Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff began working for McDonnell Douglas in 1985. He stayed there until it merged with The Boeing Company (Boeing) in 1997. In 2017 and 2018, Plaintiff unsuccessfully applied for promotions within Boeing. Both times, the promotion was given to younger candidates who scored better in the interview. In 2017, the promotion went to an employee aged 33; in 2018, to one aged 34. Plaintiff alleged that Boeing discriminated against him on the basis of age, in violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). Plaintiff brought two separate lawsuits, now consolidated, alleging age discrimination in relation to the 2018 opening and a claim for constructive discharge.  The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Boeing on both claims, holding that Plaintiff (1) failed to demonstrate a material dispute as to whether Boeing’s stated rationale for the hiring decision was a mere pretext for age discrimination and (2) failed to timely file a complaint with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights within six months of when his constructive-discharge claim accrued.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Plaintiff failed to rebut the non-age-based, legitimate reasons offered by Boeing for its choice to hire the other applicant instead of him. Further, Plaintiff alleged that his termination paperwork started the clock, not his email. The court explained that Plaintiff gave his employer a little more than five weeks’ notice. But his claim still accrued then—on the day he gave notice, not the day he filed the paperwork. Because May 28, 2020, falls 185 days after November 25, 2019, Plaintiff’s complaint was untimely and thus barred. View "Jeff Bonomo v. The Boeing Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the adverse grant of summary judgment on her claim under the Equal Pay Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Daugherty Systems, Inc. (“Daugherty”) on the basis that Plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case because almost all her alleged comparators were either paid less than she was or did not perform equal work.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the pay disparity was justified by a legitimate factor other than sex. The court explained that Daugherty’s explanation for the pay differential—the differences in skillsets and experience and the desire to incentivize Plaintiff to grow in the position—is sufficient to satisfy its burden of proving the pay differential was based on a factor other than sex. The court wrote that because “no reasonable jury” could find other than in Daugherty’s favor on the affirmative defense, Plaintiff failed to raise a genuine dispute for trial, and Daugherty has shown it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Tamara O'Reilly v. Daugherty Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Advance Auto Parts, claiming unlawful discrimination under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted Advance Auto’s motion for summary judgment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that here, unlike Green v. Dillard’s Inc., there is no genuine dispute whether Advance Auto acted negligently or recklessly under Section 213. As for Section 213(a), Plaintiff does not allege that Advance Auto made improper orders or regulations. It had a written policy prohibiting discrimination based on any protected status; all employees had to read and familiarize themselves with this policy and complete annual training. The court further explained that Advance Auto is not liable under Section 1981 for discrimination based on its employee’s conduct. Plaintiff’s claims for assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress fail under respondeat superior and ratification. View "Nicolas Tashman v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff opposed a new collective-bargaining agreement that passed by a 119-vote margin. Plaintiff sued the union for breach of its duty of fair representation and a violation of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. At their core, these claims are about whether the union hoodwinked members into ratifying the new collective-bargaining agreement by concealing what would happen to the 30-and-out benefit. The district court dismissed the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act claim, denied Plaintiff’s motion for class certification, and granted summary judgment to the union on the fair-representation claim. On appeal, Plaintiff alleged that the union concealed key information, but only nine members said it would have made a difference.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to provide other evidence that the outcome of the vote would have changed. The court reasoned that the ratification vote was overwhelmingly in favor: 228 to 109, a 119-vote margin. Plaintiff offers only nine members who would have voted “no” if they had known about the elimination of the 30-and-out benefit. Even assuming each would have voted the way he thinks, the agreement still would have passed by a wide margin. The court wrote that no reasonable jury could conclude that the union’s alleged bad-faith conduct was the but-for cause of the union’s ratification of the collective-bargaining agreement. View "Matthew Nagel v. United Food and Com. Workers" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was fired by John Deere & Co.; he sued Deere for failing to accommodate his disability and discriminating against him in violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA). The district court granted summary judgment to Deere. Plaintiff appealed the district court’s judgment on his disability and failure to accommodate claims.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff cannot make a prima facie case for failure to accommodate because he never requested an accommodation at the relevant time. In fact, Deere encouraged Plaintiff to request accommodations and accommodated him before when he asked. And when Plaintiff returned to work in September 2019, he had been cleared of all restrictions. Because Plaintiff has not shown that Deere knew he needed an accommodation on his return to work, his claim fails. Further, the court wrote that Plaintiff has not provided any direct evidence of discrimination that “shows a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged decision, sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated the adverse employment action.” Finally, the court held that Plaintiff’s suggestion that his actions weren’t serious enough to merit his termination “merely questions the soundness of [Deere’s] judgment, and does not demonstrate pretext for discrimination.” View "Michael Winters v. Deere & Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her former employers, Rowley Memorial Masonic Home and Rowley Masonic Assisted Living Community, LLC (collectively, Rowley), as well as the Administrator, and Director of Nursing, for age discrimination under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Plaintiff argued that the district court erred by denying her motion to compel and granting summary judgment to Defendants. She also moved to certify a question of law to the Iowa Supreme Court and to supplement the record under seal.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, denied the motion to certify, and granted the motion to supplement. The court held that Plaintiff provided no basis for her speculation that Lemke’s additional answers would yield evidence of age discrimination. In light of the likely minimal relevance of the investigator’s additional answers and the fact that at least some of the information Plaintiff seeks was discoverable from other sources, the court wrote it perceives no abuse of the district court’s discretion and cannot say that its denial of the motion resulted in fundamental unfairness to her. Further, the court held that because Plaintiff cannot create an inference that Defendants’ decisions were motivated by her age, she has failed to make a prima facie case of age discrimination View "Inge Smothers v. Rowley Mem. Masonic Home" on Justia Law

