Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant appealed the district court's orders granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Lake Lotawana, and its mayor, and the subsequent dismissal of her wrongful termination and retaliation claims. On appeal, appellant contended that the city breached her employment contract and that she established triable issues of fact as to her retaliation claims. The court held that the city was entitled to summary judgment on appellant's wrongful termination claim where she did not have an enforceable contract or viable tort claim. The court also held that appellant was terminated because of her inappropriate activities and therefore, the dismissal of appellant's retaliation claims was affirmed because nothing in the record indicated that her opposition to unlawful discrimination was a contributing factor to her termination. The court further held, for the same reasons, that appellant could not succeed under the more stringent standard applied in the Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgement of the district court.

Appellant appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employer in a wrongful-termination suit brought pursuant to the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) 38 U.S.C. 4316. The court held that appellant failed to raise a genuine factual dispute about whether the employer's conduct was reasonable and whether the employer had notice that such conduct would be a ground for discharge because the employer's decision to terminate appellant was reasonable where appellant violated a clear written policy by failing to personally report his absences.

Plaintiff sued Judge Larry Williams for wrongful termination, in violation of plaintiff's rights under the First Amendment and the Family Medical leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601, et seq. Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Williams. The court held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Williams terminated plaintiff's employment because of the letter plaintiff wrote to the editor of a local paper in 2007 regarding the judge's financial committee. The court also held that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Williams in his individual capacity on plaintiff's FMLA claims where plaintiff failed to argue how Williams personally received adequate notice and, given the undisputed record that Williams generally delegated the operation of the Road Department to others. Therefore, the court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment against plaintiff on his First Amendment claims; erred in granting summary judgment against plaintiff on his official-capacity claims under the FMLA; but properly granted summary judgment against plaintiff on his individual-capacity FMLA claims against Williams.

This case arose when Leiferman Enterprises LLC (Leiferman) unilaterally suspended negotiations with the International Union of Painters and Allied Trades District Council 82 (Union) regarding the renewal of the two parties' collective-bargaining agreement. The NLRB eventually filed a complaint but, during the litigation's pendency, a secured creditor forced Leiferman into receivership. During the receivership, the secured creditor sold Leiferman to Auto Glass Repair and Windshield Replacement Service (WRS), agreeing to indemnify WRS against any potential Board liability. At length, the Board found Leiferman liable for certain unfair labor practices and imposed that liability on WRS, which it determined to be a liable successor-in-interest under Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB. The Board subsequently petitioned the court to enforce its order and Leiferman cross-petitioned for review of the order. The court held that the record, reviewed as a whole, contained substantial evidence to support the Board's conclusion that WRS was Leiferman's Golden State successor-in-interest and therefore, the court enforced the Board's order and denied WRS's petition for review.

Appellant filed suit against her former employer, alleging that it wrongfully denied (or delayed) her promotion and subsequently, wrongfully terminated her. Appellant challenged four of the district court's interlocutory orders, contended that the district court erred by awarding costs to the employer, and asserted that the district court erroneously dismissed some of her claims and erroneously granted summary judgment to the employer on her remaining claims. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion where it repeatedly attempted to accommodate appellant despite her attorney's repeated failures to comply with court orders and court-imposed deadlines. The court also held that appellant had not shown that the district court abused its discretion by awarding costs to the employer. The court further held that the district court did not err by dismissing appellant's duplicative claims and affirmed the district court's dismissal of her claim under the Ledbetter Act, which she attempted to add without permission from the employer or leave from the court. The court finally held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the hostile work environment claim and the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2615, claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant entered into an Employment Agreement with his employer before the employer entered into a merger. After defendant was terminated by his employer and post-merger disputes arose as to the amounts his employer owed him, defendant filed a demand for arbitration under the Employment Agreement's arbitration provision. The employer commenced this action to enjoin the arbitration as preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. The employer alleged federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 because the severance dispute "arises out of an [ERISA] employee benefit plan" and therefore state law claims were preempted, and supplemental jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 1367 over non-ERISA claims. The court considered ERISA's statutory language, purpose, and historical context and held that an individual contract providing severance benefits to a single executive employee was not an ERISA employee welfare benefit plan within the meaning of section 1002(1). The court also held that ERISA preempted state laws that "relate to" an employee benefit plan. Consequently, further questions arose because the Employment Agreement included two provisions that could "relate" to the Employment Agreement to other programs of the employer that were ERISA plans. As neither parties nor the district court considered this jurisdictional issue, the court remanded for further proceedings.

The Minnesota Law Enforcement Association (MLEA) appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), concluding as a matter of law that the MLEA's retirement plan arbitrarily discriminated against older employees on the basis of age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 623. The court held that this exclusively age-based reduction in benefits typified "arbitrary age discrimination" and therefore failed to meet the ADEA's safe harbor requirements. The court also held that, although the Department of Corrections was not obligated under federal law to employ certain persons over the age of 55 for reasons that could include age, it could not discriminate against all persons over age 55 solely due to their age. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment.

This case arose when appellant alleged claims of tortuous interference with contract or business expectancy and violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), Ark. Code Ann. 4-88-101, et seq. Appellant subsequently sought a temporary retraining order and preliminary injunction after appellee terminated appellant's patient privileges at a residential nursing home. The court held that appellant did not meet the factors in the Dataphase Syst. Inc. v. C.L. Syst., which evaluated whether to issue an injunction. Consequently, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a preliminary injunction and the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of his claim for benefits under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., where the district court held that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The court held that because plaintiff sought either current or future benefits, the plan provided an administrative procedure for his claim. The facts alleged in plaintiff's complaint showed neither futility nor the lack of an administrative remedy and therefore, the court concluded that he was required to exhaust his administrative remedies under the plan before he could bring a civil action in federal court.

Plaintiff sued defendant, the Secretary of the Navy, for sexual harassment and retaliation, in addition to state law claims. Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of the case based on the failure to exhaust her administrative remedies. The court affirmed the dismissal and held that plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies because she first made contact with an Equal Employment Opportunity counselor on February 10, 2004 - 68 days after the sexual harassment ended. The court also held that neither equitable tolling nor equitable estoppel saved her claim.