Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued the City under 42 U.S.C. 1983 after she was sexually assaulted by a City policy officer. The officer was charged with first degree sexual assault and subsequently terminated from the police force. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to the City. The court concluded that a jury could reasonably infer, based on the evidence, that the City's custom of ignoring violent misconduct and failing to supervise or discipline officers was a moving force behind the officer's assault on plaintiff. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Doe v. City of Marianna, AR" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her former employer and others after she was terminated, alleging federal claims of discrimination based on her gender, religion, and disability, as well as defamation under state law. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment on the remaining claims that were not dismissed. The court concluded that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's discrimination claims to Trumann Health where, under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, Trumann Health articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing her and plaintiff did not show other similarly situated employees were more favorably treated; the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's libel claims against her co-workers; and Trumann Health could not be liable for defamation because plaintiff premised Trumann Health's liability upon the individual defendants' liability. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Evance v. Trumann Health Services, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the University and others under 42 U.S.C. 1983 after her employment was terminated for gross misconduct. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment on her due process violation and gender discrimination claims. The court concluded that, assuming plaintiff had a property interest in her continued employment, her due process claim failed because she received all of the process that she was due; regardless of whether defendants deprived plaintiff of a liberty interest in her reputation, she could not establish a due process violation because she did not sufficiently, if at all, request a name-clearing hearing; the district court did not err in finding that plaintiff failed to show direct evidence of discrimination or that defendants' explanation for terminating her was a pretext for gender discrimination. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Floyd-Gimon v. University of Arkansas, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued his employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 623, and the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), Iowa Code 216.6, alleging that he was discharged from his employment due to his age. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. The court concluded that, taken together, plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to allow a rational factfinder to find that the employer's proffered reasons for terminating him were pretextual. Plaintiff's evidence was not inconsistent with a reasonable inference of age discrimination and, therefore, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ridout v. JBS USA, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of U.S. Bank on her claims of discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-1 et seq. The court concluded that summary judgment in favor of U.S. Bank on plaintiff's discrimination claim was proper where the bank had a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for issuing a written warning and where plaintiff had not met her burden of demonstrating pretext. The court also concluded that summary judgment in favor of U.S. Bank was proper where plaintiff failed to show a causal connection between her protected activity and the bank's alleged adverse employment action. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Muor v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Assoc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that NCS conducted a spam e-mail campaign that harmed his business, in violation of Iowa and federal law. After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of NCS and dismissed plaintiff's claims. The district court heard from plaintiff and NCS's principals in a bench trial and it found NCS's principals more credible than plaintiff. The court concluded that the evidence cited by plaintiff did not establish a clear error in the district court's determination. The court also concluded that the district court did not err by concluding that a salesman was an independent contractor rather than an employee of NCS. The court rejected plaintiff's contention that an employment relationship made NCS responsible for any e-mail activity by the salesman. The primary consideration was the hiring party's control over the means of performance and the court agreed with the district court that the weight of the evidence taken as a whole established an independent contractor agreement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kramer, III v. National Credit System" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two former employees of MET, initiated this action in Minnesota state court alleging that MET and their supervisor terminated them in violation of the Minnesota Whistleblower Act, Minn. Stat. 181.932, and Minnesota common law. MET and the supervisor removed the case to federal court. As in Barclay Square Properties v. Midwest Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Minneapolis, the court remanded the case to the district court for the purpose of making findings of fact concerning the supervisor's citizenship. On remand, the district court should determine whether the parties were completely diverse when plaintiffs filed their complaint and when MET and the supervisor filed the notice of removal. Accordingly, the court remanded to the district court but retained jurisdiction over the appeal. View "Chavez-Lavagnino, et al v. Motivation Education Training, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, employed by the CRMC, filed charges of discrimination against her employer after CRMC's placement of her on administrative leave following work-related epileptic seizures and the hiring of a younger technician. Because plaintiff was not a qualified individual to perform the job duties with or without accommodation, the court did not err in granting summary judgment to CRMC based on the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and Missouri Human Rights Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 213.010, claims. Plaintiff's age discrimination claims failed for the same reason her disability discrimination claims failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Olsen v. Capital Region Medical Center, et al" on Justia Law

This case involved the interpretation of two contractual provisions under Minnesota law: an indemnification clause in a contract between PDSI and Miller and an insurance contract between Harleysville and PDSI which extended insurance coverage to PDSI's indemnification of third parties for tort liability caused, in whole or in part, by PDSI or by those acting on its behalf. The court agreed with the district court's finding that a PDSI employee's suit fell squarely within the indemnity provision of the 1989 Agreement between PDSI and Miller. The court also agreed with the district court's interpretation of the insurance agreements as requiring Harleysville to cover Miller's settlement of the employee's claims. Further, the court concluded that the undisputed facts established as a matter of law that PDSI or those acting on its behalf at least partly caused the employee's bodily injury within the terms of the Harleysville policy. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Physical Distrib. Serv., et al" on Justia Law

The City terminated plaintiff's employment after she refused a state trooper's request to take a drug test. Plaintiff sued the City and others, claiming that she was terminated in retaliation for her decision to exercise her Fourth Amendment rights. Even assuming the termination violated plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights, it was not clearly established at the time of the incident that such an action was unconstitutional, and therefore defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The court also agreed with the district court that plaintiff's remaining federal claims failed to allege a constitutional violation. The court further held that the district court properly dismissed the official capacity claims and the claims against the City where plaintiff failed to allege facts indicating that the City delegated final policymaking authority to the officials. Finally, because plaintiff did not explain why her Arkansas Civil Rights Act, Ark. Code Ann. 16-123-105(a), claims warranted separate analysis, the district court did not err in dismissing the ACRA claims alongside the 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Hess v. Abels, et al" on Justia Law