The United States Air Force required all service members to be vaccinated against COVID-19, subject to certain exemptions. In this case, thirty-six members of the Air Force, Air Force Reserve, or Air National Guard sued the Secretary of Defense and others, alleging that the government’s denial of their requests for religious exemptions violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The Airmen sought a nationwide preliminary injunction prohibiting the Air Force from taking steps to discharge any of the Airmen and from denying travel, training, or other career opportunities to them. The district court denied the motion and later dismissed much of the case, although one aspect of the complaint remains pending in the district court. The Airmen appealed the order denying the request for preliminary injunctive relief.
The Eighth Circuit, in light of intervening developments that have granted the Airmen all of the relief requested, dismissed the appeal. The court explained that none of the Airmen is subject to a COVID-19 vaccination requirement, and no adverse action may be taken against the Airmen for refusing to receive the COVID-19 vaccine. A statutory change that discontinues a challenged practice usually makes an appeal moot. View "Tanner Roth v. Lloyd Austin, III" on Justia Law

Philander Smith College fired Plaintiff after she referred to a student as “retarded” for using a cell phone during class. She sued for sex discrimination, retaliation, and breach of contract. After granting summary judgment to the college on the first two claims, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the third.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Plaintiff has not put forward sufficient evidence of pretext. So summary judgment marks the end of the road for her sex-discrimination claim. Further, the court reasoned that even if the conditions were intolerable, in other words, Plainitff’s own role in provoking these incidents undermines the claim that the college created a workplace full of discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult. Moreover, the court explained once Plaintiff’s federal claims were gone, the district court had no obligation to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Arkansas breach-of-contract claim. View "Patricia Walker-Swinton v. Philander Smith College" on Justia Law

Core and Main LP (“C&M”) supplies water, wastewater, storm drainage, and fire protection products and services to commercial and governmental customers. C&M acquired the assets of Minnesota Pipe and Equipment Company (“MPE”), which supplied the same products and services in areas of Minnesota and South Dakota. Defendant, one of the shareholders, was part of MPE’s management team. Defendant started work at Dakota Supply Group, Inc. (“DSG”), a C&M competitor. C&M brought a diversity action against Defendant and DSG, asserting breach of the Employment Agreement’s noncompete and confidentiality covenants, tortious interference, and related claims. The district court granted Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The main issue on appeal is whether the court correctly concluded that the Noncompetition Agreement was a later agreement and, therefore, its Entire Agreement provision superseded the restrictive covenants.   The Eighth Circuit concluded that the breach of contract and tortious interference claims turn on fact-intensive issues that cannot be determined on the pleadings. Accordingly, the court reversed the dismissal of those claims and otherwise affirmed. The court explained that it agreed with C&M that it is at least plausible the two Agreements covered different subject matters, making Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal inappropriate. The Noncompetition Agreement restricting MPE shareholders from engaging or investing in a competing business was geographically broad, but its duration was precisely limited to a specific term for each restricted party. In addition, the court concluded that in the context of the multiple agreements that completed the Asset Purchase transaction, the term “prior or contemporaneous” in the Noncompetition Agreement’s Entire Agreement provision is ambiguous. View "Core and Main, LP v. Ron McCabe" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant, Baptist Health, on her sex-discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, constructive-discharge, and negligent-retention claims. After the individual defendant was dismissed as a defendant, Baptist Health moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted its motion.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court first explained that here, Plaintiff presented no evidence that Baptist Health intended to force her to quit. Rather, the record indicates that Baptist Health tried to retain Plaintiff by giving her paid administrative leave, offering to relocate her to a different location, and offering to transfer her to a new department. Thus, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Baptist Health on this claim.   Second, the court held that Plaintiff’s sex-discrimination and retaliation claims fail because she has not suffered an adverse employment action. Baptist Health offered for Plaintiff to keep her same job at any one of three locations or to transfer departments. The court wrote that Plaintiff has not shown that transferring to another department would produce a material employment disadvantage.   Third, the court found that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Baptist Health on this claim because there is no evidence that the alleged discrimination was based on sex. Finally, the court found that the evidence does not suggest that Baptist Health subjected her to any unreasonable risk of harm. View "Courtnay Bell v. Baptist Health" on Justia Law