Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Nurse Dalton was terminated from her supervisory position at the ManorCare skilled nursing facility. Dalton alleged interference with her statutory rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601, and discrimination based on her Chronic Kidney Disease disability in violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code Ch. 216, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. ManorCare claimed that nurses that Dalton supervised had complained about her job performance and that Dalton had received a Third/Final Written Warning for violating Major/Type B Work Rules, citing inappropriate negative comments about her work at the nurses’ station, where patients could overhear; failure to notify staff members she had cancelled a meeting; and taking an extended lunch break and failing to attend patient care conferences. There were also problems with attendance and late reports. Dalton understood that any further performance-related issue could result in termination. The district court dismissed all claims. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Dalton’s termination was the end of an on-going, unrelated disciplinary process. View "Dalton v. Manor Care of West Des Moines, LLC" on Justia Law

The Festus City Council terminated Draper from his position as City Administrator six months into a three-year employment contract, after the election of a council member who was critical of Draper’s performance. The city had refused to reschedule or continue the hearing regarding Draper’s job performance. Neither Draper nor his attorney was present. Several witnesses testified. The council concluded that Draper had manipulated the evaluation process to choose an engineering firm to complete a road project; that Draper had authorized heating system repairs and the purchase of new windows without competitive bidding, in violation of Festus policy; that Draper had sent a memorandum stating that the sick-leave-bonus program had been abolished when it had not been; and that Draper had requested reimbursement for a hotel room he had paid for with his Festus credit card. The district court entered summary judgment, rejecting claims of violations of procedural and substantive-due-process rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983, a section 1983 conspiracy claim, breach of contract, and violation of the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 536.010-536.160. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The evidence supported the city’s decision to terminate Draper, so and that its decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. View "Draper v. City of Festus" on Justia Law

Washington, an African-American, began working for American Airlines in 2002, when American acquired the company for which Washington had worked since 1974. Washington applied for the position of Machinist in 2007, but was not promoted after the company’s examiner concluded that Washington failed to complete satisfactorily complete a qualifying test. Four other applicants, all Caucasian, tested with a different examiner before Washington; all were successful. The sixth applicant, also Caucasian, was tested by Washington’s examiner after Washington’s examination and failed. Washington was tested for more than four hours, but the examiner terminated the examination when he concluded that Washington removed the bushing he was machining from a lathe before he had finished. Washington claims that employees laughed and made disparaging comments. The company’s Manual provides that an employee “may have a witness of his choice present” during the exam. Washington had requested a union witness. A subject matter expert witnessed Washington’s exam, but no union witness was present. Washington exhausted administrative remedies and sued. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of American. Washington had not demonstrated that American was motivated by race (42 U.S.C. 1981; Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e) or that race was a “contributing factor” under the Missouri Human Rights Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 213.010. View "Washington v. American Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

Lyons, a part-time lecturer at the University of Missouri at Kansas City, gave a student athlete a grade of “F” in the Fall 2010 semester. The student appealed. Lyons’s supervisor determined the student should be allowed to submit a second paper. Lyons complained to Dean Vaught, who referred the appeal to the Academic Standards Committee, which also determined the student should be allowed to write a second paper. Vaught upheld the ruling. The student submitted a second paper. An appointed committee gave it a 75% grade; Vaught instructed the registrar to change the student’s course grade to D. Lyons then met with Chancellor Morton, claiming preferential academic treatment for student athletes. Morton did not take action. Lyons continued to pursue the matter. He received no advance notice that his course would be eliminated for the Spring 2012 semester. Lyons sued for First Amendment retaliation, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The defendant-administrators unsuccessfully moved to dismiss, alleging that Lyons failed to state a claim and they were entitled to qualified immunity. The Eighth Circuit reversed. Lyons failed to allege plausibly that his only constitutionally protected speech could have been a substantial or motivating factor in defendants’ alleged adverse employment action. View "Lyons v. Vaught" on Justia Law

The Department of Labor (DOL) investigated a complaint that ActionLink, a marketing company, had misclassified some of its employees as exempt under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and failed to pay overtime compensation. During the investigation, ActionLink agreed to reclassify the employees as non-exempt and to pay them their missing back wages. It sent the employees checks with a disclaimer stating that the checks represented "full payment … wages earned, including minimum wage and overtime, up to the date of the check." Several employees cashed the checks; others did not. Some then sued ActionLink, claiming that they were entitled to additional pay under the FLSA. The district court granted the employees summary judgment and declared them non-exempt. ActionLink then moved for summary judgment against the employees who had cashed the back-wages checks, claiming that they had waived their rights for additional remuneration under 29 U.S.C. 216(b). The district court agreed and dismissed the cases. The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, agreeing that the employees are non-exempt, but concluded the release language on the checks was insufficient to notify employees of the consequences of cashing the checks. The employees therefore did not waive their FLSA claims by cashing the checks. View "Adams v. ActionLink, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2001, St. Jude hired Tormey to sell cardiac-related medical devices. Tormey entered into several agreements, providing Tormey’s initial sales quota would be zero due to a noncompete agreement; that St. Jude would hire a technical support specialist (TSS) to assist Tormey; and that St. Jude could terminate Tormey if he failed to meet sales quotas. St. Jude made a $650,000 interest-free loan; Tormey executed a promissory note. Around the time he began selling for St. Jude’s, Tormey’s wife was diagnosed with terminal lung cancer. Tormey informed St. Jude of his wife’s condition. He began inquiring about when St. Jude would hire a TSS and negotiated sales quotas accordingly. Tormey rejected the TSS assigned in October 2003. Tormey’s wife’s condition worsened in November; Tormey thereafter did not meet quotas. She died in May, 2004. Two weeks later, St. Jude, terminated the agreements. Tormey claimed that he accepted St. Jude’s proposal that if Tormey waived any actions against St. Jude, it would waive repayment of the $650,000 and presumed his obligations had been discharged. There are no written documents and St. Jude denies any such agreement. The district court rejected Tormey’s counterclaims alleging fraud and, after a jury was unable to reach a verdict, entered judgment for St. Jude on the note, finding that it did not first commit a material breach. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc. v. Tormey" on Justia Law

