Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs did not purchase flood insurance for their house after the sellers told them that the property was not in a FEMA flood zone. Within weeks the area flooded, the home was destroyed and Plaintiffs sued the property sellers, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and private contractors.   Plaintiffs alleged that either FEMA or the Strategic Alliance for Risk Reduction (“STARR”) made the 2010 Change to the 100-year flood-line estimate and SFHA designation. They alleged that STARR is a joint venture by Defendants Stantec Consulting Services, Inc., Dewberry Engineers, Inc., and Atkins North America, Inc., but do not name STARR itself as a defendant. Atkins and Stantec filed a Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), extending the federal-contractor defense. The district court granted the motion.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The court held that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim because their complaint does not contain sufficient factual matter to show they are entitled to relief from Defendants. The court reasoned that Plaintiff’s complaint does not state how Atkins, Stantec and Dewberry work within STARR or which entity was responsible for any acts through STARR. Further, the complaint fails to state a claim for negligent misrepresentation against Atkins, Dewberry, and Stantec because the Plaintiffs provide “only naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” for three elements. Finally, the complaint similarly failed to state a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation because it does not plead which defendant made what representation. View "Derek Christopherson v. Robert Bushner" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleges he was unlawfully assaulted, pepper-sprayed, detained in an unlawful mass arrest, and ultimately incarcerated. He sued the City of St. Louis and multiple police officers for First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations, conspiracy to deprive him of civil rights, and supplemental state law claims. One officer moved to dismiss the 1983 claims, arguing plaintiff’s amended complaint failed to state a claim and he is entitled to qualified immunity. The only allegations relating to the defendant’s involvement are that he was working on September 17 and took custody of the plaintiff’s bicycle lying in the street at the time of his arrest. These allegations do not establish a causal link between the plaintiff and the specific wrongs the defendants as a whole allegedly committed. Further, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because the amended complaint did not contain specific and plausible allegations linking the defendant to overt acts alleged as part of the conspiracy of all the defendants. The assertion that he agreed to participate in those acts does not state a plausible claim.Finally, the circuit court held that the district court erred in denying the other defendants' motion to dismiss. The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine was not clearly established. View "Michael Faulk v. Gerald Leyshock" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was seriously injured when a pledge of the defendant fraternity snuck into her room and slit her throat after a night of drinking. The plaintiff filed tort claims against the fraternity and related parties (“the fraternity”). Plaintiff claimed primary and vicarious liability.Applying Nebraska law, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s primary liability claims, finding that the attack was not a foreseeable result of the fraternity’s forced hazing. The attacker’s criminal conduct was an intervening cause, severing the chain of causation. As to the plaintiff’s vicarious liability claims, the court held that the plaintiff failed to prove that any supposed agents of the fraternity were negligent under Nebraska law.The Eighth Circuit also held that social host liability does not apply. Nebraska’s Minor Alcoholic Liquor Liability Act provides a cause of action related to the “negligence of an intoxicated minor.” Here, the attacker was convicted of second-degree assault, which requires a finding that he acted knowingly or intentionally. This precludes a finding that the attacker acted negligently. View "Teresa Spagna v. Collin Gill" on Justia Law

In 2013, Vercellino was injured in an accident while riding on an ATV operated by his friend, Kenney. Both were minors. Vercellino was a covered dependent on his mother’s insurance plan. The plan is self-funded, so ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1001, preempted state law. The Insurer paid nearly $600,000 in medical expenses and did not exercise its right to seek recovery in subrogation from Kenney or Kenney’s parents during the applicable statutory period, nor did Vercellino’s mother ever file suit to recover medical expenses from the Kenneys. In 2019, Vercellino, then an adult, filed suit against the Kenneys seeking general damages and sought declaratory judgment that the Insurer would have no right of reimbursement from any proceeds recovered in that litigation. The Insurer counterclaimed, seeking declaratory judgment that it would be entitled to recover up to the full amount it paid for Vercellino’s medical expenses from any judgment or settlement Vercellino obtained.The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the Insurer. The plain language of the plan at issue here is unambiguous: the Insurer is entitled to seek reimbursement for medical expenses arising out of the ATV accident paid on Vercellino’s behalf from any judgment or settlement he receives in his litigation with Kenney. View "Vercellino v. Optum Insight, Inc." on Justia Law

