Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against the County and the sheriff after he was terminated as deputy sheriff. The court concluded, under the Pickering/Connick balancing test, that at least some of plaintiff's campaign speech does not merit First Amendment protection; that even if plaintiff's speech was fully protected by the Constitution, the sheriff could have reasonably believed that the speech would be at least potentially damaging and disruptive of the discipline and harmony of and among coworkers in the sheriff's office and detrimental to the close working relationships and personal loyalties necessary for an effective and trusted local policing operation; considering North Dakota law and well-established federal and state jurisprudence, the sheriff could have logically and rationally believed that his decision to terminate plaintiff was well within his duties as a public official; and that the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity to shield him from any liability. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of the sheriff's motion for summary judgment. View "Nord v. Walsh County, et al." on Justia Law

Polar Tank discharged a maintenance technician for failing to safely complete repair of an overhead crane. The Union grieved the discharge and the grievance was submitted to arbitration. The arbitrator partially upheld the grievance, reducing the technician's discipline to a thirty-day unpaid suspension. Polar Tank sued to vacate the arbitration award and the Union counterclaimed to enforce it. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment enforcing the award where the award at issue drew its essence from the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The arbitrator considered the technician's poor performance and concluded that it constituted negligence but not the type of insubordination for which Article 29 mandated discharge; the court rejected Polar Tank's claim that the arbitrator was wrong to disregard the Standards of Conduct; and the arbitrator did not err in disregarding the Management Rights clause. View "PSC Custom, LP v. United Steel, etc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, alleging race discrimination and retaliation. The court concluded that plaintiff was unable to show a prima facie case of discrimination because he failed to show circumstances which would give rise to an inference of discrimination. Plaintiff also failed to show direct or inferential evidence his employer engaged in retaliation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. View "Young v. Builders Steel Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, CBE, under 42 U.S.C. 1981, alleging claims of race discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, and constructive discharge. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CBE. The court concluded that, even considering the otherwise time-barred acts that were similar to the acts that occurred within the limitations period, plaintiff failed to set forth sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on her hostile work environment claim. The twelve incidents of alleged harassment that occurred after March 1, 2007, as well as the similar acts that occurred before then, taken together are not sufficiently severe or pervasive to show that plaintiff's work environment was objectively offensive. Having affirmed the district court's decision on the hostile work environment claim, the court need not further address plaintiff's constructive discharge claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Clay v. Credit Bureau Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his second amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Because Missouri's public policy required American Century not to retaliate against plaintiff for testifying in the arbitration proceeding at issue, plaintiff has alleged a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing sufficient to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Accordingly, the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's complaint. View "Kmak v. American Century Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Red Cross on her claims, inter alia, of race discrimination and retaliation. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination based on the Red Cross' decision not to promote her and based on the failure to train her; the decision to suspend and terminate plaintiff was not a result of race discrimination but, rather, because plaintiff failed to meet her employer's legitimate expectations; even if plaintiff was able to show that she had met her employer's legitimate expectations, she failed to show that similarly situated employees committed the same conduct but were treated differently. The court concluded that the district court did not err in granting Red Cross summary judgment on the retaliation claim where plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact to show a causal link between her protected activity and the adverse employment actions taken against her. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not err in granting the Red Cross summary judgment on plaintiff's outrage claim. View "Robinson v. American Red Cross" on Justia Law

AECI filed suit against the Union seeking to vacate the arbitrator's award and the Union counterclaimed for enforcement. Relying on the court's decision in Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 688, the district court ruled that the last chance agreement (LCA) superseded the collective bargaining agreement and therefore, when the arbitrator ignored the clear and unambiguous terms of the LCA, he imposed his personal standards of industrial justice. The court concluded that the district court read the Coca-Cola bottling decision too broadly. Where a CBA requires "just cause" to discipline or discharge an employee but fails to define the term, the arbitrator's broad authority to interpret the contract, to which the court must defer, includes defining and applying that term of the contract. Viewed from this perspective, the arbitrator's decision to sustain the Union's grievance must be enforced. Because the arbitrator specifically invoked and applied the just cause provision of the CBA, the contract between AECI and the Union that defined his authority, his decision "draws its essence" from the CBA. Accordingly, the arbitrator's decision sustaining the Union's grievance must be enforced. The court declined to enforce the portion of the award granting the employee back pay from the day he was suspended until the day he was discharged. The court reversed and remanded. View "Associated Electric Coop. v. IBEW" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the city, alleging claims under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601; Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.; section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701; and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA), Ark. Code 16-123-107. Both parties appealed the judgment of the district court. The court concluded that a reasonable juror could find that plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the job for which he interviewed and that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to support an inference of a retaliatory motive on the part of the city. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the city's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the FMLA retaliation claim. The court affirmed the district court's grant of the city's motion for judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff's ACRA disability-discrimination claim where plaintiff introduced no evidence to demonstrate that the city knew about his conditions when he sought to be rehired; affirmed the district court's vacatur of the jury's award for emotional-distress where the ACRA claim submitted to the jury did not provide a basis for the jury's award of emotional-distress damages; and reversed the denial of liquidated damages because the city cited no evidence in support of the district court's finding that it acted in good faith in refusing to rehire plaintiff and the court could find none. View "Jackson v. City of Hot Springs" on Justia Law

The Secretary petitioned for review of OSHA's order approving without comment an underlying ALJ's decision that addressed competing interpretations of a Department of Labor safety regulation, 29 U.S.C. 1910.212(a)(1). The Secretary determined that the regulation requires lathes such as those used by Loren Cook to have guards to protect workers from ejected workpieces. The court concluded that the Secretary's interpretation of the regulation in this matter was reasonable and well supported by the plain meaning of the regulation's text. Pursuant to Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, the court deferred to the Secretary's interpretation rather than the Commission. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, reversed the order of the Commission, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Perez v. Loren Cook Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., against H&R Block, alleging that H&R Block must compensate tax professionals for the time spent completing twenty-four hours of rehire training. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of H&R Block, holding that the district court engaged in the appropriate inquiry when it considered whether, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, plaintiffs were employees or trainees when they completed rehire training. The court held that tax professionals were not employees of H&R Block when they completed rehire training where H&R Block received no immediate advantage from the rehire training completed by the tax professionals. The court found further support for this conclusion in the Wage and Hour Division Field Operations Handbook. View "Petroski, et al. v. H&R Block Enterprises, et al." on Justia Law