Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In a suit alleging violation of the Nebraska Wage Payment and Collection Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201, the district court certified a class consisting of current and former hourly employees of Tyson’s Madison facility, who “are or were paid under a ‘gang time’ compensation system in the Kill, Cut or Conversion Departments.” Gang time refers to time on the production line; Tyson uses a different system (K-Code) to compensate for pre- and post-shift activities, such as donning and doffing. The amount of K-Code time compensated depends on the employee’s position. Tyson had changed the K-Code entitlements. The court granted plaintiffs summary judgment on most liability issues, and awarded nearly $19 million to the class after a bench trial on damages and Tyson’s defense of good faith. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding no evidence that Tyson had agreed to pay the disputed compensation as required for liability under the Nebraska Collection Act and that the FLSA claims should have been dismissed for failure to file a timely consent to the collective action as required by 29 U.S.C. 216(b). View "Acosta v. Tyson Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

FedEx contracts with operators to take packages from its terminals to homes and businesses. FedEx assigns each territory to an operator. Former operators claim that FedEx defrauded them as to their employment status, denying them benefits, such as overtime pay and workers’ compensation. Operators were paid based on the numbers of packages and stops serviced and were not required to drive personally; they could hire others, subject to FedEx’s qualifications. Operators received a proprietary interest in their territories, which they could sell, subject to approval. FedEx could not fire the operators at will during their contract terms, but could fire them for cause, and could choose not to renew their contracts for any reason. Operators provided their own vehicles. FedEx managers could ride along on four delivery runs per year. Contracts stated that an operator made deliveries “strictly as an independent contractor, and not as an employee,” but FedEx required that operators’ vehicles bear FedEx’s logo and be painted “FedEx White.” Operators had to provide proof of inspection and maintenance. Drivers had to wear a FedEx uniform and meet FedEx personal appearances standards. Drivers were subject to background, credit, and drug checks. They had to use FedEx package scanners. The district court granted plaintiffs partial summary judgment, finding no genuine dispute that they were FedEx employees, even though under Missouri law employment status is an issue of fact. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that a reasonable jury could disagree. View "Gray v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Ash and Jewsome filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201, on behalf of themselves and similarly-situated persons, alleging that their employer failed to pay required overtime compensation. The district court dismissed without a hearing for failure to allege that defendants were their employer for purposes of the FLSA, and failure to allege a substantive FLSA cause of action. The district court denied plaintiffs’ motion to vacate and request to file an amended complaint. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The complaint alleged only that: “During all relevant times, [defendants] were part of an integrated enterprise and, as such, were plaintiffs’ employer. During all relevant times, and upon information and belief, all of these defendants shared interrelated operations, centralized control of labor relations, common management and common ownership and/or financial control.” The allegation is simply a restatement of the legal test used to determine whether certain entities constitute a joint employer for the purpose of civil rights litigation and does not include any facts describing the “economic reality” of their employment, such as their alleged employers’ right to control the nature and quality of their work. View "Ash v. Anderson Merch., LLC" on Justia Law

Siouxland, a group practice of obstetrician-gynecologists, terminated Hagen, its President and an equity owner, invoking the for-cause termination provision in Hagen’s 1993, Employment Agreement, after an incident during which Hagen yelled at Dr. Eastman (another Siouxland doctor) and hospital staff, accusing them of neglecting a patient, resulting in a stillbirth. Hagen also reported the incident to hospital administration and told the Siouxland partners that he was considering reporting to the Iowa state medical board. Hagen advised the patient to sue for malpractice. Hagen filed suit, alleging wrongful retaliatory discharge in violation of Iowa public policy. The other doctors testified about Hagen’s history of workplace conflicts and outbursts and about concern that his suspension by the hospital would hurt the reputation of the practice. A jury awarded Hagen $1,051,814 in compensatory damages. The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that Hagen failed to prove he was an at-will employee who may assert a tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The exclusive remedy of a medical professional practicing under Hagen’s Employment Agreement would be a breach of contract claim, which would permit inquiry into the professional conduct the district court found separately protected by the tort of wrongful termination in violation of public policy. View "Hagen v. Siouxland Obstetrics & Gynecology, PC" on Justia Law

Heartland employed Thomas as an account liaison from May 2010 until she was terminated in June 2011, at age 53. Thomas claims that Hagen, an administrator for Heartland, had commented “that older people didn’t work as fast or were as productive as younger people,” and about having ‘fresh blood, younger employees.” Hagen referred to Thomas as “the old short blond girl,” and, after Thomas’s discharge,told a Heartland client that “he likes to keep himself surrounded with young people.” A Heartland human resources manager testified that Hagen was “an indirect supervisor” of the account liaison personnel. Duncan, Heartland’s regional manager, had audited three weeks of Thomas’s mileage claims and determined that Thomas had falsified her reimbursement claims. Thomas maintains she responded that she kept records that would explain discrepancies between the claimed mileage and the weekly call plans, but that Hagen dismissed her response by stating that termination “was a decision they had made.” In her suit, alleging violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act, the court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether age was a contributing factor in Thomas’s discharge by Heartland and Hagen. View "Thomas v. Heartland Employment Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

