Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

G&K filed suit against Bill's for breach of contract and sought liquidated damages. Bill's counterclaimed, asserting common-law clams and a violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ark. Code 4-88-113. A jury found in favor of G&K on the common-law counterclaims but returned a verdict for Bill's on its deceptive trade practices counterclaim, awarding Bill's damages. The district court subsequently awarded G&K attorney's fees and denied Bill's motion for attorney's fees. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $82,766.50 in attorney's fees to G&K where the district court expressly considered G&K's degree of success and reduced its requested award based on time devoted to unsuccessful causes of action; the district court did not abuse its discretion by implicitly finding that the hourly rates claimed by G&K's Little Rock-based attorneys were reasonable; the documentation was sufficient to support the district court's conclusion where the record includes invoices that detail the amount of time spent on this litigation and the activities on which that time was spent; although the district court did not expressly mention all eight of the Chrisco factors, the district court did address several and provided enough explanation for the court to conclude that there was no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court rejected Bill's challenge to the award of attorney's fees to G&K. In light of comments from the Arkansas courts and the absence of mandatory language in section 4-88-113(f), the court agreed with the district court that Bill's was not automatically entitled to an award of fees when it prevailed on a claim under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. However, the court found little explanation for the district court's ruling and remanded for the district court to consider whether Bill's should be awarded a reasonable attorney's fee under section 4-88-113(f). The Act establishes an independent basis for awarding fees and does not restrict awards to a party that prevails in whatever larger litigation involves a claim under the Act. A party who prevails on a cause of action to recover actual damages under the Act is eligible for an award of attorney's fees, even when another party is the prevailing party in the overall action for purposes of Ark. Code Sec. 16-22-308.View "G&K Services Co., Inc. v. Bill's Super Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from litigation involving long grain rice producers' allegations that Bayer contaminated the United States rice supply. After plaintiffs settled, the district court awarded common benefit fees from a common benefit trust fund to leadership counsel and denied Phipps' request for a common benefit award. Phipps and Phipps' clients raise various challenges to the establishment of the fund and the award of fees, and lead counsel cross-appealed. The court concluded that the Settlement Agreement, by which Phipps agreed to be bound, resolved that a percentage of payments due to clients of Phipps would be allocated to the Fund in accordance with the 2010 Order. Therefore, Phipps waived its challenge to the creation of the Fund and to the order that Phipps and its clients must contribute to the Fund. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Phipps' request for additional procedures before the Fund monies were disbursed; the procedures employed by the district court were not an abuse of discretion; the district court did not abuse its discretion by approving the requested award as substantively reasonable; the district court's rationale for approving the fee request was reasonable when it adopted the Special Master's analysis; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Phipps' request for a benefit award. In regards to the cross-appeal, the court concluded that lead counsel had standing to pursue the cross-appeal but that the district court did not have jurisdiction to order holdbacks from state-court plaintiffs' recoveries. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "The Phipps Group v. Don Downing & Adam Levitt, etc." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from litigation involving long grain rice producers' allegations that Bayer contaminated the United States rice supply. Plaintiff class representatives filed suit for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit against other plaintiff lawyers, alleging that these other lawyers benefited in their state court actions from litigation materials and work product generated in the MDL by the plaintiff class but refused to pay for it. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court concluded, however, that each defendant voluntarily entered Missouri more than once to negotiate settlement of their state court cases, a settlement process which ultimately resulted in their receiving compensation as part of a settlement. Their voluntary entry into Missouri for financial benefit was both the transaction of business as that term is used in the Missouri long arm statute and constitutionally sufficient minimum contacts under the Due Process Clause. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.View "Downing, et al. v. Goldman Phipps, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Wyeth, alleging that she developed breast cancer after using Wyeth's's hormone therapy medication, Prempro. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred the case to the the Eastern District of Arkansas as part of the ongoing In re Prempro Products Liability Litigation. After the district court subsequently dismissed plaintiff's case for failure to respond to discovery orders, her attorney filed a Rule 60(b)(1) motion to set aside the dismissal. Plaintiff's attorney had failed to register for the Case Management/Electronic Case Files (CM-ECF) system and, consequently, did not receive electronic notices of the filings in plaintiff's case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the Rule 60(b)(1) motion because the district court did not abuse its discretion where, on more than one occasion, the district court instructed all attorneys to register for the CM-ECF system and warned that those who did not would not receive electronic filing notices or hard copies of orders.View "Freeman v. Wyeth, et al." on Justia Law

