Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

For more than 30 years, Wagner worked at the Merrick County sheriff’s office, as chief dispatcher and office manager. Campbell was appointed as sheriff in 2011 and told Wagner he wanted her to train another employee to perform her duties in her absence.” Campbell later expressed concerns that the training was taking too long and informed Wagner that he had received a complaint from a judge about delays in depositing bond money with the court. Campbell wanted to change policy to have bond money taken directly to court, rather than deposited in the sheriff’s office account. Wagner disagreed. Campbell gave Wagner a reprimand, stating that she failed to follow directives. Wagner refused to sign the reprimand, claiming it contained false information, told Campbell she was leaving, and walked home. Wagner never returned to work; she filed a grievance, which the Board of Supervisors denied. Wagner sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Neb. Rev. Stat. 20-148, alleging she suffered an adverse employment action in retaliation for protected speech on a matter of public concern. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Campbell. When a reprimand does not affect the terms and conditions of employment, a plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case of retaliation. View "Wagner v. Campbell" on Justia Law

The Hughes, Arkansas school district hired Ray Nassar as superintendent in 2008. Nassar hired Gena Smith as a business manager. Both are white. The school district renewed Nassar’s contract until June 30, 2013. After the racial composition of the school board shifted to an African-American majority, Nassar’s already-poor relationship with two African-American board members deteriorated. One member, Jackson, referred to Smith as Nassar’s “girlfriend,” at a public meeting (both are married to others) and to Nassar’s “lie[s].” A profanity-laced exchange followed; soon after, the district fired Nassar without a hearing. Months later, the school district fired Smith, without a hearing. Nassar and Smith sued, alleging violations of due process, unlawful racial discrimination, breach of contract, and defamation. A jury found for Nassar and Smith on all claims, awarded Nassar $340,000 on his due-process claim (more than he would have earned through the end of his contract), $1.00 on his discrimination claim, and $1.00 on his contract claim. The court granted Nassar and Smith attorney’s fees at a rate of $375 per hour. The Eighth Circuit vacated the due process award and remanded with instructions to offer remittitur. View "Nassar v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Long, the elected head prosecutor for the first judicial district of Arkansas, supervises deputy prosecutors in six counties. In 2006, Long hired Austin, an African-American, as a deputy prosecutor for Phillips County. The prosecutor previously hired for that position was African-American, as was the prosecutor hired to replace Austin. Austin failed to follow the instructions of Murray, the senior deputy prosecutor, conerning allocation of county funds. Long asserts that Murray and other court personnel had trouble contacting Austin during business hours, that Austin deviated from policy on felony bond reduction orders and expungement orders and incurred extraordinary expenses without approval. A judge reportedly contacted Long to ask why Austin had failed to appear in court. Austin contends that Long never provided him with a formal evaluation and never explained why he was fired. Austin filed an employment discrimination action under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983, claiming that Long treated him more harshly than similarly situated white prosecutors, who had been convicted of driving while intoxicated and sanctioned for an ethical violation. The district court denied Long's motion asserting qualified immunity. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the record gave rise to disputes of material fact over whether Long's stated reasons for firing Austin were a pretext for racial discrimination. View "Austin v. Long" on Justia Law

Johnson began working for U.S. Steel in 2004. On May 12 2011, he left work, complaining of a headache, and went to a clinic where a physician’s assistant indicated that he had high blood pressure. The next day he provided a note that was deemed insufficient by his employer. His regular physician later indicated that Johnson's blood pressure was normal. Emails, memoranda, and letters indicate that Johnson was suspended on May 16 and then terminated for altering, falsifying, or forging the work excuse. U.S. Steel never provided him with notice of his FMLA rights and obligations. Nor was such notice included in the employee handbook. Johnson filed suit under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601-2654, alleging that U.S. Steel retaliated against him for taking protected FMLA leave, failed to reinstate him after a period of protected leave, and otherwise unlawfully interfered with his FMLA rights. The district court entered summary judgment for the employer. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Johnson did not demonstrate how any alleged technical violations could have prejudiced him if his condition was not a serious health condition and did not qualify him for FMLA leave in the first place. View "Johnson v. Wheeling Mach. Prods." on Justia Law

NanoMech, researcher and developer of nanotechnologies, filed suit against defendant, a former employee, for breach of a noncompete agreement. On appeal, NanoMech challenged the district court's judgment on the pleadings for defendant. The court affirmed the district court's finding that the noncompete agreement was unenforceable under Arkansas law where any error in the district court's decision to convert defendant's motion to dismiss into a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings was harmless; under Arkansas law, a noncompete agreement must be valid as written; and a blanket prohibition on defendant's ability to seek employment of any kind with an employer in the nanotechnology industry anywhere in the world is overbroad, unreasonable, and therefore unenforceable. View "NanoMech, Inc. v. Suresh" on Justia Law

Chief of Police Lillis announced his retirement. Lieutenant Hilde, on the force for 29 years, was the second-ranking officer, and had served as acting Chief. A commission that controls hiring had previously promoted internally. They selected finalists, including Hilde and external candidate, Koivunen. Hilde had an Associate’s degree in law enforcement. Detective Koivunen had served another city for 18 years. He had a Bachelor’s degree in criminal law. The hiring protocol involved: weighted years of service, training and employment, and an interview. Hilde had a service score of 65, the highest of the finalists. He received 9 out of 20 on training-and-employment, the lowest of the finalists. The commissioners could not explain that score. Koivunen received a service score of 28 and 15 out of 20 for his training-and-employment, the highest of the finalists. Each commissioner gave Koivunen an unprecedented perfect 100 score for his interview. Hilde’s interview sheets also reported identical scores: 69 points. Hilde and Koivunen each had 143 points after the interview. Two commissioners claimed not to remember changing Hilde’s scores, although the sheets were altered. When Hilde applied, he was 51 years old. Koivunen was 43. An officer is retirement-eligible at 50. Commissioner England said that retirement eligibility “might have” been a factor. Hilde sued, alleging violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1), 631(a), and the Minnesota Human Rights Act. The district court granted the city summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. View "Hilde v. City of Eveleth" on Justia Law

