Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, employees of the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics sued the Iowa Board of Regents (“Board”), alleging state law claims. The Board removed the case to federal court after the plaintiffs amended their complaint to include a Fair Labor and Standards Act (“FLSA”) claim.The Board argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over the FLSA claim because the Board has sovereign immunity. The court reasoned that FLSA overtime isn’t guaranteed for Board of Regents employees. And because its own pay agreements don’t separately provide FLSA overtime standards, the Board hasn’t consented to private accountability to those standards. A private cause of action cannot work as express consent to suits under the FLSA itself. Iowa courts retain the doctrine of constructive waiver of sovereign immunity.Further, though the University of Iowa system may benefit from the Board’s immunity at times, the University lacks independent authority to abrogate it. Finally, the court remanded for the district court to consider whether the legal consequences of the hospital’s policies can be attributed to the Board. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Melinda Myers v. Iowa Board of Regents" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a police officer, served in the Intelligence Division. When a new captain took over, he made personnel changes, including the transfer or detachment of 17 male officers and 5 female officers across the department. Two males and two females were transferred out of the Intelligence Division. Plaintiff was transferred to the Fifth District.Shortly after her transfer, Plaintiff filed a discrimination charge with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights. Around the same time, Plaintiff sought to transfer out of the Fifth District. The Captain made an informal request for Plaintiff’s transfer, but no formal request was ever made. Eventually, the following year, Plaintiff was transferred back into the Intelligence Division.Plaintiff filed gender discrimination and retaliation claim in state court. Defendants removed the case to federal court. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Plaintiff’s transfer from the Intelligence Division to the Fifth District did not constitute an adverse employment action. Plaintiff’s pay and rank remained the same after the transfer. The transfer did not affect her future job prospects. An employee’s reassignment, absent proof of harm resulting from that reassignment, is insufficient to constitute an adverse employment action. View "Jatonya Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, State of Mo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff commenced a class-action lawsuit alleging that SC Data Center, Inc. (“SC Data”) committed three violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). The parties reached a settlement agreement. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016), SC Data moved to dismiss the action. The plaintiff first alleged that SC Data took an adverse employment action based on her consumer report without first showing her the report. The court reasoned that the right to pre-action explanation to the employer is not unambiguously stated in the statute’s text. Next, the plaintiff asserts that SC Data obtained her consumer report without first obtaining an FCRA compliant disclosure form. The court found that plaintiff has not established that she suffered a concrete injury due to the improper disclosure. Finally, the plaintiff’s last claim asserts that she did not authorize SC Data to obtain a consumer report. She did authorize a company to conduct a criminal background search. The court found that plaintiff has not pleaded any facts demonstrating concrete harm—a prerequisite for Article III standing. As such, she lacks standing to pursue her failure-to-authorize claim. The court vacated the district court's orders. View "Ria Schumacher v. SC Data Center, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of First Care in an action brought by plaintiffs, alleging that First Care unlawfully terminated them from their positions at an assisted-living facility. First Care claimed that plaintiffs were terminated because, as mandatory reporters, they had failed to immediately report observed abuse.The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to allege a claim of retaliation under Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-1114(1)(c) where they have failed to identify any demand by First Care to engage in an unlawful action. The court also concluded that plaintiffs' race discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981, Title VII, and Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-1104(1) failed because plaintiffs ultimately failed to identify a similarly situated comparator. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine issue for trial regarding the district court's exclusion of investigator notes and reports on hearsay grounds. View "Walker v. First Care Management Group, LLC" on Justia Law

After RMC implemented new staffing grids for registered nurses at its acute-care hospital, the Union filed a grievance under the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and later sought arbitration. The grievance alleged that “the hospital intends to displace bargaining unit (BU) RNs [with] supervisory RNs in the performance of BU work as expressed in the hospital’s staffing grids” that were implemented in June 2020 and that “removed RNs in the BU.” RMC refused to process the grievance, claiming that the CBA did not cover the Union’s allegations of wrongdoing. The Union filed suit, seeking to compel arbitration.The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Union. The CBA defines “grievance” as “[a]n alleged breach of the terms and provisions of this Agreement,” sets forth the process for submitting grievances to RMC, and provides that if the grievance is not resolved by the parties, “the Union may advance the grievance to arbitration.” Article 38(1)(F) exempts from arbitration certain disputes. Because the grievance alleges displacement of bargaining unit nurses, which is covered by Article 3, and not issues related to nurse-to-patient staffing levels, which are covered by Article 38, Article 38(1)(F)’s arbitration exemption does not apply. View "National Nurses Organizing Committee-Missouri & Kansas v. Midwest Division-RMC, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2015, Powley joined RCX as a driver. RCX accommodated multiple requests for leave, specific trucks, and specific shifts based on doctors’ notes. In May 2018, Powley became a dispatcher. On August 8, Powley provided a doctor’s note stating, “Patient needs day shift work.” The note did not mention headaches. RCX rearranged schedules to accommodate her. Powley also requested she return to driving, stating that the noise in the office “gave her a headache.” On September 18, Powley submitted a doctor’s note saying: “Must have 11 hrs between shifts.” On September 28, Powley sent RCX an email stating the office noise “interferes with my ability to perform my duties,” restating her desire to return to driving, and reiterating her frustration with the arrangement of the office. She did not mention headaches or back pain. RCX treated this as a resignation.Powley sued, citing failure to accommodate her disabilities and unlawful retaliation in response to her request for an accommodation, under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Nebraska Fair Employment Practices Act. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her claims. Powley did not actually seek a reasonable accommodation for her alleged disability. Powley received many reasonable accommodations for her back pain by submitting doctor’s notes but never submitted a doctor’s note or indicated that her request to return to driving was connected to her back pain. She complained about noise, light, and office layout and did not suggest that her request was based on medical needs. View "Powley v. Rail Crew Xpress, LLC" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Tyson on plaintiff's interference claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The court concluded that Tyson's request for recertification was reasonable as a matter of law under 29 U.S.C. 2613(e) and did not interfere with defendant's FMLA rights. The court explained that it was reasonable as a matter of law to require recertification based on a significant change in the circumstances of plaintiff's absences. View "Whittington v. Tyson Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

