Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves a criminal prosecution for a murder in Indian country. Francisco Villanueva and Adan Corona were convicted of first-degree murder and other offenses related to the killing of Vincent Von Brewer III, who owed money to members of the Eastside Oldies gang. Villanueva organized a group, including Corona and Estevan Baquera, to collect the debt. They confronted Brewer at a community center in Pine Ridge, South Dakota, where Villanueva and Corona fatally shot him. Baquera, who acted as an accessory after the fact, helped disguise a getaway car.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota convicted Villanueva and Corona on all counts, sentencing them to life imprisonment. Baquera pleaded guilty to being an accessory after the fact and received the statutory maximum sentence of 180 months, which was an upward variance from the advisory guideline range of 78 to 97 months. The district court found that Baquera pointed a firearm at the crowd to protect the gang members during the attack.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Villanueva challenged the admissibility of an eyewitness identification and the exclusion of a defense expert's testimony. The court found no reversible error, ruling that the identification was not arranged by law enforcement and that the exclusion of the expert's testimony was consistent with precedent. Corona contested the denial of his motion to suppress statements made during a traffic stop, but the court held that the Miranda warnings were not required during the initial detention. Baquera appealed his sentence, arguing it was based on erroneous facts and was unreasonable. The court found no clear error in the district court's findings and upheld the sentence as reasonable.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgments of the district court for all three defendants. View "United States v. Villanueva" on Justia Law

Two tribal companies, Rock River Manufacturing, Inc. and HCI Distribution, Inc., challenged Nebraska's enforcement of its escrow and bond requirements for cigarette sales. These requirements stem from a Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) that mandates tobacco manufacturers either join the MSA or place money in escrow based on cigarette sales. The companies argued that the Indian Commerce Clause prevents Nebraska from enforcing these requirements on cigarettes sold within Indian country.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska granted partial summary judgment, enjoining Nebraska from enforcing the escrow and bond requirements for cigarettes sold on the Winnebago Tribe's reservation but not for those sold on the Omaha Tribe's reservation. Nebraska appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Nebraska's escrow and bond requirements could be enforced for cigarette sales to nonmembers on the Winnebago Reservation but not for sales to tribal members. The court reasoned that the state's interest in public health and fiscal soundness outweighed the tribal and federal interests for sales to nonmembers. However, for sales to tribal members, the tribe's sovereignty and self-governance interests prevailed. The court reversed the district court's decision in part and remanded with instructions to tailor the injunction, enjoining Nebraska from enforcing the escrow and bond requirements for cigarettes sold on the Winnebago Reservation to tribal members. View "HCI Distribution, Inc. v. Hilgers" on Justia Law

Frank Bibeau, a member of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, argued that his self-employment income from his law practice on the Leech Lake Reservation was exempt from federal taxation. For the 2016 and 2017 tax years, Bibeau reported his income on a joint federal income tax return with his wife, claiming a net operating loss carryforward that shielded his income from taxes but not from self-employment taxes. After receiving a notice from the IRS regarding his tax debts, Bibeau requested a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing, arguing his income was exempt. The IRS disagreed and issued a notice of determination to collect the tax.Bibeau petitioned the United States Tax Court, asserting that Indians are generally exempt from federal taxes or that treaties between the U.S. and the Chippewa exempted his income. The Tax Court ruled against him, stating that Indians are subject to federal tax laws unless a specific law or treaty provides otherwise. The court found that neither the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 nor the 1837 Treaty between the U.S. and the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe contained a specific exemption from federal taxation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that as U.S. citizens, Indians are subject to federal tax requirements unless specifically exempted by a treaty or act of Congress. The court found that Bibeau failed to point to any statute or treaty that specifically exempted his self-employment income from taxation. The court also noted that the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 and the 1837 Treaty did not provide such an exemption. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s decision, holding that Bibeau’s self-employment income is subject to federal self-employment taxes. View "Bibeau v. CIR" on Justia Law

