Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Local 36 obtained an arbitration award against Whitney d/b/a Whitney Industrial, a non-signatory to any collective bargaining agreement, under an alter-ego theory. Whitney appealed the district court's order enforcing the arbitration award. The court held that a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement need not participate in the arbitration while expressly reserving jurisdictional questions, file a preemptive declaratory judgment action, notify the arbitrator of its refusal to participate, or timely initiate a court action to vacate the arbitrator's award in order to have "the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate . . . decided by the court, not the arbitrator." Accordingly, the court agreed with Whitney that the joint adjustment board had no authority to determine whether his new company was the alter ego of Whitney Mechanical, and thus, bound by the collective bargaining agreement. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded.

Plaintiffs, husband and wife, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of AGC on their race and discrimination retaliation claims. The court held that, even assuming both husband and wife presented sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case of age discrimination, they both have failed to present adequate proof to overcome AGC's proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment actions - limiting wife's cross-training opportunities and terminating husband. The court also held that wife did not produce sufficient evidence to indicate AGC's employment actions allegedly denying her cross-training were retaliatory in nature and husband did not provide evidence that his termination was pretextual. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of AGC on all claims.

Plaintiff, born in Jordan, filed suit alleging that the City discriminated against him based on his national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The magistrate judge granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The court affirmed and held that plaintiff failed to establish that Captain Adler was a decisionmaker and thus had not presented direct evidence of discrimination; the record failed to support an inference that Adler's discriminatory animus was a proximate cause of the police chief's decision to forego hiring plaintiff for a full-time position; plaintiff failed to establish that he was a more qualified candidate; and the police chief's explanation had some basis in fact and did not support an inference of pretext.

Plaintiff sued her former employer for retaliation in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(2). The district court granted the employer's motion for judgment as a matter of law. Because the employer did not offer a non-discriminatory reason for its alleged act, the proper inquiry for the district court was whether plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Because plaintiff failed to provide any other evidence linking her termination to her use of FMLA leave, a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for her on that issue. Therefore, the employer was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

An Arkansas jury found in favor of plaintiff on her Title VII claims of race discrimination and constructive discharge against the school district and individual members of the County's Board of Education and awarded her compensatory damages, wage and fringe benefits, and punitive damages. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's judgment. The court held that, under the circumstances, it believed that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude defendant was constructively discharged. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's decision to grant the Rule 50 motion on that claim. The court held that the jury was not instructed to consider whether the individual Board members affirmatively proved ignorance of federal law when discriminating against defendant on the basis of her race. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's Rule 50 motion vacating the punitive damage award, but remanded this issue to the district court. Because the court's resolution of the constructive discharge claim and the punitive damage awards directly affected the degree of success plaintiff obtained in her civil rights action, the court remanded the issue of attorneys' fees.

The EEOC filed suit against CRST, one of the country's largest interstate trucking companies, alleging that CRST subjected Monika Starke "and approximately 270 similarly situated female employees" to a hostile work environment, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The EEOC alleged that CRST was responsible for severe and pervasive sexual harassment in its New-Driver Training program. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the EEOC's claims as to Starke because the EEOC, suing as plaintiff in its own name under section 706 of Title VII, could not be judicially estopped because of Starke's independent conduct; reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the EEOC's claims on behalf of Tillie Jones because the EEOC had produced sufficient evidence to create a genuine fact issue as to the severity or pervasiveness of harassment that she allegedly suffered; vacated, without prejudice, the district court's award of attorneys' fees to CRST because CRST was no longer a "prevailing" defendant under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k); and affirmed the remainder of the district court's orders and remanded for further proceedings.

This case concerned the Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA), 26 U.S.C. 3101 et seq., and certain employment taxes FICA imposed upon employers. After a bench trial on the merits, the district rendered a tax deficiency judgment against DEWPC for unpaid FICA taxes and DEWPC appealed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the government's expert testimony on the issue of reasonable compensation and, because the district court applied the correct legal standard, its determination on Watson's FICA wages was affirmed. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing her claims against her former employer for defamation; breach of a unilateral contract to pay a performance bonus; failure to timely pay wages after discharge in violation of Minn. Stat. 181.13(a); age discrimination; and interference with her rights to employee benefits in violation of section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1140, and the court's denial of her motion to continue the summary judgment proceedings. The court agreed with the district court that the employer was entitled to the qualified privilege as a matter of law for plaintiff's defamation claims. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the breach of contract and unpaid wages claims because all the employer's documents clearly stated that the awarding of bonuses was discretionary. The court further held that the district court properly granted summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's age discrimination claim where plaintiff failed to show that either of her replacements were "sufficiently younger" or that there was a material question of fact regarding pretext; the district court correctly concluded that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of employee benefit plan interference under section 510 of ERISA; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion for continuance.

The EEOC alleged that under Product Fabricators' drug policy, Product Fabricators made unlawful medical inquiries of employees, failed to keep confidential their medical information, and discharged a shear operator employee because of his disability and/or as a result of an unlawful application of the drug policy - all in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112(a). The district court subsequently rejected a proposed decree to ensure compliance with the ADA on the ground that the EEOC did not identify a basis for the court to continue jurisdiction over the case for two years. The court concluded that the district court gave no consideration to the strong preference for settlement agreements as a means of protecting the federal interest in employment discrimination cases, or to the fact that jurisdiction was a usual component of such agreements, in part due to its deterrent effect. The district court also improperly gave significant weight to Product Fabricators' contention that its acts of discrimination were insufficiently widespread to justify continuing jurisdiction in the face of the EEOC's allegations. As a result, the district court did not explain why continuing jurisdiction was not fair, reasonable, and adequate, and thus abused its discretion.

Plaintiff, a white male, employed as a forklift operator, supported another employee's racial discrimination claim by testifying that he also routinely failed to sign a forklift checkout sheet and had never been disciplined. After an investigation, two operators were determined to be the individuals signing the checkout sheet on behalf of other employees and were issued disciplinary warnings; plaintiff was not disciplined. Plaintiff subsequently had a conflict with another employee that resulted in multiple complaints by fellow workers. The company terminated his employment for "violations of company policies, including ... creation of a hostile and intimidating work environment and engaging in unsafe work practices." The union filed a grievance but decided not to pursue it. The district court rejected his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and alleging defamation on summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff failed to prove pretext.