After Tyler S. Halsey suffered a heat stroke while working for Townsend Tree Service, his parents filed suit for wrongful death and negligence. The district court dismissed the claims against the supervisor with prejudice, dismissed the claims against Townsend Tree without prejudice, and granted summary judgment to the parent company, The Townsend Corporation of Indiana.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that plaintiffs failed to allege that the supervisor breached a duty separate and distinct from the nondelegable duties of Townsend Tree. In this case, plaintiffs stress two allegations: (1) that the supervisor directed Halsey to continue working despite indications of heat exhaustion, and (2) that the supervisor disabled the air conditioning in the work trucks so Halsey could not escape the heat. Under Missouri law, the court concluded that both plaintiffs' allegations are within Townsend Tree's nondelegable duties to provide a safe workplace and equipment. Because plaintiffs' claims against the supervisor have no reasonable basis in fact or law, the case was properly removed to federal court.The court further concluded that the district court properly dismissed Townsend Tree without prejudice and the district court did not err in applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine where the question of the cause of death was within the special competence of the Missouri Labor Industrial Relations Commission. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Townsend Corporation where it did not incur liability under either Restatement(Second) of Torts Sec. 324A(b) or 324A(c). View "Halsey v. The Townsend Corporation of Indiana" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants in an action alleging retaliation, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against plaintiff's former employer, Workforce Development and the state of Iowa, as well as against certain former supervisors and coworkers. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from her termination as an ALJ based on allegations that she fraudulently filed insurance enrollment forms and had deliberately falsified her daughter's marital status. Plaintiff alleged that her termination was based on retaliation for her testimony before the Oversight Committee and that the insurance fraud investigation constituted a mere pretext.In regard to the whistleblower retaliation claim, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that she was suspended or terminated in reprisal for her testimony. In regard to the defamation claim, the court concluded that Defendant Wahlert was entitled to summary judgment with respect to her allegedly defamatory testimony to the Oversight Committee where her testimony and related actions were within the scope of her employment. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to establish any constitutional violation as to the First Amendment retaliation claim; defendants' conduct was not sufficiently egregious to satisfy the outrageousness prong of the Iowa tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress; and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's retaliation claim based on the Iowa Constitution's free speech clause. View "Ackerman v. Iowa" on Justia Law

Avenoso, a maintenance supervisor, had long-term disability insurance under a Reliance policy, governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B). The policy provided two years of benefits if the claimant showed that he was unable to perform the material duties of his current occupation and provided continued benefits if the claimant showed that he was unable to perform the material duties of any occupation. Avenoso left his job due to lower-back pain and underwent back surgery. Reliance approved two years of benefits. At the end of the two years, Reliance informed Avenoso that it would discontinue benefits because Avenoso had not shown that he was unable to perform the material duties of any occupation.Avenoso had an MRI; the results appeared relatively mild. Avenoso sent Reliance a note from his physician, recommending that Avenoso “avoid lifting, bending and prolonged sitting” due to his lower back condition. He was receiving Social Security disability benefits. Following a “functional-capacity evaluation,” a physical therapist concluded Avenoso did not demonstrate an ability to tolerate an 8-hour workday. An independent medical evaluation concluded that Avenoso retained sedentary-work capacity and was “able to work 8 hours a day but was engaging in “symptom magnification.” A vocational-rehabilitation specialist identified five “viable sedentary occupational alternatives” consistent with Avenoso’s physical capacities. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Avenoso. The district court’s finding that Avenoso lacks sedentary-work capacity was not clearly erroneous. View "Avenoso v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co" on Justia Law