This appeal is a companion to Baker v. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. The appeal concerns action the district court took while purporting to exercise jurisdiction over that dispute, namely, disqualifying plaintiffs' counsel (Zerger and Mauer). Greenwood sought Zerger and Mauer's disqualification due to a conflict of interest out of the attorneys' former representation of Greenwood and its current representation of plaintiffs. The district court entered the disqualification order based on its inherent need to manage its bar and uphold the rules of professional conduct. The record supported the district court's determination that the two matters were substantially related and there was a conflict of interest. Therefore, although the court concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the merits case, the court concluded that the district court had authority to disqualify counsel and did not abuse its discretion in doing so. View "Zerger & Mauer v. City of Greenwood" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging claims of unlawful sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000 et seq., and the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code 216.6. On appeal, defendants challenged the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff, arguing that they were entitled to a new trial. Defendants argued that the district court erred in overruling their objection to improper rebuttal closing argument by plaintiff's counsel, and then abused its discretion in denying defendants' post-trial motion because this argument, while improper, was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial. Counsel made emotionally-charged comments at the end of rebuttal closing argument, referencing her own sexual harassment during law school and assurances to the jury that her client testified truthfully about past sexual abuse. The court concluded that the timing and emotional nature of counsel's improper and repeated personal vouching for her client, using direct references to facts not in evidence, combined with the critical importance of plaintiff's credibility to issues of both liability and damages, made the improper comments unfairly prejudicial and required that the court remand for a new trial. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gilster v. Primebank, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the bankruptcy court's order imposing sanctions and judgment, and an order denying a motion to vacate or alter or amend judgment. The bankruptcy appellate panel affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision that defendant violated Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011, as well as its imposition of sanctions in connection therewith, including suspension of defendant from practice for six months under Local Rule 2090-2; reversed the bankruptcy court's imposition of sanctions against defendant under 11 U.S.C. 105 and its inherent authority because defendant did not receive separate prior notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding such sanctions; and remanded to the bankruptcy court the decision regarding sanctions for alleged misrepresentations by defendant at the Order to Appear and Show Cause hearing. View "Young v. Cruz" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit claiming malicious prosecution and violations of his civil rights. After plaintiff's attorney failed to comply with discovery deadlines, the district court dismissed plaintiff's suit with prejudice for failure to prosecute and failures to comply with a court order and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court concluded that, in these circumstances, it was an abuse of discretion to impose the "ultimate sanction" of dismissal with prejudice without first considering the viability of lesser sanctions. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Bergstrom v. Sgt. Michelle Frascone, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the first African-American circuit court judge elected in Phillips County, Arkansas, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the commission and officials during the disciplinary proceedings against him. The district court denied plaintiff's request for a temporary restraining order and stayed proceedings in accordance with the Younger abstention doctrine. The state disciplinary proceedings ended with a decision by the Arkansas Supreme Court. The district court then granted the commission and officials' Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss, finding no justifiable federal controversy. The court concluded that Defendant Stewart, Executive Director of the commission, was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity as to plaintiff's claims for damages on the first cause of action; plaintiff had no justiciable claim for damages against any defendant in the second cause of action where plaintiff's allegations amounted to nothing more than a state law defamation claim and the district court did not abuse its discretion; and plaintiff's requests for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Simes, II v. Arkansas Judicial D. & D. Comm, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the bankruptcy court's imposition of sanctions on her for making factually unsupported and harassing statements in documents filed with the court. The court concluded that Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 did not authorize the sanctions imposed in this case; even if Rule 9011 was inapplicable, it did not mean that the bankruptcy court lacked authority to sanction plaintiff; the court had jurisdiction over the appeal where the penalty imposed was criminal in nature because the monetary penalty was punitive, payable to the court, and non-compensatory; plaintiff did not move for recusal or object to the judge's participation and she therefore forfeited any objection; the bankruptcy court did not commit an obvious error by failing to recuse sua sponte and there was no showing of prejudice or miscarriage of justice; there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome before a different judge where the evidence of plaintiff's contempt was undisputed and aggravated; and plaintiff's remaining claims about the contempt process were without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Isaacson v. Manty" on Justia Law