Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that recent amendments to Minnesota's No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, Minn. Stat. 65B.41-71, violated the First Amendment. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin defendants from enforcing the new provisions. The court concluded that the "inherently misleading" standard was broad enough in application to encompass 411-Pain's references to the $40,000 in potential insurance benefits. As such, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of subdivision 6(d)(5). The court concluded that plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits in the ultimate litigation because the ads at issue were "inherently misleading" where 411-Pain's use of actors posing as persons of authority to sell its business extended a misleading aura of authorized approval to the services in question and where the disclaimer "PAID ACTOR" did not disclaim endorsement by the actors. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of subdivision 6(d)(6). Finally, the court concluded that the requirements at issue in subsections 6(d)(1), 6(d)(2), and 6(d)(3) were constitutional and the court rejected plaintiffs' claims to the contrary. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. View "1-800-411-Pain Referral, et al. v. Leroy Otto, D.C., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against State Farm in Missouri state court, seeking to recover underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits under plaintiff's policy with State Farm (the Pontiac policy). State Farm removed to district court based on diversity of citizenship and then the district court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the State Farm policy unambiguously prohibited stacking UIM coverage limits. Plaintiff's argument was foreclosed in Daughhetee v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. where the court affirmed the lower court's determination that the language in an identical State Farm automobile policy unambiguously precluded policy stacking of UIM coverage limits under Missouri law. View "Crain v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a student cheerleader paralyzed while practicing a tumbling maneuver in gymnastics class, sought coverage under the insurance policy that Mutual issued to Prairie View as a member of the NCAA. Mutual argued that the policy covered student cheerleaders who were injured during cheerleading practice sessions. The court concluded that the gymnastics class could be considered a "practice session" under the policy; the coach authorized, supervised, and organized the cheerleading activities during the gymnastics class; the activities performed during the class were performed in preparation for a Qualifying Intercollegiate Sport team competition where plaintiff's primary purpose in taking the class was to improve his skills as a cheerleader; and the activities during the class were directly associated with the activities of a Qualifying Intercollegiate Sport team. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. View "Patterson v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Appellant appealed the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's (BAP) judgment holding that the bankruptcy estate of her former employer, Racing Services, was entitled to the liquidation proceeds of a cash-value life insurance policy the employer purchased for her. Because the trustee had presented no evidence demonstrating that appellant could have demonstrated insurability, the court rejected the argument that the purported "equities" of this case required that the court deem appellant's failure to reinstate the policy as an act of surrender. The terms of the agreement between appellant and Racing Services granted Racing Services only the limited right to receive a repayment of policy premiums from the cash value upon surrender of the policy. Accordingly, the court reversed where appellant at no time surrendered the policy and the estate did not possess a right to control the policy or receive its liquidation proceeds. View "Kaler v. Bala" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, injured in a truck accident that killed their daughter, filed suit for additional payment under a State Farm policy insuring another vehicle (Hyundai policy) that had identical underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage as the policy insuring their truck (Ford policy). The court concluded that a reasonable person, reading the Hyundai policy in its entirety, would know the stacking of the UIM policies was prohibited. Further, the district court correctly ruled that the Hyundai policy was not illusory. Because the district court found that the Hyundai policy unambiguously precluded policy stacking, it did not address State Farm's alternative argument that the UIM "Exclusions" in the policy barred recovery for any insured other than plaintiffs. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Daughhetee, et al. v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins." on Justia Law

Harleysville issued Diamondhead a commercial insurance policy where, although the parties intended for the policy to exclude coverage for law enforcement, Harleysville inadvertently omitted that exclusion from the policy itself. Harleysville subsequently filed suit against Diamondhead and two residents after a Diamondhead police officer got into an altercation with the residents. Harleysville sought a reformation of the insurance contract and a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the officer. The court concluded that the district court did not err in reforming the policy to reflect the parties' intent and the doctrine of laches was inapplicable in this instance where the officer pointed to no fact that would make it unjust for Harleysville to seek relief in this circumstance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Harleysville Worchester Ins. Co. v. Ensminger" on Justia Law

After CIC denied the Archdiocese's demand for secondary excess carrier coverage, CIC filed suit seeking a declaration that its policy did not provide coverage for the underlying wrongful death litigation. On appeal, the Archdiocese challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of CIC. The court concluded, under Gibson v. Brewer, that the Archdiocese did not affirmatively establish that it was legally liable for the conduct alleged in the wrongful death claim and the court concluded that the Archdiocese was not entitled to indemnity coverage under CIC's policy. The court rejected the Archdiocese's remaining arguments and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Chicago Ins. Co. v. Archdiocese of St. Louis, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Safeco seeking to stack the underinsured motorist coverage from various policies she and her husband had taken out with Safeco for their five vehicles. On appeal, plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Safeco. The court rejected Safeco's argument that the Missouri Supreme Court in Ritchie v. Allied Property & Casualty Insurance Co. limited its holding to situations where the insured was occupying a non-owned vehicle at the time the injury was suffered and was not applicable to plaintiff because she was a pedestrian at the time of the accident. The court concluded that whether the policy in Ritchie required occupancy of a non-owned vehicle was not specifically decided by the Missouri Supreme Court. From the Missouri Supreme Court's holding in Ritchie, the court believed it would reject the Missouri Court of Appeals decision in Kennedy v. Safeco Insurance Co. of Illinois. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to grant plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and to conduct further proceedings. View "Jordan, et al. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of IL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment respecting the timeliness of his lawsuit against Nationwide seeking coverage under plaintiff's employer's underinsured motorist (UIM) policy with Nationwide. In Minnesota, the plain language of an unambiguous insurance policy controls its legal effect, whereas an ambiguous policy term is construed strictly against the insurer. In this instance, the policy plainly required plaintiff to have filed his action in a court of competent jurisdiction within two years of the underlying accident, a condition which was not satisfied here. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Larson v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against their insurer, American Bankers, after American Bankers denied plaintiffs' claim to recover for property damage under their Standard Flood Insurance Policy. Although plaintiffs filed a proof of loss for their undisputed claims, including the damage to their residence, they never filed a proof of loss for their disputed debris removal claim. The court concluded that plaintiffs' failure to file a proof of loss for their debris removal costs was a complete bar to recovery under the policy. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of American Bankers. View "Dickson, et al. v. American Bankers Ins. Co." on Justia Law