After plaintiffs filed suit for various torts in Iowa state court against a radiologist at the Veterans Health Administration's Medical Center, the case was removed to federal court under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The district court substituted the United States as defendant and subsequently dismissed the case.The Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary and that defendant acted within the scope of his employment such that the government was properly substituted as the defendant in this case. Applying Iowa law, the court concluded that the radiologist's conduct was largely authorized by the VHA; responses from VHA management reinforce the normalcy of the radiologist's conduct; the VHA had strong reason to foresee conduct like the radiologist's; the time and place of his conduct also places it within the scope of his employment; and his purpose, without more, does not render his acts a substantial deviation from his scope of employment. View "Kearns v. United States" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from plaintiffs' action alleging that nuclear waste materials from various St. Louis sites leaked into Coldwater Creek and its 100-year floodplain in St. Louis County, damaging their health and property. Following Cotter's removal to federal court on the basis of the Price-Anderson Act (PAA), the district court concluded that the PAA did not apply and remanded to state court. After plaintiffs amended their complaint in state court, Cotter filed a third party action for contribution against seven defendants, including Mallinckrodt, which then removed the entire lawsuit under the PAA and other bases. The district court granted the motion and Cotter appealed.After determining that the court has jurisdiction over the appeal, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court abused its discretion by determining that the PAA does not apply to plaintiffs' claims against Cotter because Cotter lacked an applicable license or indemnity agreement. Contrary to the district court's ruling, the court concluded that the PAA provides federal question jurisdiction over all "nuclear incidents," regardless of whether the defendant had an applicable license or indemnity agreement. The court explained that the PAA's text and history support its conclusion. In this case, the PAA Act provides original federal question jurisdiction for all nuclear incidents regardless of whether the defendant had an applicable indemnity agreement. View "In Re: Cotter Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, relatives of individuals who worked at the Tyson Foods pork processing facility that contracted COVID-19 and later died, filed suit alleging claims for fraudulent misrepresentation and gross negligence. Plaintiffs contend that Tyson's actions in March and April of 2020 caused their relatives' deaths. Tyson removed the cases to federal court and then the district court remanded to state court.The Eighth Circuit affirmed and concluded that Tyson has failed to show that it was performing a basic governmental task or operating pursuant to a federal directive in March and April of 2020. Therefore, Tyson was not acting under a federal officer at the time that plaintiffs' relatives contracted COVID-19 and is not eligible for removal under the federal officer removal statute. The court also concluded that Tyson has abandoned the federal question argument concerning removal by failing to brief it, either in its initial brief or by supplemental brief, after the Supreme Court decided BP P.L.C. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 141 S.Ct. 1532 (2021), permitting alternative arguments against remand to be raised. View "Buljic v. Tyson Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

After Tyler S. Halsey suffered a heat stroke while working for Townsend Tree Service, his parents filed suit for wrongful death and negligence. The district court dismissed the claims against the supervisor with prejudice, dismissed the claims against Townsend Tree without prejudice, and granted summary judgment to the parent company, The Townsend Corporation of Indiana.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that plaintiffs failed to allege that the supervisor breached a duty separate and distinct from the nondelegable duties of Townsend Tree. In this case, plaintiffs stress two allegations: (1) that the supervisor directed Halsey to continue working despite indications of heat exhaustion, and (2) that the supervisor disabled the air conditioning in the work trucks so Halsey could not escape the heat. Under Missouri law, the court concluded that both plaintiffs' allegations are within Townsend Tree's nondelegable duties to provide a safe workplace and equipment. Because plaintiffs' claims against the supervisor have no reasonable basis in fact or law, the case was properly removed to federal court.The court further concluded that the district court properly dismissed Townsend Tree without prejudice and the district court did not err in applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine where the question of the cause of death was within the special competence of the Missouri Labor Industrial Relations Commission. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Townsend Corporation where it did not incur liability under either Restatement(Second) of Torts Sec. 324A(b) or 324A(c). View "Halsey v. The Townsend Corporation of Indiana" on Justia Law

The Estate of Willy Fritz filed suit against a police officer and the City of West Union, alleging a claim of recklessness, among other things, after the officer's police cruiser crashed into Fritz's truck which led to Fritz's death. The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the evidence does not establish recklessness under Iowa law where it failed to show that the officer had conscious knowledge of a dangerous situation as his police cruiser crossed a four-way intersection. In this case, the police cruiser approached the intersection, traffic had stopped, the road was straight, and the "lane ahead" was clear. Therefore, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment. View "Estate of Fritz v. Henningar" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, employees of civilian and military contractors who used Combat Arms Version 2 earplugs, filed separate suits against 3M in Minnesota state court, asserting failure-to-warn claims under state law. After removal to federal court, the district court granted plaintiffs' motions to remand the cases to state court for lack of federal jurisdiction, concluding that 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1) was not a basis for removal.Reviewing de novo, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the remand orders in the Graves and Hall actions, whose members acquired commercial earplugs. The court concluded that 3M failed to establish it was "acting under" a federal officer or agency in developing and disseminating warnings and instructions for its commercial earplugs. However, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the remand orders in the Copeland cases and remanded for further proceedings. The court concluded that 3M has a colorable federal contractor defense for claims made by Copeland plaintiffs who acquired earplugs through the military, and has satisfied the other elements required for section 1442(a)(1) removal as to these plaintiffs. Therefore, the district court's remand orders are reversed as to this group, whose members will need to be determined on remand. View "Graves v. 3M Company" on Justia Law