Minnihan worked for Mediacom for 30 years. As an Ames, Iowa technical operations supervisor (TOS), His duties included observing service calls, being on call 24/7 to respond to outages; accident investigations; unannounced safety checks; and delivering equipment to the field. Mediacom provided a vehicle. At least half of his working hours were spent outside of the office. In 2009, Minnihan had a seizure and was prohibited, by Iowa law, from driving for six months. Mediacom reallocated his driving responsibilities. After another seizure, Mediacom asked Minnihan to apply for positions that did not require driving. Minnihan inquired about Family Medical Leave or having his position restructured. Mediacom accommodated him until October 2010, when Minnihan resumed his regular duties. In April, 2011, Minnihan had a third seizure. Mediacom transferred him to the Des Moines office in a non-driving position with the same pay and benefits as a TOS. Minnihan did not report to the position, although Mediacom provided transportation options, including another employee with whom Minnihan could ride to Des Moines. Mediacom terminated Minnihan's employment. After receiving right-to-sue letters from the Iowa Civil Rights Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Minnihan sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, and the Iowa Civil Rights Act. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment, finding that Minnihan was not a qualified individual under disability law because he could not perform the essential functions of his job. View "Minnihan v. Mediacom Commc'ns Corp." on Justia Law

Alleging illegal tip pooling Conners filed a collective action against her former employer (a restaurant) under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 216(b). The employer then implemented a new arbitration policy that requires all employment-related disputes between current employees and the employer to be resolved though individual arbitration. The policy purports to bind all current employees who did not opt out; each employee received an opt-out form. Citing public policy, the district court declared the policy unenforceable insofar as it could prevent current employees from joining this collective action. On interlocutory appeal, the Eighth Circuit vacated, holding that former employees like Conners lack standing under Article III of the United States Constitution to challenge the arbitration agreement, which applied only to current employees. View "Conners v. Gusano's Chicago Style Pizzeria" on Justia Law

Walz worked for Ameriprise, 1996-2012 and received mostly positive reviews. Walz suffers from bipolar affective disorder, which, beginning in 2012, caused her to interrupt meetings, disturb her coworkers, and disrespect her supervisor, Radel. Radel approached Walz several times to discuss her behavioral problems and to offer help, before issuing a formal warning. Walz applied for Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave, which was granted by a third-party administrator. Walz never disclosed the reason for her FMLA leave to Ameriprise. Upon returning from leave, Walz gave Radel a doctor’s note, clearing her to return to work and stating, “[s]he has been stabilizing on her medication.” Walz signed an Individual Treatment Policy, which explained Ameriprise’s policy against disability discrimination and the process for requesting accommodations. Months after returning to work, Walz’s erratic and disruptive behavior returned. Radel warned Walz, but Walz repeated her erratic and intimidating behavior in meetings. Ameriprise fired Walz because of her repeated misconduct. Walz never informed Ameriprise that she suffered from bipolar disorder or requested any accommodation. Walz sued, citing the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Minnesota Human Rights Act. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment, noting that Walz failed to establish that her termination was based on her disability and never requested an accommodation. View "Walz v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc." on Justia Law

CVS hired Jain, a woman of East Asian descent, as a pharmacist in 2006. She claims that coworkers and supervisors discriminated against her, calling her the "little Indian lady," and her Indian clothing “unprofessional.” Referring to her "bossy" attitude, the manager remarked that "she was from India but might as well be from Germany." Jain became "pharmacist-in-charge" (PIC) at another store, with permission to work a three day schedule. Supervisor Deaner later learned that the store was struggling in numerous performance metrics; that Jain had not been following company policies; and that multiple complaints had been filed. Deaner issued a performance action plan and began holding weekly meetings to help Jain. Problems continued. Jain was issued another warning. After inspections revealed additional problems, Jain was terminated. Jain sued for discrimination and retaliation under the Missouri Human Rights Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 213.055, 213.070. Jain opposed a summary judgment motion with a declaration from her husband, stating that an "arithmetic comparison" of scores showed that the pharmacy had improved in every performance metric after Jain became PIC. The court struck the declaration because Mr. Jain "never worked for [CVS] and did not claim to have industry experience” and granted CVS summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Jain v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc." on Justia Law