Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff (and IVYR PLLC, doing business as Par Retina) sued Wolfe Clinic, P.C. (and three of its owner-physicians). Plaintiff alleged that the Clinic monopolized or attempted to monopolize the vitreoretinal care market. On the merits, the district court initially dismissed the monopolization, fraudulent inducement, and recission claims while remanding the remaining state law claims. In an amended judgment, the district court denied Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint and affirmed the dismissal of the monopolization claims, but declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, dismissing all state law claims.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint. The information in the amended complaint was previously available to Plaintiff and should have been pleaded before the judgment was entered. Plaintiff was on notice of the deficiencies in his complaint when the Clinic filed its motion to dismiss. Despite this, Plaintiff inexcusably delayed filing the Rule 59(e) motion—waiting over five months after the motion to dismiss was filed and almost a month after the district court dismissed the complaint. The court ultimately held that Plaintiff failed to plead a plausible claim for monopolization or attempted monopolization because he did not allege a relevant geographic market. View "George Par v. Wolfe Clinic, P.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff suffers from multiple sclerosis. Nearly four years after his diagnosis, he and his wife sued FAG Bearings, LLC, alleging the company caused his condition by improperly disposing of trichloroethylene at a facility near his childhood home in Missouri. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of FAG Bearings after concluding the suit originated in Texas under Missouri’s borrowing statute and was time-barred under Texas law.The Eight Circuit affirmed. The dispute centers on Missouri’s borrowing statute, which provides: “Whenever a cause of action has been fully barred by the laws of the state . . . in which it originated, said bar shall be a complete defense to any action thereon, brought in any of the courts of [Missouri].” Plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that his claim rose in Missouri. The court held that Plaintiff lived in Texas when he learned he may have a claim against the company. And, under Texas law, Plaintiff's claim was subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Thus, the district court did not error in finding Plaintiff's claim was time-barred. View "Spencer Knapp v. FAG Bearings, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff loaded purchases he made at a Home Depot store in Maplewood, Minnesota, on two flat carts. A Home Depot employee assisted Plaintiff by pushing one of the carts out of the store while Plaintiff followed, pushing the other. The exit doors automatically opened for the Home Depot employee and then closed while Plaintiff was exiting the store, tearing Plaintiff’s right rotator cuff and causing other injuries. Plaintiff alleged his injuries were caused by the door prematurely closing. The doors at issue were manufactured, installed, and serviced by Stanley. Plaintiff alleged a negligence claim against Home Depot and claims of strict product liability, negligence, and breach of express and implied warranties against Stanley. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all claims.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff offered no evidence that Home Depot caused the alleged dangerous condition or that it had actual knowledge of the existence of the alleged dangerous condition. Instead, he argued that Home Depot should have known of the existence of the problem with the automatic doors. But Plaintiff did not retain an expert, nor did he offer evidence demonstrating that Home Depot should have known the automatic doors might close while a customer was entering or exiting the store. The court wrote that because Plaintiff did not submit any evidence indicating the automatic sliding doors were unsafe or an inspection of the doors would have revealed the alleged dangerous condition, Home Depot is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s negligence claim. View "Michael Oien v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit against Walmart in the Circuit Court for St. Louis County, Missouri. Plaintiff alleged Walmart engaged in misleading and deceptive marketing practices by selling cough suppressants with dextromethorphan hydrobromide (“DXM”) and a “non-drowsy” label. Walmart removed the case to the Eastern District of Missouri, and Plaintiff moved to have the case remanded to state court. The district court remanded, finding Walmart had not met the Class Action Fairness Act’s jurisdictional requirement of showing the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.
The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that Walmart has shown the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.  The court concluded that Walmart’s declaration was sufficient to support a finding that sales exceeded $5 million. The total amount of sales can be a measure of the amount in controversy. The court explained that the declaration was sufficient, particularly when it is very plausible that a company the size of Walmart would have sold more than $5 million in cough suppressants in the state of Missouri over a period of five years. View "Nicholas Brunts v. Walmart, Inc." on Justia Law

Louis DeGidio, the father of Plaintiffs, began purchasing, distributing, and servicing Industrial Combustion, LLC’s (“IC”) burners for institutional boiler systems in a sales area including most of Minnesota. IC’s non-exclusive distributors are responsible for installing and servicing the IC burners they sell. In 1996, the family incorporated Louis DeGidio, Inc. (“LDI”) and Louis DeGidio Services, Inc. (“LDSI”). LDI continued purchasing burners from IC. LDSI installed and serviced the burners LDI sold, purchasing replacement parts from IC. The two corporations shared the same location, officers, and shareholders. Plaintiffs were joint 50% shareholders and key officers of both. Whatever written agreement was then in effect is not in the record, but it is undisputed that LDI was the distributor. At issue is whether a manufacturer collects an indirect “franchise fee” within the meaning of the Minnesota Franchise Act if it charges the distributor a price based on the retail price the manufacturer paid a third-party vendor for the parts.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed and agreed with the district court the answer is clearly no, and therefore, the distributorship agreement here at issue was not a franchise. The court further agreed that the manufacturer did not breach an oral implied-in-fact contract and was not barred by promissory estoppel when it terminated the DeGidio sales representative without cause. Applying Minnesota law and reviewing de novo, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of IC and its parent company, Cleaver-Brooks, Inc. View "Louis DeGidio, Inc. v. Industrial Combustion, LLC" on Justia Law

