while supervised by an assistant, was blinded in one eye by a BB gun given to him by the assistant. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to ACE, finding that plaintiff's claim was excluded from the policy's general-liability coverage. Plaintiff argued that his injury was within the general-liability coverage because he was not a "patient" within the meaning of the patient exclusion in the policy. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that the district court correctly found that the term "patient" was unambiguous. View "Volk v. Ace American Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against National Life and Penn Mutual after both companies denied his claims for disability benefits under insurance policies they had issued to him. Plaintiff was unable to practice chiropractic because his license was suspended. The court concluded that an incapacity arising from license suspension was not a sickness or injury that qualified as total disability under the policies. Once plaintiff lost his chiropractic license, the practice of chiropractic no longer was an occupation from which he could become disabled by virtue of sickness. That a sickness or illness might have prevented plaintiff from reestablishing a practice of chiropractic did not qualify him for disability benefits because the sickness did not render him unable to perform an occupation under the terms of the policies. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to National Life and Penn Mutual and denied plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. View "Cich v. National Life Ins. Co., et al," on Justia Law

Continental appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiffs. The district court determined that plaintiffs' had made more than one claim against their former financial advisor. The financial advisor was insured by Continental under a professional liability insurance policy. Therefore, the district court held that the insurance policy's coverage limit for a single claim did not apply and that plaintiffs' claims triggered the insurance policy's aggregate coverage limit. The court concluded that, although the financial advisor made different alleged misstatements, omissions, and promises on different dates to each plaintiff, there nonetheless existed a logical connection between her wrongful acts. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded to the district court for entry of judgment in favor of Continental. View "Kilcher, et al. v. Continental Casualty Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and the Estate of John Green appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Church Mutual. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that coverage for the injuries plaintiffs suffered because of their exposure to carbon monoxide was precluded by the pollution exclusions contained in the relevant policies where the court held that the Nebraska Supreme Court would conclude that carbon monoxide constituted a "pollutant" under the policies. The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of plaintiffs' expert. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in rejecting plaintiffs' estoppel claim where the insured suffered no actual prejudice or harm as a result of Church Manual's delay in reserving its rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Church Mutual Ins. Co. v. Green, et al." on Justia Law

Netherlands filed suit against Main Street, seeking a declaratory judgment as to whether Netherlands had a duty to defend or indemnify Main Street in the underlying lawsuit with Malt-O-Meal. The court concluded that, because Main Street did not intentionally sell to Malt-O-Meal FDA-condemnable dried milk, the sale of FDA-condemnable dried milk was an "accident" that constituted an "occurrence" under the policy; the district court properly concluded that the "your product" exclusion did not apply because the property damage claimed was to Malt-O-Meal's product, not Main Street's product; the district court correctly found the impaired property exclusion did not apply where the instant oatmeal was not "impaired property" because it could not "be restored to use" and where the instant oatmeal was "physically injured;" and construing the recall exclusion "strictly against the insurer," the court concluded that the district court correctly found that the exclusion did not apply. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment where Main Street's loss was covered under the policy and no exclusions applied. View "The Netherlands Ins. Co. v. Main Street Ingredients, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that recent amendments to Minnesota's No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, Minn. Stat. 65B.41-71, violated the First Amendment. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin defendants from enforcing the new provisions. The court concluded that the "inherently misleading" standard was broad enough in application to encompass 411-Pain's references to the $40,000 in potential insurance benefits. As such, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of subdivision 6(d)(5). The court concluded that plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits in the ultimate litigation because the ads at issue were "inherently misleading" where 411-Pain's use of actors posing as persons of authority to sell its business extended a misleading aura of authorized approval to the services in question and where the disclaimer "PAID ACTOR" did not disclaim endorsement by the actors. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of subdivision 6(d)(6). Finally, the court concluded that the requirements at issue in subsections 6(d)(1), 6(d)(2), and 6(d)(3) were constitutional and the court rejected plaintiffs' claims to the contrary. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. View "1-800-411-Pain Referral, et al. v. Leroy Otto, D.C., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against State Farm in Missouri state court, seeking to recover underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits under plaintiff's policy with State Farm (the Pontiac policy). State Farm removed to district court based on diversity of citizenship and then the district court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the State Farm policy unambiguously prohibited stacking UIM coverage limits. Plaintiff's argument was foreclosed in Daughhetee v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. where the court affirmed the lower court's determination that the language in an identical State Farm automobile policy unambiguously precluded policy stacking of UIM coverage limits under Missouri law. View "Crain v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a student cheerleader paralyzed while practicing a tumbling maneuver in gymnastics class, sought coverage under the insurance policy that Mutual issued to Prairie View as a member of the NCAA. Mutual argued that the policy covered student cheerleaders who were injured during cheerleading practice sessions. The court concluded that the gymnastics class could be considered a "practice session" under the policy; the coach authorized, supervised, and organized the cheerleading activities during the gymnastics class; the activities performed during the class were performed in preparation for a Qualifying Intercollegiate Sport team competition where plaintiff's primary purpose in taking the class was to improve his skills as a cheerleader; and the activities during the class were directly associated with the activities of a Qualifying Intercollegiate Sport team. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. View "Patterson v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Appellant appealed the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's (BAP) judgment holding that the bankruptcy estate of her former employer, Racing Services, was entitled to the liquidation proceeds of a cash-value life insurance policy the employer purchased for her. Because the trustee had presented no evidence demonstrating that appellant could have demonstrated insurability, the court rejected the argument that the purported "equities" of this case required that the court deem appellant's failure to reinstate the policy as an act of surrender. The terms of the agreement between appellant and Racing Services granted Racing Services only the limited right to receive a repayment of policy premiums from the cash value upon surrender of the policy. Accordingly, the court reversed where appellant at no time surrendered the policy and the estate did not possess a right to control the policy or receive its liquidation proceeds. View "Kaler v. Bala" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, injured in a truck accident that killed their daughter, filed suit for additional payment under a State Farm policy insuring another vehicle (Hyundai policy) that had identical underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage as the policy insuring their truck (Ford policy). The court concluded that a reasonable person, reading the Hyundai policy in its entirety, would know the stacking of the UIM policies was prohibited. Further, the district court correctly ruled that the Hyundai policy was not illusory. Because the district court found that the Hyundai policy unambiguously precluded policy stacking, it did not address State Farm's alternative argument that the UIM "Exclusions" in the policy barred recovery for any insured other than plaintiffs. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Daughhetee, et al. v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins." on Justia Law