During negotiations with Nichols to replace an expired collective bargaining agreement, the union called for a strike. Most employees participated; some crossed the picket line. Nichols hired replacement workers. Bandy, a 34-year employee, participated, but did not take a strategic or leadership role. The union ended the strike. Nichols began recalling strikers, including Bandy. Nichols requested, and, without objection, Bandy took a pledge that they would not “strike again over the same dispute,” subject to discipline. Nichols maintains the pledge merely confirmed returning employees would not engage in unlawful intermittent striking, which is not protected activity. Nichols also distributed its longstanding “zero tolerance” policy, which was incorporated into the CBA: “[h]arassing, disruptive, threatening, and/or violent situations or behavior by anyone, regardless of status, will not be tolerated and” offending employees would be “subject to discharge for the first offense.” Nichols posted notice. Two weeks after his return, Bandy drew his finger across his throat in a “cut throat” gesture toward Braafhart, who had crossed the picket line. Bandy was discharged. T An ALJ concluded Nichols did not violate National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), (3), but the NLRB concluded that Bandy’s strike activity was a motivating factor and ordered Bandy reinstated with back-pay. The Eighth Circuit declined to enforce the order. View "Nichols Aluminum, LLC v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

In 2008, Wages began working as a caretaker for StuartCo, a property management firm, responsible for vacuuming, cleaning, mopping, washing windows, dusting, and snow removal. Wages worked 30 hours per week. Her employee record was unblemished. In 2009, Wages learned she was pregnant. The doctor considered her pregnancy to be high risk. Wages experienced abdominal pain in October. Her doctor directed her not to vacuum or mop and provided her a note for her employer. StuartCo redistributed those duties to other employees and contacted the doctor to verify no other job duties were restricted. In November, Wages’s doctor prohibited snow removal. Wages missed three days of work, in November due to abdominal pain. Her doctor limited her to working no more than 20 hours per week. StuartCo terminated her employment, stating that it was “unable to accommodate the work restrictions provided by your physician.” Wages sued, alleging violations of her rights under the FMLA, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Minnesota Parenting Leave Act (MPLA), and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Wages on her FMLA entitlement claim and her FMLA retaliation claim, but reversed and remanded for a jury trial on damages. View "Wages v. Stuart Mgmt. Corp." on Justia Law

Tipton, Gilbert, and Padgett worked for Treadway, under agreements that contained a noncompete provision: when you leave Treadway’s employ, for whatever reason, you will not compete with Treadway … by soliciting or accepting business from Treadway’s customers within your territory … for at least one (1) year after leaving; and . . . you will not solicit the employment of any Treadway representatives for at least one (1) year after leaving. Irby bought Treadway with an assignment of Treadway’s contracts, in 2012. Tipton, Gilbert, and Padgett became Irby employees, keeping essentially the same benefits and seniority. In 2013, the three left Irby to work for Wholesale. Tipton apparently spoke to Gilbert and Padgett about the move in advance. Irby sued, asserting claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, civil conspiracy, and tortious interference with a contract. The district court granted summary judgment and awarded the defendants in excess of $200,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding genuine disputes of material fact about whether Wholesale recruited and hired Tipton, Gilbert, and Padgett so that they would solicit or accept business from Irby customers in their former territory within one year. View "Stuart C. Irby Co., Inc. v. Tipton" on Justia Law

Falco sold insurance for Farmers, under a 1990 Agent Agreement, which provided that Falco would be paid Contract Value upon termination of the Agreement. As a Farmers agent, Falco was entitled to borrow money from the Credit Union. In 2006, Falco obtained a $28,578.00 business loan and assigned his interest in his Agreement receivables—including Contract Value—as security. The loan document gave the Credit Union authority to demand payments that Farmers owed Falco; it could tender Falco’s resignation to levy on Falco’s Contract Value. Falco failed to make payments and filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, listing the loan on his schedules. Falco received a discharge in February 2011, covering his liability under his Credit Union loan. In April 2011, the Credit Union notified Farmers that Falco had defaulted and exercised the power of attorney to terminate his Agent Agreement. Farmers notified Falco that the resignation had been accepted, calculated Contract Value as $104,323.30, paid the Credit Union $29,180.92, and paid the balance to Falco. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendants, finding that the Credit Union’s secured interest survived bankruptcy; it did not tortuously interfere with Falco’s Agreement because it had a legal right to terminate the Agreement; and Falco failed to show an underlying wrongful act or intentional tort as required under civil conspiracy. View "Falco v. Farmers Ins. Grp." on Justia Law

The Union represents Company employees, governed by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), which required that there be tiered job classifications with specific work functions, that the parties arbitrate disputes, and that an arbitrator's disposition be "final." The Company’s Missouri call center was staffed with customer service representatives (CSRs) and service representatives (SRs). A CSR "[p]rimarily receives, screens, tests, analyzes, and dispatches trouble reports; explains and suggests various services and/or products … performs other generally related functions." SRs"[h]andle[] the business transactions in connection with customers' accounts, including telephone and correspondence contacts and collection and order work, etc." The Company chose 20 CSRs for special training to work with a new computer system. They were trained by an SR, used SR training materials, and were subsequently moved to a new work location where they worked alongside SRs and took calls out of the same queue. The CSRs claimed that this was different from the work that they had previously performed. The Union filed a grievance alleging violation of the CBA, which states that: A qualified employee . . . who is temporarily … assigned and does work in a position with a higher established maximum rate of pay” shall receive a higher rate of pay after a specified period. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the arbitrator’s award in favor of the Union. View "SBC Advanced Solutions, Inc. v. Commc'n Workers of Am, Dist. 6" on Justia Law