Zurich American Insurance Company (“Defendant”) insured St. Joe Minerals Corporation (“St. Joe”) and its sole shareholder Fluor Corporation (“Plaintiff”) from 1981 to 1985. St. Joe operated a lead smelting plant in Herculaneum, Missouri. Residents of the town sued Fluor and St. Joe in the early 2000s, claiming that they had been injured by the plant’s release of lead and other toxins.Defendant agreed to defend the companies and paid out $9.87 million. Defendant also contributed more than $25 million to a settlement between St. Joe and the remaining plaintiffs. Plaintiff went to trial, lost in a jury trial, and then settled the claims for $300 million.Defendant filed for declaratory judgment against Plaintiff, who filed a counterclaim alleging bad faith failure to settle. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendant, concluding that the policy limited Defendant’s liability on a per-occurrence basis and that the $3.5 million per-occurrence limit had been exhausted by Defendant’s initial payments. The court also concluded that Defendant did not act in bad faith when it elected not to settle the claims against Plaintiff.The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s policy-limits determination and remanded for further proceedings. The court found that an endorsement modified the limits of liability for comprehensive general liability, including bodily injury liability, to be on a per-claim basis. View "Fluor Corporation v. Zurich American Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, thousands of Peruvian citizens, alleged injury from Doe Run’s lead-mining and smelting complex in La Oroya, Peru. Doe Run, based in St. Louis, Missouri, has operated the complex since 1997. The Renco Group owns Doe Run. Plaintiffs sued in Missouri state court, and Defendants removed the case to the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. Defendants submitted a report to the district court about allegedly fraudulent conduct by two former “plaintiff recruiters” in Peru. Defendants sought certain discovery in this case. Plaintiffs opposed these efforts and filed for a protective order to bar the defendants from obtaining discovery from the non-trial-pool Plaintiff. Plaintiffs also filed an emergency motion for a protective order to prohibit Defendants’ Peruvian counsel from participating in witness interviews in the Peruvian criminal investigation, claiming that it would be impermissible ex parte communication. Defendants appealed the grant of Plaintiffs’ emergency motion for a protective order. Plaintiffs then filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. But they moved to withdraw their motion to dismiss.   The Eighth Circuit granted Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and denied Plaintiffs’ motion to withdraw their motion to dismiss as moot. The court reasoned that though the order is not appealable merely by virtue of its effect on a foreign criminal investigation, it may nevertheless be appealable if it has the practical effect of an injunction and has serious, irreparable consequences. The court concluded that the order does not have that effect. Moreover, Defendants have not demonstrated that it has serious, irreparable consequences. View "Chris Collins v. Doe Run Resources Corporation" on Justia Law

After (Decedent) died, two of his three adult children brought a pro se diversity action in the District of Minnesota against Defendant, Decedent’s second wife. They asserted multiple claims arising from Defendant’s alleged use of her power as Decedent’s attorney-in-fact to close two Certificates of Deposit and keep funds that Decedent intended would benefit his children. Defendant moved to dismiss, alleging lack of diversity jurisdiction because Decedent’s third child, like Defendant, is a resident of California and is an indispensable, non-diverse party. Defendant filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiffs’ incomplete assignment did not establish diversity jurisdiction. The district court determined it has diversity subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the FAC claims with prejudice because they fail to state a claim and Plaintiffs are not real parties in interest. Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s dismissal.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court found that the district court properly granted Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion because Plaintiffs’ FAC failed to state plausible claims of fraudulent misrepresentation and civil theft. Therefore, the court wrote it need not separately consider the district court’s alternative ruling that Plaintiffs are not “real parties in interest” under Rule 17(a). Further, the court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing with prejudice the claims asserted in the FAC. The court explained it does not agree that additional claims regarding Defendant’s use of the CD proceeds after she was done acting as Attorney-in-Fact would necessarily have been futile. But without a proposed amended complaint to consider, the district court did not abuse its discretion by assuming they would be. View "Eric Sorenson v. Joanne Sorenson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Advance Auto Parts, claiming unlawful discrimination under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted Advance Auto’s motion for summary judgment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that here, unlike Green v. Dillard’s Inc., there is no genuine dispute whether Advance Auto acted negligently or recklessly under Section 213. As for Section 213(a), Plaintiff does not allege that Advance Auto made improper orders or regulations. It had a written policy prohibiting discrimination based on any protected status; all employees had to read and familiarize themselves with this policy and complete annual training. The court further explained that Advance Auto is not liable under Section 1981 for discrimination based on its employee’s conduct. Plaintiff’s claims for assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress fail under respondeat superior and ratification. View "Nicolas Tashman v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Homolka, Homolka P.A., Watts Guerra, and Watts, alleging he is owed (1) $10,000 per month as leasing payments from October 2015, the first month he stopped receiving payments, until the September 2017 settlement; (2) a promised $50,000 truck reimbursement; and (3) a $3.4 million bonus. The jury returned a unanimous verdict for Plaintiff, finding that Homolka breached the oral contract, acting as an agent of Homolka P.A. and Watts Guerra. The jury awarded $175,000 in compensatory damages with no prejudgment interest. The district court denied Watts Guerra’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. Watts Guerra and Plaintiff cross-appealed these rulings.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that it agreed with the district court that the jury reasonably found Watts Guerra liable on an ostensible agency theory for Homolka’s breaches of the contract underlying the jury’s award of $175,000 in compensatory damages. The court reasoned that in considering these issues, “we start with the assumption jurors fulfilled their obligation to decide the case correctly,” and “we defer second to the trial court, which has a far better sense of what the jury likely was thinking and also whether there is any injustice in allowing the verdict to stand.” Applying these deferential standards, the court wrote that it has no difficulty concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. The jury verdict awarding $175,000 compensatory damages was neither inadequate nor the product of an inappropriate compromise. View "Lowell Lundstrom, Jr. v. Watts Guerra LLP" on Justia Law