Colton Bagola was convicted of first-degree murder and discharge of a firearm during a crime of violence after shooting Sloane Bull Bear in the back of the head at a gathering in Pine Ridge, South Dakota. Witnesses testified that Bagola shot Bull Bear from approximately one inch away. Following the incident, Bagola and others fled the scene, and Bull Bear's body was found in the exterior doorway. Bagola was indicted on multiple charges, including first-degree murder and tampering with evidence. The district court severed the conspiracy count and granted a motion for acquittal on the tampering charge. The jury convicted Bagola of first-degree murder and discharge of a firearm during a crime of violence, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota handled the initial trial. After the jury's guilty verdict, Bagola filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, which the district court denied. Bagola then appealed his conviction, raising several challenges, including the admission of expert testimony, the adequacy of jury instructions regarding his "Indian" status, the sufficiency of evidence for premeditated first-degree murder, and whether premeditated first-degree murder qualifies as a crime of violence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that any error in admitting expert testimony was harmless due to the overwhelming evidence against Bagola. The court also determined that the district court's failure to properly instruct the jury on the "Indian" status element did not affect Bagola's substantial rights, given the uncontroverted evidence of his tribal membership. Additionally, the court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of premeditation. Finally, the court ruled that premeditated first-degree murder is categorically a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The Eighth Circuit affirmed Bagola's convictions. View "United States v. Bagola" on Justia Law

The Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation (MHA), an Indian nation of three affiliated tribes, appealed the U.S. Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM) approval of eight applications for oil drilling by the Slawson Exploration Company, Inc. next to Lake Sakakawea, MHA's sole source of drinking water. MHA challenged the approvals under the Administrative Procedure Act, arguing that BLM's approval of the project was arbitrary and capricious due to an insufficient record and by precluding MHA from further developing the record about the threat the project posed to MHA's health and welfare.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to BLM and Slawson, dismissing the case with prejudice. The court found that BLM had engaged in reasoned decision-making and had evaluated all relevant factors. It noted that the agency placed the responsibility on Slawson to comply with tribal law without impeding MHA's ability as a sovereign to enforce its laws. The court also found that BLM's decision not to evaluate tribal law did not impact tribal sovereignty. The court concluded that MHA's jurisdiction over Slawson's project was not a relevant factor to the approvals and therefore further development of the record was not required.Furthermore, the court found that MHA was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing as there was no dispute of material fact and MHA had adequate opportunities to submit evidence. Therefore, the court ruled that MHA had received all process required by the Constitution, laws, and agency regulation. View "Mandan, Hidatsa & Arikara Nation v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the defendant, Donavan Jay White Owl, appealed an order of the district court denying his motion to dismiss an indictment based on the Double Jeopardy Clause. White Owl had been indicted for felony murder and arson within Indian Country. A mistrial was declared during the initial trial after a dispute over White Owl’s access to information about a prosecution witness. White Owl argued that a new trial would violate his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution.The Appeals Court, however, ruled that White Owl had impliedly consented to the mistrial. The court noted that while the defendant did not expressly request a mistrial, his actions and responses during the proceedings indicated his implicit agreement. Specifically, when the district court declared its intention to declare a mistrial and asked the parties for their views, White Owl did not object but instead emphasized the need for more time to prepare for cross-examination of a prosecution witness.In light of this, the court concluded that White Owl's lack of objection amounted to implied consent to a mistrial. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order denying White Owl's motion to dismiss the indictment based on the Double Jeopardy Clause. View "United States v. Donavan White Owl" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued the Arkansas Division of Corrections (ADC), alleging its policies violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA). After a bench trial, the district court dismissed the complaint. It found that their religious beliefs were not sincerely held; that even if they were sincerely held, the policies did not substantially burden those beliefs; and that even if there was a substantial burden, the policies were the least restrictive means to further ADC’s compelling interests. Plaintiffs appealed.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. The court explained that the district court found that ADC lacks the staff and space for separate Jumu’ah services. But Plaintiffs proposed alternatives, including utilizing other available spaces, partitioning the same space, and scheduling two Jumu’ah services in the same space at different times. The district court neither addressed these proposed alternatives to determine whether they were available or would effectively address ADC’s compelling security interests nor addressed whether the prison’s reasons for refusing to offer an accommodation were persuasive in light of the evidence that other prisons are able to do so. Correctly applying the governing law to Plaintiffs’ challenge requires that the court do so. Further, the court wrote that the district court also found that ADC’s religious headdress policy did not substantially burden Plaintiffs’ beliefs because ADC informally allows them to wear kufis in violation of the policy. But even if ADC does not enforce it consistently, the policy expressly prohibits Plaintiffs from wearing their kufis except during religious services. View "Gregory Holt v. Dexter Payne" on Justia Law

