Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Personal Injury
Core and Main, LP v. Ron McCabe
Core and Main LP (“C&M”) supplies water, wastewater, storm drainage, and fire protection products and services to commercial and governmental customers. C&M acquired the assets of Minnesota Pipe and Equipment Company (“MPE”), which supplied the same products and services in areas of Minnesota and South Dakota. Defendant, one of the shareholders, was part of MPE’s management team. Defendant started work at Dakota Supply Group, Inc. (“DSG”), a C&M competitor. C&M brought a diversity action against Defendant and DSG, asserting breach of the Employment Agreement’s noncompete and confidentiality covenants, tortious interference, and related claims. The district court granted Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The main issue on appeal is whether the court correctly concluded that the Noncompetition Agreement was a later agreement and, therefore, its Entire Agreement provision superseded the restrictive covenants.
The Eighth Circuit concluded that the breach of contract and tortious interference claims turn on fact-intensive issues that cannot be determined on the pleadings. Accordingly, the court reversed the dismissal of those claims and otherwise affirmed. The court explained that it agreed with C&M that it is at least plausible the two Agreements covered different subject matters, making Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal inappropriate. The Noncompetition Agreement restricting MPE shareholders from engaging or investing in a competing business was geographically broad, but its duration was precisely limited to a specific term for each restricted party. In addition, the court concluded that in the context of the multiple agreements that completed the Asset Purchase transaction, the term “prior or contemporaneous” in the Noncompetition Agreement’s Entire Agreement provision is ambiguous. View "Core and Main, LP v. Ron McCabe" on Justia Law
A.M.L. v. United States
A U.S. Postal Service (USPS) vehicle allegedly ran over A.M.L.’s foot on July 18, 2018. A.M.L.’s mother sent a Claim for Damage, Injury or Death (Standard Form 95) to USPS in August 2018. A year later, A.M.L.’s attorney sent a demand letter that set forth A.M.L.’s medical expenses. After USPS denied liability, A.M.L. (by and through her parent) filed suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The government moved to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that A.M.L. had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before bringing suit. The district court dismissed the suit, and A.M.L. appealed, arguing that her claims satisfied the FTCA’s presentment requirement.
The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that Sections 2672 and 2675(b) do not require that a claim set forth a single-dollar amount, but that it must express the maximum value of the asserted claim. Accordingly, the expression of a range complies with the statute’s requirements because it presents the maximum value of the claim. A.M.L.’s claim of “$250,000 to $275,000” thus presented a sum certain in compliance with the FTCA’s presentment requirement. View "A.M.L. v. United States" on Justia Law
C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. Traffic Tech, Inc.
Employees at C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. jumped ship to join Traffic Tech, Inc. C.H. Robinson then sued five of those former employees and Traffic Tech, raising various state-law claims, including tortious interference with a contractual relationship. After the case was removed to federal court, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the former employees and Traffic Tech. The district court also awarded attorney fees to the former employees and Traffic Tech
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, reversed the judgment in all other respects, and vacated the district court’s order awarding attorney fees and costs. The court held that Minnesota law applies to the interpretation and enforceability of Defendants’ employment contracts. The court remanded for the district court to consider whether C.H. Robinson’s claims or disputes against Peacock arose in California or elsewhere under Peacock’s employment contract. The court further remanded for the district court to substantively analyze whether all or part of the former employees’ contracts are unenforceable and, if not, whether the claims for breach of contract and tortious interference with a contractual relationship survive summary judgment. View "C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. Traffic Tech, Inc." on Justia Law
Edward Blackorby v. BNSF Railway Company
After Plaintiff prevailed at trial and was awarded $58,240 in damages, plus post-judgment interest, Plaintiff sought attorneys’ fees in the amount of $701,706, litigation costs in the amount of $43,089.48, and additional filing and transcript-preparation fees in the amount of $1,620.45. The district court ultimately awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of $570,771 and filing and transcript-preparation fees in the amount of $1,620.45 but denied the request for litigation costs. Defendant BNSF Railway Company (BNSF) appealed, asserting that the district court abused its discretion with respect to the award of attorneys’ fees.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and reduced the award of fees by $103,642.50. BNSF first argued that the award of fees is unreasonable because Plaintiff only achieved limited success. The court reasoned that Plaintiff undisputedly prevailed at trial on his FRSA claim. As this claim was at the heart of Plaintiff’s case, his degree of success is significant, regardless of the fate of his FELA claim or another theory of liability underlying his FRSA claim.
However, the court found that BNSF’s request for the reduction of fees related to the first trial, however, has merit. The court wrote that Plaintiff undisputedly offered the jury instruction that contained a legal error based on Eighth Circuit precedent, which required vacatur of the judgment. The court agreed with BNSF that Plaintiff is not entitled to fees that were unreasonably caused by his own legal error. View "Edward Blackorby v. BNSF Railway Company" on Justia Law
Ahern Rentals, Inc. v. EquipmentShare.com, Inc.
Ahern Rentals, Inc. (Ahern), alleges that two competitors— EquipmentShare.com, Inc. (EquipmentShare) and EZ Equipment Zone, LLC (EZ)— misappropriated its trade secrets to gain an unfair advantage in the construction equipment rental industry. The district court first dismissed EZ from the lawsuit, ruling that Ahern failed to state a plausible claim for relief against it. Later, the district court dismissed the case altogether, ruling that Ahern’s remaining claims against EquipmentShare were duplicative of claims against EquipmentShare in several other ongoing lawsuits brought by Ahern. Ahern appealed both rulings, arguing that the district court erred in dismissing its claims.
