Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Daniel’la Deering, an in-house lawyer for Lockheed Martin, was terminated and subsequently sued the company for discrimination and retaliation. While her discrimination claim was dismissed at the summary judgment stage, her retaliation claim was set to go to trial. However, during the litigation, Deering misled Lockheed Martin and the district court about her employment status and income. She falsely claimed to be employed by nVent and did not disclose her higher-paying job elsewhere, even submitting false information in a deposition, declaration, and settlement letters.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, presided over by Judge David S. Doty, found that Deering’s actions constituted intentional, willful, and bad-faith misconduct. Lockheed Martin discovered the deception shortly before the trial, leading to an emergency motion for sanctions. The district court dismissed Deering’s case with prejudice and awarded Lockheed Martin $93,193 in attorney fees. Deering’s motions for a continuance and reconsideration were also denied by the district court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case due to Deering’s prolonged and intentional deception. The court emphasized that dismissal was appropriate given the severity and duration of the misconduct. Additionally, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Deering’s motions for a continuance and reconsideration. However, the appellate court dismissed Deering’s appeal regarding the attorney fee award due to a premature notice of appeal. View "Deering v. Lockheed Martin Corp." on Justia Law

The State of South Dakota charged Ronald Lee Neels with multiple sex-related offenses, including rape, sexual contact, and incest, for the sexual abuse of his adopted daughter over a 14-year period. During the trial, the prosecutor made an opening statement that asked the jury to imagine themselves in the victim's position, which is considered a "Golden Rule" argument and is generally condemned. Neels did not object to this statement at the time. Following his conviction, Neels filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting to the prosecutor's opening statement.The South Dakota Supreme Court summarily affirmed Neels's conviction on direct appeal, stating that the issues raised were without merit. Neels then filed a state habeas corpus petition, which was denied on the grounds of res judicata, as the court found that the issue of prejudice had already been decided on direct appeal. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed this decision, holding that the same standard of prejudice applied in both plain error review and ineffective assistance of counsel claims.Neels subsequently filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court granted the petition, concluding that Neels suffered prejudice from his attorneys' failure to object to the prosecutor's opening statement, despite acknowledging the overwhelming evidence of Neels's guilt. The court reasoned that the magnitude of the prosecutorial misconduct required vacating the conviction to ensure a fair trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Neels did not suffer Strickland prejudice from his counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's opening statement, given the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. The court emphasized that the jury instructions and the strength of the evidence against Neels mitigated any potential prejudice from the prosecutor's improper remarks. View "Neels v. Fluke" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Roads was convicted of transporting and accessing child pornography, and received a 324-month prison sentence. He appealed, alleging conflicts of interest among his defense counsel and the presiding judge. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit previously vacated Roads's sentence and ordered a lower court to determine whether a conflict of interest among Roads's defense counsel may have affected his substantial rights. After re-assignment of the case to a different judge and changes in counsel, Roads's motions for disclosure of information and recusal were denied. His motion to withdraw his guilty plea was also denied, and he was re-sentenced to the same term of imprisonment.On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, Roads argued that the district court erred in denying his motions and in applying a two-level obstruction enhancement during sentencing. He claimed that a reasonable person may question the impartiality of the court due to perceived personal relationships with federal officials or court employees who had been threatened by another individual, Justin Fletcher.However, the Appeals Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Roads's motions. It found that Roads had failed to provide any information suggesting the court could not be impartial. The court also found that Roads's reasons for recusal were based on inaccurate "facts" and mere speculation. The court denied Roads's motion to withdraw his guilty plea as he failed to show a fair and just reason for withdrawal. It concluded that the district court was correct in applying the obstruction enhancement, as Roads had attempted to destroy evidence. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding Roads's sentence. View "United States v. Roads" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed a district court's decision to impose sanctions on attorney Gregory Leyh and his law firm under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 55.03 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 for filing frivolous claims. The sanctions were requested by Martin Leigh, P.C., a party that Leyh had included in a series of lawsuits filed on behalf of Gwen Caranchini, who had defaulted on her home loan and was seeking to stop foreclosure proceedings.The district court had imposed sanctions after Leyh failed to respond to a warning letter and motion for sanctions served by Martin Leigh. On appeal, Leyh argued that the sanctions imposed were inappropriate because Martin Leigh had not complied with Rule 11(c)(2)'s safe harbor provision, which requires that a party be given an opportunity to withdraw or correct the offending document before a motion for sanctions is filed.The appellate court agreed with Leyh, finding that Martin Leigh had not adhered to the strict procedural requirements of Rule 11(c)(2). The court also noted that while Leyh's legal tactics were an abuse of the system, Martin Leigh had not pursued other possible avenues for sanctions, such as Rule 11(c)(3), 28 U.S.C. § 1927, or the court's inherent powers. The court thus reversed the sanctions and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to vacate the award. View "Martin Leigh PC v. Leyh" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld a conviction against Richard Lee David Brown for possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. Law enforcement found Brown in an apartment during the execution of a search warrant, along with drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a cell phone that Brown admitted was his. Brown appealed his conviction, alleging multiple pre-trial and trial-related errors. However, the court affirmed the conviction, rejecting Brown's claims that he was improperly denied a jury instruction regarding "mere presence," that the court erred in admitting evidence of his prior convictions, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, among other issues. The court held that the instructions given to the jury were adequate and that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. The court also found that Brown's claims of ineffective assistance were best left for a post-conviction relief proceeding, such as a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The court concluded that none of the alleged errors either individually or cumulatively warranted reversal of the conviction. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Tod T. Tumey and Tumey, LLP (collectively, “Tumey”) commenced this action in 2021, alleging that Mycroft AI, Inc., engaged in harassment of Tumey, including through “online hacking, phishing, identity theft, and other cyberattacks.” In May 2021, Tumey contacted an M.L. to inquire about employing him as an expert witness in the case. Tumey emailed M.L. a copy of their Complaint against Mycroft, after which Tumey’s counsel and M.L. had a forty-to-sixty-minute conference call to discuss the nature of the case and potential expert work involved. Tumey never executed the engagement letter and did not retain M.L. Mycroft designated M.L. as their expert witness, and Tumey moved to disqualify the expert on grounds of a conflict of interest. The district court denied Tumey’s motion to disqualify M.L. Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s denial of their motion.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that in denying Plaintiff’s motion to disqualify the expert, the district court held that the facts “do not favor a finding that a confidential relationship existed” between Plaintiffs and the expert witness that would give rise to a conflict of interest. The court explained that the district court found that Tumey’s lack of concrete examples failed to show they shared confidential information with M.L. Similarly, the court found that Plaintiffs have failed to show the court that the district court clearly erred in finding that no conflict of interest existed. View "Tumey, LLP v. Mycroft AI, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant Attorney Kezhaya represented The Satanic Temple, Inc., in its lawsuits against the City of Belle Plaine, Minnesota. The Temple sued the City, claiming that the City opened a limited public forum for a Christian monument, but closed the forum to exclude a Satanic monument. The City sought $33,886.80 in attorney’s fees incurred by responding to the complaint in the second lawsuit and preparing the motion for sanctions. The court determined that the rates charged by the City’s counsel were reasonable but observed that a portion of the work was duplicative of the first lawsuit and that the issues unique to the second lawsuit were not complex, novel, or difficult. The court thus reduced the requested amount by fifty percent and ordered the Temple’s counsel to pay the City $16,943.40 under Rule 11(c). Kezhaya appealed the sanctions order. He argues that the district court abused its discretion by (i) imposing sanctions, (ii) failing to consider non-monetary sanctions, and (iii) granting an arbitrary amount of sanctions.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that under the circumstances, it disagreed with Kezhaya’s contention about the righteousness of a second lawsuit. For the claims dismissed “without prejudice” in the first lawsuit, Kezhaya and the Temple made a strategic choice to seek leave to amend the complaint to correct the deficiencies identified in the dismissal order. Further, the court found that even if the City’s insurance carrier ultimately paid the fees, the fees were “incurred” for the motion and could be awarded under Rule 11(c)(2). View "Matthew Kezhaya v. City of Belle Plaine" on Justia Law

