Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellants appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of American Standard. The district court concluded that appellants were not entitled to recover underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage benefits under four American Standard policies because the tortfeasor's vehicle was not an "underinsured motor vehicle" under the policies' plain language. The court held that the district court correctly concluded that appellants were not entitled to recover under the UIM policies because stacking them did not result in an amount exceeding the tortfeasor's liability. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

LINA appealed the district court's ruling that LINA abused its discretion in denying death benefits to Dawn McClelland based upon her husband's life insurance policy. LINA also appealed the district court's award of attorney's fees. The court found that LINA committed an abuse of discretion in denying benefits because its interpretation was contrary to the language of the plan that it would cover "loss of life" based upon an "accident" and because substantial evidence did not support its decision. The court also found that the total fee awarded should be $85,000 and remanded to the district court to enter an award in that amount. The prejudgment interest award was affirmed.

After plaintiff was denied long-term disability benefits by Standard, he sought review of Standard's determination under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Standard and held that there was substantial evidence supporting Standard's denial of benefits. The court also held that a conflict of interest alone was not determinative where there existed substantial evidence on the record supporting the denial of benefits.

Plaintiff sued Hartford seeking coverage under his life insurance policy for accidental dismemberment benefits after he suffered serious injuries to his eyes when a can of oven cleaner exploded in his face. The district court dismissed plaintiff's suit, concluding it was untimely because it was brought three years after the loss, outside the policy's time limitations for bringing legal actions against Hartford. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that he brought suit within Arkansas's five-year statute of limitations for breach of contract actions, Ark. Code Ann. 23-79-202(b). The court agreed with plaintiff and held that prior case law was inconsistent with Hartford's contention that the "period prescribed by law" referred to in section 23-79-202 meant something other than the full five-year period set forth in Ark. Code Ann. 16-56-111. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

This appeal arose from an insurance coverage dispute where the City sought coverage from Genesis for 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims in the nature of malicious prosecution. Genesis filed suit against the City, seeking a declaratory judgment that its policies provided no coverage for the underlying actions. The district court granted summary judgment to Genesis and the City appealed, arguing that the district court erred in ruling as a matter of law that the policies did not provide the City insurance coverage for the claims. Because Genesis did not have an insurance contract with the City in 1977, when the underlying charges were filed, it did not have a duty to defendant and indemnify the city in the suits. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff sued Jessica J. Wright and her insurers for equitable garnishment to collect a state court judgment. Wright had hacked into plaintiff's voicemail and Facebook services, sending disparaging letters and emails about him, and making anonymous phone calls and texts to harass or defame him, among other things. The district court granted summary judgment to the insurers and plaintiff appealed. The court concluded that the Umbrella Policy covered personal injury arising from defamation or privacy violations and excluded coverage for personal injury arising from mental abuse. Therefore, the acts in this case - whether they were the results of Wright's negligence - were mental abuse and not covered by the insurance policy.

Plaintiffs sued defendants, seeking indemnification and reformation of a workers' compensation insurance policy. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that Cascades' gratuitous assignment to Newton was valid under Minnesota law. Newton, as Cascades' assignee, was entitled to enforce both the right to indemnification and the right to reformation. He was a real party in interest, destroying diversity jurisdiction. Therefore, the court held that because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the court vacated and remanded.

Lowell Burris and his wife commenced a product liability action against Menard, Versa, and Versa's affiliate in Minnesota state court. After Menard removed the action to federal court, which had diversity jurisdiction, Gulf commenced this action seeking a judgment declaring "that the policy issued by Gulf to [the named insureds] does not afford coverage to them or Menard, Inc. for any claim made by [Burris] under the terms of the Gulf Policy." The district court granted Gulf's motion for a summary declaratory judgment on the ground that Versa' dissolution after expiration of the policy meant that the insured "cannot meet its obligations under the SIR" (Self-Insured Retention endorsement), a material breach that terminated Gulf's obligations under the policy. Burris appealed. The court concluded that summary judgment for Gulf was factually unwarranted and the declaratory judgment action was dismissed with prejudice.

Plaintiff sued her employer and its workers' compensation insurer for intentional obstruction of workers' compensation in violation of Minnesota statute 176.82. The employer and insurer moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The court held that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the employer intentionally obstructed her receipt of workers' compensation benefits through her manager's fabrications and its 17-month delay in payment. The court also held that genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the insurer intentionally obstructed her receipt of workers' compensation benefits by concealing the manager's first statement about the purpose of the meeting at issue, filing a factually-inaccurate claim denial, and continuing to deny the claim through trial. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings.

Debtor appealed an order of the bankruptcy court sustaining the objection of the Chapter 7 trustee to her claimed exemption of her interest in an annuity. The court concluded that res judicata applied to the debtor's claim of an exemption; and even if res judicata did not apply the bankruptcy court properly disallowed the debtor's claimed exemption. The court also affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision on the bases that: (1) it properly determined that the record did not show that the Company was "authorized to do business" as a "stipulated premium" or "assessment plan" insurance company, as required for Mo. Rev. Stat. 377.330 and 377.090 to apply to the annuity; and (2) the annuity was not insurance, as required for any of the three statutes at issue.