The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court reasoned that, according to Ahern, EquipmentShare developed programs by exploiting Ahern’s trade secrets. Ahern also alleged that the market information used by EZ to develop profitable utilization and rental rates is based on Ahern’s trade secrets illegally obtained by EquipmentShare. Taking all factual allegations as true, Ahern pled enough facts to make it entirely plausible that EZ is at least using systems developed by EquipmentShare through the exploitation of Ahern’s trade secrets. Further, the court found that Ahern has pled sufficient facts to state a claim against EZ for unjust enrichment. It is not disputed that Ahern’s trade secrets are a benefit with real economic value. And, as alleged in the complaint, EquipmentShare and EZ have used the benefit to their advantage. Finally, Ahern plausibly alleges malfeasance in the acquisition of these confidential trade secrets. Thus, the district court erred in dismissing Ahern’s claims against EZ for civil conspiracy and unjust enrichment. View "Ahern Rentals, Inc. v. EquipmentShare.com, Inc." on Justia Law
Teresa Thompson v. William Harrie
Plaintiff, individually and as special administrator of the Estate of her father (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), appealed following the district court’s dismissal of her claims for legal malpractice, fraud, and deceit against attorneys (collectively, “the law firm”).
The Eighth Circuit granted Plaintiff’s motion to supplement the record. However, the court affirmed, reasoning that the court predicts the South Dakota Supreme Court would prohibit the assignment of legal malpractice claims and the district court did not err in dismissing the remaining claims. The court explained that Plaintiff asserts the district court erred when it dismissed her fraud and deceit claims against the law firm. To the extent Plaintiff intended to state a claim for fraud or deceit claim, no such claim actually appears in the amended complaint— especially in light of South Dakota’s requirement that fraud and deceit be pled with particularity. While the original complaint contained an allegation of fraud and deceit, the failure to retain that allegation in the amended complaint is dispositive. The only remaining allegations pertain to punitive damages, but an assertion of punitive damages is not a free-standing cause of action under South Dakota law. View "Teresa Thompson v. William Harrie" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Legal Ethics, Personal Injury
Victor Maldonado v. City of Sibley
Plaintiff was electrocuted by a powerline owned and operated by the City of Sibley, Iowa. Plaintiff sued the City, in relevant part, for negligence and negligence per se. Plaintiff’s wife also brought a loss of consortium claim. The district court granted summary judgment.
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to negligence and affirmed as to negligence per se. The court reinstated the loss of consortium claim. Plaintiff alleged that the City violated the Iowa Administrative Code, specifically (1) its adopted NESC standards and (2) Iowa Administrative Code 199- 25.4(1). The City argued that the NESC, as adopted by Iowa regulations, establishes the standard of care. But it hasn’t pointed to any authority stating that compliance with Iowa regulations is conclusive of the standard of care in ordinary negligence actions. The court reasoned that compliance with Iowa regulations is not dispositive of the standard of care for negligence. Because a jury could find that the City breached its duty, Plaintiff’s negligence claim has genuine issues of fact for trial. Further, the court held that the public-duty doctrine does not bar Plaintiff’s negligence claim because it involves City misfeasance. View "Victor Maldonado v. City of Sibley" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury
Jane Doe v. United States
Plaintiff sued the government pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), asserting multiple negligent and intentional tort causes of action after being sexually assaulted by an employee of the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The government moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court granted the government’s motion. Plaintiff appealed the district court’s determination that the assault occurred outside the scope of the employee’s employment.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the FTCA makes clear that the scope-of-employment test is defined by state law, not the employer. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in concluding that the provider’s duties were restricted to providing battlefield acupuncture therapy (BFA). The court explained that initially, the provider denied sexually assaulting or massaging Plaintiff. He later admitted to the sexual assault and admitted that it was inappropriate for him to massage a patient. He also failed to document anything that occurred after the BFA therapy, including the massage. This is consistent with the finding that the massage and subsequent sexual assault exceeded the scope of his treatment authority. The court explained that in light of the pleadings and undisputed evidence, the district court did not err, determining that the provider acted outside the scope of his employment. View "Jane Doe v. United States" on Justia Law
Michael Tucker v. General Motors LLC
General Motors (“GM”) installed Generation IV 5.3 Liter V8 Vortec 5300 LC9 engines (“Gen IV engine”) in seven different GMC and Chevrolet trucks and SUVs in model years 2010 to 2014 (the “affected vehicles”). In 2016, representatives from various States filed a putative class action alleging that the affected vehicles contain a defect that causes excess oil consumption and other engine damage (the “oil consumption defect”). Plaintiffs appealed only the dismissal of their Missouri Merchandising Practice Act (MMPA) claim, stating that “the sole issue presented on appeal is whether the district court improperly applied the concept of puffery to their deceptive omissions claims under the MMPA.”
The Eighth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the MMPA claims. The court concluded that advertising “puffery” does not affect an MMPA claim based on omission of a material fact, at least in this case, and the court agreed that Plaintiffs’ Class Action Complaint alleges sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state an omissions claim to relief that is plausible on its face. View "Michael Tucker v. General Motors LLC" on Justia Law
Lonnie Two Eagle, Sr. v. United States
Plaintiff sued the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) after an employee of a hospital operated by the Indian Health Service (IHS) struck Plaintiff with his vehicle. Plaintiff claimed that the hospital employee was negligent by driving despite his prior seizures; and the employee’s supervisor was negligent for not preventing the employee from driving; and the employee’s doctor was negligent for releasing the employee to drive
The district court concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because United States’ sovereign immunity applied to Plaintiff’s claims. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that because it is Plaintiff’s burden to establish subject-matter jurisdiction, he must adduce evidence showing that Rosebud Health had sufficient control or supervision over the employee’s doctor’s work. He has not done so. Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this claim. View "Lonnie Two Eagle, Sr. v. United States" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Personal Injury