In this § 1983 lawsuit, Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief to stop ongoing physician disciplinary proceedings in which the Iowa Board of Medicine (“the Board”), represented by the Attorney General of Iowa, charges Wassef with violating Iowa law by inappropriately accessing patient records during his residency at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics (“UIHC”). The Board is responsible for regulating the practice of medicine in Iowa and is authorized to discipline doctors who do not meet minimum practice standards established by the Board and by the Iowa Legislature. Plaintiff alleged the ongoing proceedings violate federal law -- the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”). The district court dismissed the action, concluding that it must abstain pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The court also dismissed the due process claim because Plaintiff failed to exhaust state remedies and failed to plausibly allege a claim.   The Eighth Circuit modified the dismissal to be without prejudice, vacated the district court’s due process ruling, and granted Plaintiff’s unopposed Motion To Substitute Parties. The court concluded the district court properly abstained under Younger. However, as the state disciplinary proceedings are ongoing, the court should have declined to reach the merits of the due process claim, which Plaintiff can litigate in the state proceedings. Accordingly, the court modified the dismissal to be without prejudice, which is usually the proper disposition when a court abstains under Younger. View "Shafik Wassef v. Dennis Tibben" on Justia Law

In 2015, Elite sued Legacy for breach of contract. Attorney Bredahl received a $5,000 check from Legacy. On December 30, 2015, and February 26, 2016, he appeared on behalf of Legacy in the Elite suit. Bredahl did not respond to discovery, resulting in an order banning Legacy from putting on evidence at trial. Legacy later retained Hankey Law but neither Legacy nor any defense counsel attended the March 2017 trial. Elite won a $1 million judgment. Elite and Legacy settled the suit for $575,000 in 2018.In October 2017, ALPS issued an insurance policy to Bredahl with loss inclusion starting October 1, 2016. In January 2018, Legacy notified ALPS of a potential claim. Legacy sued Bredahl in April 2019. Bredahl notified ALPS, which indicated that it would defend that suit subject to a complete reservation of rights, then sought a declaratory judgment that the Policy did not apply to the Legacy suit.The district court held that ALPS had no duty to indemnify or defend Bredahl. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Policy does not apply to the Legacy suit if the “Insured” knew or reasonably should have known, as of the October 1, 2017 effective date, that his conduct during the Elite suit might be the basis for a “demand for money” against him. Before that date, Bredahl knew of acts or omissions in the Elite suit and reasonably should have known Legacy might bring a claim against him, View "ALPS Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Legacy Steel Building, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to HHW and DKH in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging professional malpractice and negligence. The court concluded that the district court did not err in ruling that the "Q" deduction did not apply to the estate return in January 2013, and DKH was not professionally negligent in failing to claim the deduction. Furthermore, the district court did not err in ruling that a certified public accountant was not negligent in failing to wait to file the return until the amendment was enacted.The court also concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's legal malpractice claim; the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to sua sponte extend discovery deadlines to allow plaintiff to submit another expert affidavit; and the district court properly granted summary judgment on the aiding and abetting claim, as well as the RICO claim. Finally, the district court did not err in ruling that questions -- regarding whether an individual, who was not a party in this case, breached a fiduciary duty and whether the district court should declare specific rental rates -- were not at issue and denying summary judgment. View "Schreier v. Drealan Kvilhaug Hoefker & Co." on Justia Law