Gibson, an African-American male, was hired by the IRS on January 1, 2008, as a full-time seasonal tax examiner, subject to completion of a one-year probationary period. Gibson's work leader was an African-American female. Gibson's first-level supervisor was Butler, an African-American female; Gibson's second-level supervisor was Hunter, an African-American female. Gibson's third-level supervisor was Vermillion, a Caucasian female. In his unit, there were 32 employees; 18 were probationary. Of the 18, four were African-Americans, 12 were Caucasian, and two were Hispanic. Six were female and 12 were male. Gibson was the only African-American male. During his probation, Gibson was observed to not be editing entire bundles of returns, mislabeling bundles, recording working hours he was not present, and improperly altering a government document. Butler prohibited Gibson from working overtime. Gibson claimed he was being unfairly targeted by Butler. Gibson's work product, subject to 100% review, revealed an unacceptable error rate. In April, Gibson delivered a letter to Jones, titled "Sexual Harassment, Retaliation, Harassment, and Creating a Hostile Environment, by Manager Ms. Felecia Butler." Hunter reported that the letter’s allegations were unfounded. Vermillion terminated Gibson based on Gibson's failure to attain successful performance during his probation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the IRS, rejecting race and sex discrimination and retaliatory termination claims. View "Gibson v. Geithner" on Justia Law

In 2007 Pedersen began working for BMA dialysis clinics. She became a registered nurse. On April 17, 2012, clinic manager Ince talked to Pedersen about Pedersen’s aggression and patient care performance issues; Pedersen was to be transferred to another clinic with more experienced staff. Pedersen yelled at Ince. Later that day, the two met with nephrologists to discuss patient care planning. Pedersen informed the nephrologists about mispackaging of blood samples a week earlier. Ince discussed how the incident had been handled. Following the meeting, Pedersen contacted regional manager Kienzle and others to report the mispackaging. Kienzle informed them that the incident had been investigated and no samples were affected. On April 19, a patient reported that Pedersen had slapped her arms; others complained that Pedersen had impersonated a manager and had inappropriately documented patient treatment. BMA investigated. Pedersen went on medical leave. BMA determined Pedersen could return under a corrective plan. Pedersen did not return. BMA offered Pedersen employment as a technician due to Pedersen’s long absence and new policies; she could be retrained as an RN. Pedersen refused to return unless BMA met her conditions. After several months, BMA terminated Pedersen’s employment, characterizing her failure to return as voluntary resignation. Pedersen sued, alleging retaliation and violation of the Minnesota Whistleblower Act. The district court granted BMA summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Pedersen v. Bio-Med. Applications of Minn." on Justia Law

EEOC sued CRST in its own name, under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, alleging that CRST subjected Starke and 270 similarly situated female employees to a hostile work environment, in its Driver Training Program. For two years, EEOC failed to identify the women comprising the putative class; the court ordered EEOC to make all class members available for deposition or risk a discovery sanction. EEOC filed updated lists of allegedly aggrieved individuals, but failed to make all of them available for deposition before the deadline. The court barred EEOC from pursuing relief for any individual not made available for deposition before the deadline. EEOC then listed 155 individuals for whom it was still pursuing relief and 99 individuals, allegedly sexually harassed, but for whom EEOC was not pursuing relief based on the order. Following remand, the court dismissed, but for one claim, which settled for $50,000, and awarded CRST $92,842.21 in costs, $4,004,371.65 in attorneys' fees, and $463,071.25 in out-of-pocket expenses. The Eighth Circuit held that CRST is not entitled to attorneys' fees for claims dismissed based on EEOC's failure to satisfy pre-suit obligations and a purported pattern-or-practice claim. On remand, the court must individually assess each claim for which it granted summary judgment on the merits and explain why it deems each to be frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc." on Justia Law

Townsend worked as an Arkansas pharmaceutical sales representative for Bayer, selling Mirena, a contraceptive device. Townsend visited physicians, including Dr. Shrum. Townsend learned Shrum was importing from Canada a version of Mirena that was not FDA-approved, at half the cost of the approved version. Shrum had submitted Medicaid claims at the same rate as the approved version and bragged about $50,000 in extra profit. Townsend sought guidance from his superiors. Bayer told Townsend not get involved. Townsend called the Medicaid Fraud Hotline, although he feared losing his job. Shrum was charged with Medicaid fraud. Meanwhile, Bayer changed its method of reimbursing sales expenses. Not understanding the change, Townsend’s wife spent funds intended for those expenses, causing Townsend’s account to be closed temporarily. Although Townsend's account had been reactivated, Bayer fired him, claiming his closed account prevented him doing his job. Townsend sued, citing anti-retaliation provisions of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3730(h).). A jury awarded Townsend back pay, doubled to $642,746, and $568,000 in emotional distress damages. The court denied front pay and ordered Bayer to reinstate Townsend. The Eighth Circuit affirmed on all issues except the emotional distress damage award and remanded to allow Townsend the option of accepting a remittitur of $300,000, or a new trial on emotional distress damages. View "Townsend v. Bayer HealthCare Pharm. Inc." on Justia Law