Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law
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This case arose out of Chipotle's decision to fire an employee who was involved in a campaign for higher pay in the fast-food industry. The Board claimed that Chipotle fired the employee for his union activities, but Chipotle argued that the employee was fired for missing a mandatory meeting and had a history of deficient performance and motivation. The Board applied the Wright Line framework and described the General Counsel's initial burden. Chipotle argued that the burden was a mistake and the General Counsel instead needed to act according to the language in the court's recent opinion in Nichols Aluminum, LLC v. NLRB. Because Chipotle failed to raise this argument before the Board, or otherwise contest the ALJ's application of the Wright Line standard, the court was jurisdictionally barred from considering Chipotle's argument. Because no extraordinary circumstances exists in this case, the court denied the petition and enforced the order. View "NLRB v. Chipotle Services" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, an African American female, filed suit against DHS, alleging disparate treatment on account of race, and retaliation in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 and 2000e-3(a). The district court dismissed the claims. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court erred in dismissing her claim for disparate treatment "on account of her race, when she was disciplined for something that a Caucasian female employee did not accomplish." The court concluded that plaintiff's claim of discipline did not allege that the Caucasian employee was not disciplined or received less discipline. The court explained that without an allegation of disparate treatment, this claim failed. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred in dismissing the retaliation claim where plaintiff alleged but-for causation. The court explained that plaintiff's claim permitted the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Wilson v. Arkansas DHS" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, Optomec, alleging that he was terminated on account of his age in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. 363A.01 et seq. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Optomec because plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. The court reasoned that, even if he had, there was insufficient evidence to suggest the lawful reason Optomec gave for its decision was pretext for an underlying unlawful motive. In this case, Optomec's reasons for firing plaintiff was that he lacked the skill set and potential Optomec wanted from lab technicians to account for the company's anticipated growth. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Nash v. Optomec, Inc." on Justia Law

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After plaintiff was seriously injured on the job, BNSF disciplined him for violations of BNSF rules that led to his injury. Plaintiff filed suit, alleging that BNSF's discipline violated the employee-protections provision of the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. 20109(a)(4). The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for BNSF, concluding that plaintiff failed to establish that his supervisors intentionally retaliated against him for filing his injury report. In this case, without more specific evidence of an improper retaliatory motive, the court found that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case. View "Heim v. BNSF Railway" on Justia Law

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After plaintiff was disciplined by his employer, BNSF, for not promptly reporting a workplace injury, he filed suit claiming that BNSF's discipline violated the employee-protections provision of the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. 20109(a)(4). The jury awarded plaintiff damages for emotion distress. The court concluded, however, that its decision in Kuduk v. BNSF Railway Co. required plaintiff to establish intentional retaliation and that the jury instructions did not compel such a finding. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Blackorby v. BNSF Railway" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against Chipotle, alleging claims under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. State. 363A et seq., for reprisal, age discrimination, and sexual orientation discrimination. On appeal, plaintiff challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment on his reprisal claim. Chipotle claims that he was discharged due to declining work effort and performance. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Chipotle’s stated reason for terminating his employment was pretextual. Therefore, the district court correctly determined that his reprisal claim under the MHRA fails as a matter of law and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Sieden v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc." on Justia Law

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Semmie John Guenther, Jr., filed an administrative charge with the EEOC, alleging that his former employer, Griffin Construction, discriminated against him on the basis of his disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. When Guenther passed away while his charge was pending, the special administrator of his estate filed suit on his behalf when he received the EEOC right-to-sue letter. The district court dismissed the action based on Ark. Code Ann. 16-62-101(a)(1) and found the claim had abated. The court held that federal common law does not incorporate state law to determine whether an ADA claim for compensatory damages survives or abates upon the death of the aggrieved party. The court joined its sister circuits that have allowed the individual’s estate to bring and maintain a suit for compensatory damages under the ADA in place of the aggrieved party. Therefore, Guenther’s ADA claim for compensatory damages survived his death and Griffin Construction is not entitled to judgment on the pleadings. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Guenther v. Griffin Construction Co." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against the City, alleging violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621-634, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff alleged that he was terminated from his job on account of his race and age after being employed by the City for twenty-seven years. The court affirmed the district court's grant of the City's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the district court did not err in setting aside the entry of default judgment where the City's delay in filing its answer was excusable and there was no bad faith or intentional effort to delay on the City's part; plaintiff failed to identify no similarly situated employee outside plaintiff's protected class who was treated more favorably by the City, and thus the inference-of-discrimination element of plaintiff's prima facie case has not been established on this basis; plaintiff failed to identify any biased comments made by a decisionmaker that might establish an animus-based inference of discrimination; there has been no showing that the City failed to follow any applicable policy in making the decision to fire plaintiff and no inference of discrimination has been established on this basis; and the City consistently cited insubordination as its reason for firing plaintiff, and thus there is no record-based shifting-reasons basis for an inference of discrimination. Accordingly, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to substantiate his claims of race and age discrimination with sufficient probative evidence to permit a rational trier of fact to find in his favor. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Grant v. City of Blytheville, Arkansas" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, the former building commissioner of the city, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that she was fired in retaliation for engaging in protected speech. The district court granted summary judgment to the city. The court concluded that the present record does not support a conclusion that the city is liable because a municipality cannot be held liable under section 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor. In this case, plaintiff maintains that the city is liable because her harm stemmed from an official municipal policy or an unofficial municipal custom. The court explained that plaintiff tangentially refers to other evidence of the custom that she claims victimized her, but the materials cited reveal only unsubstantiated suspicions. Because no reasonable jury could conclude that the evidence demonstrated a reasonable dispute about the presence of a continuing, widespread, and persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct that led to her termination, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bolderson v. City of Wentzville" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit alleging that her former employer, Trinity Health, and former supervisors violated her rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the North Dakota Human Rights Act, N.D. Cent. Code 14-02.4-03(1). The district court granted summary judgment against plaintiff, concluding that she failed to show she was capable of performing the essential functions of her position, and that Trinity did not have a duty to reassign plaintiff to an alternate position. The court concluded, however, that plaintiff produced evidence that she could have performed the essential functions of her position with reasonable accommodation. In this case, plaintiff's written notification that she would be unable to complete the basic life support certification without medical clearance, and her statement that she required four months of physical therapy before completing the certification, could readily have been understood to constitute a request for a reasonable accommodation of her condition. Consequently, there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff made a request for an accommodation sufficient to trigger Trinity’s duty to engage in the interactive process of identifying a reasonable accommodation. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kowitz v. Trinity Health" on Justia Law