Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging claims of unlawful sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000 et seq., and the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code 216.6. On appeal, defendants challenged the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff, arguing that they were entitled to a new trial. Defendants argued that the district court erred in overruling their objection to improper rebuttal closing argument by plaintiff's counsel, and then abused its discretion in denying defendants' post-trial motion because this argument, while improper, was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial. Counsel made emotionally-charged comments at the end of rebuttal closing argument, referencing her own sexual harassment during law school and assurances to the jury that her client testified truthfully about past sexual abuse. The court concluded that the timing and emotional nature of counsel's improper and repeated personal vouching for her client, using direct references to facts not in evidence, combined with the critical importance of plaintiff's credibility to issues of both liability and damages, made the improper comments unfairly prejudicial and required that the court remand for a new trial. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gilster v. Primebank, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 after she was terminated by the law school of Hamline University. Plaintiff alleged that the university, the dean, and the president of the St. Paul Police Federation (SPPF) conspired with the St. Paul Police Department to deny her constitutional right to freedom of speech. The court concluded that plaintiff did not plead sufficient facts that a police officer was acting under color of state law; plaintiff did not plead sufficient facts about the University or the Dean to demonstrate that they participated in a concerted action to terminate plaintiff; concerning leave to amend, plaintiff has not plausibly alleged a meeting of the minds between the Department, the SPPF, and the University; and the district court properly ruled that adding the SPPF would be futile. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Magee v. Trustees of Hamline University, et al." on Justia Law

The Union sought to set aside an arbitration award that ruled in favor of the MADA and several member car dealerships. At issue was the transition between the 2006 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and the 2010 CBA and its impact on above-scale time allowances for hybrid car warranty and recall work. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The court agreed with the district court and found that the arbitrator was "warranted" in determining the CBA's plain language to be "silent or ambiguous with respect to the disputed issue - how the above-scale time allowances could be legitimately terminated." With MADA's attorney's unrebutted testimony and the letters documenting other dealerships' similar conduct to help the parties' past practice with respect to the ambiguous CBA language at issue, the court concluded that the arbitration award drew its essence from the CBA. Therefore, the court found no basis to vacate the arbitration award. The court affirmed the district court's order granting MADA's motion to dismiss with prejudice. View "Garage Maintenance, etc. v. Greater Metropolitan, etc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendant under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983. The district court concluded on remand that defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity on any ground. Determining that the court had jurisdiction in this interlocutory appeal, the court concluded that plaintiffs had not put forth sufficient evidence to demonstrate that defendant's decisions were motivated by racial animus; plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that defendant made stigmatizing comments about Plaintiff Jones that deprived Jones of his liberty interest to earn a living in his profession as a substance abuse counselor; and, therefore, the court concluded that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity on the sections 1981 and 1983 claims. The court reversed the judgment of the district court with instructions to dismiss the complaint. View "Jones, et al. v. McNeese" on Justia Law

Sara Lee and the Unions entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), and an outsourcing agreement which permitted Sara Lee to outsource covered functions to a contract company. After Sara Lee did outsource one of the covered functions and the contract company hired Sara Lee's displaced employees, Sara Lee refused to require the contract company to adhere to the CBA for its remaining terms. The Unions argued that Sara Lee breached the outsourcing agreement. The court concluded that Sara Lee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law where the Unions failed to establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Sara Lee subsequently changed subcontractors. The court found it unnecessary to address the extension agreement's impact on the old CBA's term or to reconcile this tangle of agreements, because the proposition that Sara Lee never subsequently changed subcontractors provided a clear basis upon which to affirm. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Allied Sales Drivers, et al. v. Sara Lee Bakery Group, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, three former employees, filed suit against Lumber One, claiming that Lumber One incorrectly classified them as executive employees who were exempt from overtime pay regulations under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 207(a)(1). After overturning the jury verdict, the district court awarded plaintiffs overtime pay and attorneys' fees. The court concluded that Lumber One failed to show that Plaintiffs Madden and O'Bar met the executive exemption standard where Lumber One failed to prove that these plaintiffs had the authority to hire or fire employees, or that their recommendations regarding personnel decisions were given "particular weight" by the decisionmaker. The court concluded, however, that Lumber One did prove that Plaintiff Wortman was eligible for the executive exemption. Accordingly, the court affirmed with respect to Madden and O'Bar, reversed with respect to Wortman, and remanded for a new determination of attorneys' fees. View "Madden, et al. v. Lumber One Home Center, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed sex- and pregnancy-based employment discrimination claims against Nationwide under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), Iowa Code 216.6. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to meet her burden of demonstrating constructive discharge, where, even if her supervisor's comment that it was best that plaintiff go home with her babies might support a finding of intent to force plaintiff to resign, plaintiff did not give Nationwide a reasonable opportunity to address and ameliorate the conditions that she claimed constituted constructive discharge. The court also concluded that plaintiff waived her argument that she was actually discharged because she did not raise it in the district court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Nationwide. View "Ames v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., et al." on Justia Law

Appellant appealed the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's (BAP) judgment holding that the bankruptcy estate of her former employer, Racing Services, was entitled to the liquidation proceeds of a cash-value life insurance policy the employer purchased for her. Because the trustee had presented no evidence demonstrating that appellant could have demonstrated insurability, the court rejected the argument that the purported "equities" of this case required that the court deem appellant's failure to reinstate the policy as an act of surrender. The terms of the agreement between appellant and Racing Services granted Racing Services only the limited right to receive a repayment of policy premiums from the cash value upon surrender of the policy. Accordingly, the court reversed where appellant at no time surrendered the policy and the estate did not possess a right to control the policy or receive its liquidation proceeds. View "Kaler v. Bala" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a member of the National Guard, filed suit against TXD, alleging that TXD violated the Uniform Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301 et seq., when it terminated him while he was deployed on active duty in Iraq. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of TXD. At issue was whether TXD violated its USERRA obligations to plaintiff while he was on leave by not including him on an asset list of TXD employees provided to Foxxe, which took over TXD's operations without interruption. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that the modified claim turned on one or more essential facts that the summary judgment record did not address. View "Dorris v. TXD Services, LP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Timothy Geithner, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Treasury, for retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The court concluded that no senior-international-agent position was available to which plaintiff could be promoted based on his work in the "M" case and plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the IRS's failure to promote him to a senior international agent for his work on the "M" case constituted a materially adverse employment action; failed to demonstrate unlawful retaliation because no reasonable juror could determine that the IRS undertook material adverse employment actions; and failed to demonstrate constructive discharge. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "AuBuchon v. Geitner" on Justia Law