Defendant’s mother called local dispatch and said an officer needed to come by because her son was “acting up.” A Bureau of Indian Affairs Officer was dispatched to the home, learning on the way that Defendant had an active tribal arrest warrant. Defendant’s mother invited Defendant into the living room and told Defendant to join them. The officer told Defendant he was “going to have to take you because you got that warrant.” Defendant fled to the garage, pursued by the officer, where Defendant knocked the officer down and escaped. Defendant was charged with forcibly assaulting, resisting, opposing, impeding, intimidating, or interfering with a federal officer and inflicting bodily injury. The jury convicted him of the lesser included offense of forcible assault of a federal officer involving physical contact. The district court sentenced Defendant to 44 months’ imprisonment. He appealed, raising numerous evidentiary issues and challenging the assessment of a two-level sentencing increase.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, the amicable conversation -- dominated by Defendant-- occurred in his mother’s home, a non-custodial atmosphere. The officer testified he did not know what the warrant was based on. Defendant fled only after the officer later told him he would be arrested, confirming that Defendant initially believed or at least hoped that he could avoid immediate arrest. Further, the court explained that even if Defendant was in custody, follow-up questions to clarify ambiguity do not amount to “interrogation” unless “their point is to enhance the defendant’s guilt.” The court concluded the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. View "United States v. Jade LaRoche" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District of South Dakota challenging the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court’s exercise of jurisdiction in a custody matter involving his minor daughter, C.S.N. Petitioner claimed that the Tribal Court’s refusal to recognize and enforce North Dakota state court orders awarding him custody of C.S.N. violated the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. Section 1738A. The district court granted summary judgment to the Tribal Court after concluding that the PKPA does not apply to Indian tribes. Petitioner appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the PKPA does not apply to Indian tribes. As a result, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court is not obligated under that statute to enforce the North Dakota court orders awarding custody of C.S.N. to Petitioner. The district court properly granted summary judgment to the Tribal Court. The court further explained that its conclusion that the PKPA does not apply to Indian tribes is further supported by the fact that when Congress intends for tribes to be subject to statutory full-faith-and-credit requirements, it expressly says so. View "Aarin Nygaard v. Tricia Taylor" on Justia Law

These appeals arise from a dispute over rights-of-way granted to WPX Energy Williston, LLC by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The areas are located on allotments of land owned by members of the Fettig family within the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. WPX Energy and the Fettigs agreed to a condition, which was incorporated into the grants, that bans smoking on the right-of-way land. In 2020, the Fettigs sued WPX Energy in the Three Affiliated Tribes District Court, alleging that the company breached the smoking ban. WPX Energy moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The tribal court concluded that it possessed jurisdiction over the case and denied the motion to dismiss. WPX Energy appealed the decision to a tribal appellate court. he district court concluded that WPX Energy had exhausted its tribal court remedies and that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction, so it granted a preliminary injunction.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the injunction and remanded to the district court with directions to dismiss the complaint without prejudice. The court concluded that WPX Energy did not exhaust its tribal court remedies and that a ruling in federal court on the question of tribal court jurisdiction was premature. The court explained that the policy of promoting tribal self-governance is not limited to tribal court proceedings that involve the development of a factual record. Rather, exhaustion of tribal court remedies “means that tribal appellate courts must have the opportunity to review the determinations of the lower tribal courts.” View "WPX Energy Williston, LLC v. Hon. B.J. Jones" on Justia Law