Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After plaintiff sustained injuries in an on-the-job accident, he filed suit against his former employer, Key Energy, and the company that manufactured the equipment that caused his injuries, Hydra-Walk, alleging products liability and negligence claims. Plaintiff suffered injuries when the Hydra-Walk system he was operating became unstable and overturned, crushing him.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants, concluding that Hydra-Walk is not a third-party tortfeasor for purposes of determining whether plaintiff may pursue a remedy. The court explained that plaintiff's arguments to the contrary ignored that a merger occurred between Key Energy and Hydra-Walk, with Key Energy emerging as the only surviving entity and Hydra-Walk, ceasing to exist. Furthermore, the North Dakota Supreme Court has never allowed an employee to successfully recover against an employer where the employee was injured by equipment manufactured by another company prior to the company's merger with the employer and the injury occurred post-merger. Without further indication that the North Dakota Supreme Court would be receptive to the application of the exception, the court was unwilling to apply it, for the first time, to plaintiff's claims. Finally, the court concluded that the North Dakota Supreme Court would not apply the dual capacity doctrine to the exclusive remedy rule to plaintiff's claims. View "Scott v. Key Energy Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff file a products liability action against Teva, the manufacturer of intrauterine devices, after she suffered complications from the implantation of an intrauterine device that broke and embedded inside her uterus.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the manufacturer, holding that all Teva was required to do under Nebraska law was warn medical professionals like plaintiff's physician about the device's potential risks. The court explained that the Nebraska Supreme Court has indicated that it would follow the "overwhelming majority rule" and join other states in rejecting the prescription-contraceptives exception to the learned-intermediary doctrine. View "Ideus v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's admission of evidence over plaintiffs' objection and denial of plaintiffs' motion for a new trial in a products liability action brought against Crown, a forklift manufacturer. The court applied Huff v. Heckendorn Manufacturing Co., 991 F.2d 464, 467 (8th Cir. 1993), and concluded that plaintiffs waived their challenge to the admission of the video simulations where they preemptively introduced the simulations into evidence. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion for a new trial. View "Reinard v. Crown Equipment Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his wife filed claims of negligence and failure to warn against Grainer, a distributor of industrial equipment, and its subsidiary, Dayton, after plaintiff was injured by a web sling at work. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding plaintiff's expert's opinion that the subject sling was a Grainger-distributed Juli sling. In this case, the district court concluded that the expert's report was inadmissible because his opinion that the subject sling was a Grainger-distributed Juli sling was based on insufficient facts. Without the expert's report, plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence that defendants supplied the sling to the employer in order to defeat summary judgment. View "Hirchak v. W.W. Grainger, Inc." on Justia Law

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) removed sovereign immunity from suits for “injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission” of a federal employee acting within the scope of his employment, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1)). The FTCA generally exempts intentional torts, which remain barred by sovereign immunity. The “law-enforcement proviso” allows plaintiffs to file claims arising “out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, [and] malicious prosecution” that are the result of “acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government” and defines investigative or law enforcement officer as “any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.”Iverson went through security at the Minneapolis-St. Paul airport, walking with the aid of crutches. Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) performed a pat-down search; Iverson was allowed to place his hands on his crutches but had to stand on his own power. Iverson alleges that a TSO pulled him forward and then abruptly let go, causing Iverson to fall and be injured. The TSA denied an administrative claim. Iverson sued, asserting battery and negligence. The Eighth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the case, finding that TSOs satisfy the FTCA’s definition of an investigative or law enforcement officer. View "Iverson v. United States" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was injured while serving as an engineer for UP when the train he was operating partially derailed because of a misaligned switch, he filed suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), alleging claims of FELA negligence per se and negligence.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and grant of UP's motion for summary judgment. In regard to plaintiff's negligence per se claim, the court held that plaintiff failed to present any evidence that would raise a genuine issue of material fact that UP "played any part, even the slightest" to cause the switch to be moved from its designated position. Rather, the evidence showed the switch was misaligned by a criminal act of a third party. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record that any act of a UP employee contributed to the misalignment. Therefore, UP committed no act violating the regulation requiring switches to be aligned per the railroad's written policy.In regard to the negligence claim, the court held that UP cannot be liable under a negligence theory for failing to properly align the switch unless it knew or had reason to know it was misaligned. In this case, there was no evidence that UP was aware the switch was not properly aligned. Likewise, plaintiff presented no evidence that UP failed to reasonably protect its keys or had reason to know that the security of its keys or locks were compromised; plaintiff proffered no evidence of an industry standard or other evidence that could lead a jury to find UP negligent for failing to remove the switch or track; and plaintiff failed to point to any evidence that would establish that UP was negligent if it failed to install additional or different devices to prevent someone from tampering with the switch. View "Miller v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, of plaintiff's suit against the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging that the VA provided negligent psychiatric care that resulted in her son's death. In this case, plaintiff concedes she was not the appointed trustee under Minnesota law and was only the next-of-kin at the time she filed a claim with the VA. Therefore, plaintiff failed to present the VA with her authority to act as the trustee as required by the FTCA. Because this was a jurisdictional requirement under the FTCA, the court held that the complaint was properly dismissed. View "Rollo-Carlson v. United States" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was injured after being thrown from his ATV when its right wheel came off, he filed suit against DTG, the manufacturer of the wheel, seeking redress for his injuries. The complaint alleged causes of action for product liability, negligence, breach of implied warranty, failure to warn, and post-sale failure to warn. The first three claims merge by operation of law under Minnesota's single product-liability theory. Plaintiff has abandoned his post-sale failure-to-warn claim by not including any argument on the issue in his brief.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of DTG on the product-liability claim where plaintiff's expert specifically disclaims an opinion as to whether the subject wheel had a design defect that made it unreasonably dangerous. The court also affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of DTG on the failure-to-warn claim where the summary judgment record is completely devoid of evidence that an inadequate warning caused plaintiff's injuries. View "Markel v. Douglas Technologies Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his wife filed suit against Assist American for defamation after the organization published a case study in a travel and insurance magazine concerning an injury plaintiff suffered. The district court granted Assist America's motion to dismiss the complaint, finding that the case study at issue did not refer to plaintiff and his wife either explicitly or by implication and thus defamation was improperly pled under Minnesota law.The Eighth Circuit reversed and held that there is a plausible inference, sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, that persons who read the case study about a middle-aged doctor from the Midwest who injured his leg while zip lining in Mexico resulting in amputation would understand the article to be referencing plaintiff. Because the description in the case study is so specific and unique that it could be viewed by a jury as fitting one individual, this was sufficient to satisfy the pleading requirements. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Tholen v. Assist America, Inc." on Justia Law

After a nitric acid manufacturing plant operated by Dyno emitted a cloud of nitric oxides engulfing workers, including plaintiff, plaintiff and his wife filed a negligence action against Dyno. The district court applied Missouri law and granted summary judgment to Dyno, concluding that Dyno did not owe plaintiff a legal duty of care because his injury was not foreseeable.The Eighth Circuit reversed and held that the record on summary judgment establishes that the question of foreseeability, as incorporated into the analysis of the legal duty of care under Missouri law, was not appropriate for summary judgment. Rather, the court held that the question of foreseeability is subject to varying inferences and is therefore an issue for a jury. In this case, although there was no evidence that emissions of NOx gas from the Dyno smokestack previously had caused injury to workers at the nearby Calumet site, a reasonable jury could find that the circumstances of the emissions in this case created some probability or likelihood of harm sufficiently serious that ordinary persons would take precautions to avoid it. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Scott v. Dyno Nobel, Inc." on Justia Law