Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After Lumbermens denied Smith Flooring's claim for loss of one of their buildings, Smith Flooring filed suit alleging breach of contract and sought a declaratory judgment as to the terms of the insurance policy. Lumbermens removed the case to the district court and counterclaimed for reformation of the insurance policy. The court held that the district court erred in finding that there were no issues common to the parties' legal and equitable claims; Smith Flooring had a Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury on the common issue of what the terms of the intended contract were; the district court also erred in treating the jury's verdict as merely advisory under Rule 39 insofar as this issue was concerned; however, the district court's error did not necessitate reversal of its granting post-verdict judgment as a matter of law to Lumbermens. The court further held that the evidence in this case was not sufficient to support the jury's verdict in Smith Flooring's favor. Because there was no coverage for the building, it followed that Lumbermens did not breach its contract in denying Smith Flooring's proof of loss. With no breach, Lumbermens owed Smith Flooring no damages. The district court was correct to find that clear, cogent, and convincing evidence demonstrated that the policy did not accurately set forth the agreement between the parties and that the building at issue be excluded from coverage. Consequently, the district court did not err in reforming the policy. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Smith Flooring v. Pennsylvania Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Beneficiaries of the deceased sued WSLAC after it denied life insurance benefits to the beneficiaries on the basis that the deceased had not disclosed her Hepatitis B on the application. A reasonable jury could conclude that the deceased gave truthful answers about her medical condition and that the agent recorded them incorrectly. It could also conclude that the deceased did not examine the application. The disputed facts were material because there was a genuine issue as to whether the deceased knew of misrepresentation in the application. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Yang, et al v. Western-Southern Life Assurance Co." on Justia Law

Clarinet sued Essex alleging that Essex wrongfully refused to pay Clarinet under a commercial general liability insurance policy. Clarinet sought payment for expenses for stabilizing and demolishing a building that it owned, in accordance with Clarinet's interpretation of the policy. Essex denied coverage and refused payment. The insurance policy contained several conditions and exclusions, including the owned property exclusion. The court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Essex and denied relief to Clarinet because the owned property exclusion barred coverage. View "Clarinet v. Essex Ins. Co." on Justia Law

AEGIS, an insurer, appealed from the district court's denial of its motion to compel alternative dispute resolution in its dispute with UEC. The court agreed with the district court that by agreeing in the endorsement of the contract to submit to the jurisdiction of Missouri state courts, AEGIS agreed to have any dispute relating to the insurance or to the claim resolved in those courts. Thus, the endorsement entirely supplanted the condition's mandatory arbitration provision. Even if the policy as a whole were ambiguous as to the mandatory arbitration, the court concluded that UEC would still prevail because it would be entitled to have the ambiguity resolved in its favor. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Union Electric Co. v. AEGIS Energy Syndicate 1225" on Justia Law

Betty Lu Hughes appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment declaring Owners was not obligated to cover her claim for damages caused by an underinsured motorist. The court concluded that the Owners policy's underinsured motorist coverage did not cover Hughes's claims because the underinsured motorist's liability insurance bodily limit was not "less than" $100,000 as required by the policy's unambiguous definition of "underinsured automobile." The court need not reach the alternative argument that, even if the underinsured motorist's vehicle was "underinsured," the Owners policy set-off provision reduced the amount available under the Owners policy to zero. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Owners Ins. Co. v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Olympus appealed the district court's dismissal of its complaint for failure to state a claim. Olympus argued that the district court erred in determining that its contract with Benfield clearly and unambiguously provided that Benfield did not owe Olympus an annual fee after Benfield was notified of Olympus's decision to replace Benfield with another reinsurance broker. The court agreed with the district court's sound reasoning that the proper reading of the contract was to define "Subject Business" as the placement and servicing of all of Olympus's reinsurance contracts and therefore, this part of the contract was not ambiguous. The court also agreed with the district court, which determined that "intent not to renew" encompassed both termination and replacement and therefore, no ambiguity existed as to that matter. When Guy Carpenter informed Benfield that it would be taking over as Olympus's reinsurance broker, this activated the forfeiture provision of the contract and released Benfield from the obligation to pay the Annual Fee to Olympus, regardless of whether it was viewed as termination, replacement, or intent not to renew. Because the court found the contract to be clear and unambiguous, Olympus's claims for equitable relief must be rejected. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Olympus Ins. Co. v. AON Benfield, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Gear Automotive appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of its insurer. Gear Automotive's sole owner suffered an injury that resulted in substantial medical and disability loss. Gear Automotive subsequently sought coverage from its insurer for the owner's injuries. The court concluded that the owner was an employee for purposes of employing the Employee exclusion and that the owner's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment with Gear Automotive. Because the undisputed facts established both elements of the Employee exclusion, Gear Automotive was not entitled to coverage. Ultimately, the owner, as an employee, attempted to recover under a policy of insurance that was not intended to cover Gear Automotive's liability to its employees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. View "Gear Automotive v. Wilshire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued American General, alleging that American General breached the terms of a life insurance policy plaintiff purchased. The policy at issue was a ten-year term life insurance policy on the life of her father. The district court denied plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and granted judgment to American General. Because the policy was not in force when plaintiff's father died because plaintiff failed to make the first payment, the district court did not err in concluding that no benefits were due under the terms of the policy. Plaintiff also failed to present a submissible case of estoppel or waiver under Missouri law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Dallas v. American General Life and Accident Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In this insurance coverage dispute, BSI brought suit against Hartford alleging breach of contract and vexatious refusal to pay claims under Missouri law. The district court granted Hartford's motion for summary judgment, determining that Hartford's policy excluded coverage under the present circumstances. The court concluded that the faulty workmanship exclusion excluded coverage for the damaged roof at issue; there was no conflict between the exclusion and the ensuing loss exception because the property for which coverage was excluded was not the same property for which coverage was maintained pursuant to the exception; and the district court properly granted Hartford's motion for summary judgment on BSI's vexatious refusal to pay claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "BSI Constructors v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Heubel and Raymond appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Universal on Heubal's claim for coverage under a Universal insurance policy. The district court held that Heubel's breach of a cooperation clause in the Universal policy absolved Universal of the duty to defend or provide coverage for a products liability lawsuit against Heubel. Because no reservation of rights or conflict of interest entitled Heubel to select its own counsel while continuing to enjoy the coverage benefits of the Universal policy, Heubel breached the policy by refusing to allow Universal to control the defense. Because nothing in the Universal policy or the Raymond indemnification program precluded a third-party indemnification claim by Universal against Raymond in the Harris suit, Universal suffered substantial prejudice from Heubel's refusal to allow Universal to control the defense. As a result, Universal was justified in denying coverage based on Heubel's breach of the cooperation clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Heubel Materials Handling Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co." on Justia Law