Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit against Auto-Owners, alleging breach of contract and bad faith. On appeal, Auto-Owners challenged the district court's certification of a class for those policy owners whose policies were issued in North Dakota. The court reversed, concluding that the certified class did not meet the predominance requirement of Rule 23 where the reasonableness of any claim payment may have to be individually analyzed and, therefore, the district court abused its discretion in certifying the class. View "Halvorson, et al. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., et al." on Justia Law

Indigo and one of its employees filed suit against Advanced and Lile, alleging breach of contract, negligence, conspiracy, and violations of federal law on the theory that Advanced and Lile had intentionally delayed payments on valid insurance claims. Indigo argued on appeal that, despite receiving full reimbursement from the receiver, it suffered an injury because a monthly retention amount it had paid to Advanced was neither credited towards the employee's medical costs nor repaid by Indigo. The court agreed with the district court that Indigo failed to establish standing because Indigo failed to show how any injury had arisen, or might arise in the future, from the alleged conduct. View "Indigo LR LLC, et al. v. Advanced Ins. Brokerage, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit seeking interest on benefits she received under an Accidental Death and Dismemberment (ADD) insurance policy issued by Hartford. The parties disagreed on whether Tennessee law or Missouri law applied. Plaintiff did not dispute Hartford's argument that under Missouri law and the policy language, Hartford paid the benefit to her when it was payable. Accordingly, the court concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to interest under Missouri law. Assuming Tennessee law applied, the court relied on Performance Sys., Inc. v. First Am. Nat'l Bank, to conclude that the Tennessee Supreme Court would likely construe "due" in Tenn. Code Ann. 7-14-109(b) to mean the time of payment designated in the policy, not the date of loss. In this instance, Hartford paid the benefit to plaintiff within the time of payment designated in the policy and, therefore, plaintiff was not entitled to interest under subsection (b). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Williamson v. Hartford Life & Accident, etc." on Justia Law

Doe Run commenced a declaratory action seeking to enforce Lexington's contractual duty to defend Doe Run per its Commercial General Liability (CGL) policies in two underlying lawsuits (the Briley Lawsuit and the McSpadden Lawsuit). These underlying lawsuits sought damages arising out of Doe Run's operation of a five-hundred-acre waste pile (Leadwood Pile). The court concluded that the pollution exclusions in the CGL policies precluded a duty to defend Doe Run in the Briley Lawsuit. The court concluded, however, that the McSpadden Lawsuit included allegations and claims that were not unambiguously barred from coverage by the pollution exclusions in the policies. The McSpadden Lawsuit alleged that the distribution of toxic materials harmed plaintiffs, without specifying how that harm occurred. The McSpadden complaint also alleged that Doe Run caused bodily injury or property damage when it left the Leadwood Pile open and available for use by the public without posting warning signs. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Doe Run Resources Corp. v. Lexington Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Doe Run commenced a declaratory judgment action seeking to enforce Lexington's contractual duty to defend Doe Run per its Commercial General Liability (CGL) policies in an underlying lawsuit. The underlying lawsuit alleged environmental property damage resulting from Doe Run's mine and mill operations. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that Lexington had no duty to defend because the policies' absolute pollution exclusions unambiguously barred coverage of all claims asserted in the underlying lawsuit. View "Doe Run Resources Corp. v. Lexington Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Grinnell on their claim for equitable garnishment of a personal liability insurance policy issued to the sellers of the home. Plaintiffs claimed that the insureds' misrepresentations regarding the condition of the home qualified as a covered occurrence under the policy. The court concluded, however, that the policy provided coverage only for property damage caused by the occurrence. In this instance, there was no property damage caused by the asserted occurrence, and therefore, there was no applicable coverage. Plaintiffs' alternative argument failed where, even if plaintiffs were correct that the structural damage was caused by a covered occurrence, the damage would be excluded from coverage by the policy. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Payne, et al. v. Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a claim with its insurer, Axis, after electrical wiring was stolen from its lumberyard. Axis refused to pay the full claim, citing a coinsurance provision in the policy. Plaintiff brought this action seeking to recover under the policy. The court concluded that the proper interpretation of the coinsurance provision depended on whether the insured had filed an actual cash value claim or a replacement cost claim. Here, plaintiff filed a claim with Axis for the actual value of its stolen wire. In order to calculate whether plaintiff was subject to a coinsurance policy on that claim, then, the term "value" in the coinsurance provision should be read as the actual cash value of plaintiff's saw and planing mills. Therefore, plaintiff was not subject to a coinsurance penalty on its claim for the actual value of the stolen wire; plaintiff was entitled to receive its claim of $725,000 less the $100,000 interim payment made by Axis and two undisputed $25,000 deductibles; and plaintiff was entitled to a judgment in the amount of $575,000. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Buddy Bean Lumber Co. v. Axis Surplus Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Spirtas was hired to demolish a bridge and it hired a subcontractor for the blasting and demolition. The full demolition took more time and resources to complete. Spirtas incurred additional costs, and the general contractor withheld some payment from Spirtas. Spirtas made a claim under its commercial general liability policy with Nautilus and, after Nautilus denied the claim, Spirtas sued for declaratory judgment and vexatious refusal to pay. The court concluded that the district court correctly held that Exclusions (j)(5), (j)(6), and (m) of the policy precluded coverage. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Spirtas Co. v. Nautilus Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case involved the interpretation of two contractual provisions under Minnesota law: an indemnification clause in a contract between PDSI and Miller and an insurance contract between Harleysville and PDSI which extended insurance coverage to PDSI's indemnification of third parties for tort liability caused, in whole or in part, by PDSI or by those acting on its behalf. The court agreed with the district court's finding that a PDSI employee's suit fell squarely within the indemnity provision of the 1989 Agreement between PDSI and Miller. The court also agreed with the district court's interpretation of the insurance agreements as requiring Harleysville to cover Miller's settlement of the employee's claims. Further, the court concluded that the undisputed facts established as a matter of law that PDSI or those acting on its behalf at least partly caused the employee's bodily injury within the terms of the Harleysville policy. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Physical Distrib. Serv., et al" on Justia Law

In 2005, Curtis McGhee and another individual brought claims against the City alleging violations of civil rights sounding in malicious prosecution. The City sought coverage under insurance policies issued by CIC and Columbia. On appeal, the City and McGhee challenged the district court's order granting summary judgment to CIC and Columbia, on CIC's and Columbia's declaratory judgment claims concerning coverage under the various insurance policies. The court concluded that the district court correctly refused to consider and correctly denied additional discovery of extrinsic evidence. The court also concluded that the alleged malicious prosecution and resulting personal injuries occurred when the underlying charges were filed against McGhee in 1977. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment that the following policies did not afford coverage to the City for the malicious prosecution claims: the two excess liability policies issued by CIC; four of the special excess liability policies issued by Columbia; and the commercial umbrella liability policy issued by Columbia. As to the 1977-78 special excess liability policy issued by Columbia, the court reversed the district court's judgment regarding the applicability of the reasonable expectations doctrine. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Chicago Ins. Co., et al v. City of Council Bluffs, et al" on Justia Law